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Introduction
Citizens’ protests appear often in the media. Citizens protest against unemployment, corruption 
and budget cuts. Only the slogan on a protestor’s T-shirt changes slightly. Interpretations of these 
protests vary. Some consider them episodic and innocuous in terms of real change. Others see them 
as seeds of citizen’s empowerment and signs of the need for profound social, economic and political 
change. In any case, citizens’ protests made me wonder to what extent our national, regional and 
global political and economic institutions are able to channel societal demands constructively. I 
wanted to understand how citizens taking action and organising across borders were contributing 
to shape and challenge decision-making processes. In other words, what are citizens doing to 
challenge decisions that are being made on their behalf but about which they seem to have no say? 
How do governments respond to citizens’ demands? How do contentious processes lead to political 
change? These questions had floated haphazardly in my mind for years and led me to start a PhD 
thesis in May 2007. 
Though it may seem unusual to start the introduction of a thesis with a note about my 
personal process, I wanted to acknowledge this personal original motivation. I also want to warn the 
reader that the ‘I’ form will appear in the chapters of this thesis when the methodological choices 
and research process are explained and when I do analysis of my field observations. I engaged in 
some activities and participated in meetings so I will make explicit my personal interpretations. In 
the following paragraphs I will introduce the topic of my thesis and the contents of this chapter. 
This thesis is about the power of organised citizens, activists, who coordinate joint actions 
across borders with the aim to affect political and economic decision-making processes. Activists 
challenge the accepted norms and the underlying ideas which frame decision-making. Thus, the 
content of their actions in terms of their messages is central as well as their discursive capacity, 
that is, their capacity to make their ideas known and accepted. Activists organise at different levels, 
locally, regionally and internationally. I use the term transnational activism to refer to these various 
forms and levels of cross-border collaboration which seek to realise political actions not only in 
national political arenas but also in regional and international ones. The focus is on transnational 
activism related to a particular type of decision-making process: international trade negotiations 
which in most cases lead to legally binding agreements. Basically, trade agreements are pacts 
among countries which establish, reduce or eliminate tariffs (a duty to be paid on imports or 
exports), quotas and other trade restrictions on goods and services traded among the signatories. 
Increasingly, trade agreements have become complex legal texts covering a wide range of issues 
(e.g. trade in services, public procurement and investment). Trade agreements, as part of market 
integration processes, have important implications for the economic structures of involved countries 
and the kind of economic relations and interdependence among them. Specifically, the implications 
of trade agreements between developed and developing countries have deserved special attention 
in the present multilateral trade system (World Trade Organisation, WTO) given the higher economic 
vulnerability of less developed countries. Though all trade agreements are guided by the principle 
of non-discrimination – countries should not discriminate among its trading partners – agreements 
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involving developing countries or among unequal partners take into account greater flexibility, 
special privileges and transitional periods to adjust to new market conditions. This thesis looks into 
the power of transnational activism concerned with the social and development implications of 
trade agreements among unequal partners in terms of their level of economic development. It 
examines transnational activism related to the negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAS) between the European Union (EU) and West Africa and the negotiations of an Association 
Agreement between the EU and Central America. 
This introductory chapter explains the rationale of this study in terms of its theoretical and 
social relevance, its aims, its guiding research questions and its theoretical and methodological 
approach. The chapter is structured as follows: the first section explains the rationale for studying 
transnational activism related to trade negotiations. It puts forward the reasons why qualitative 
differences can be expected between transnational activism in these special types of trade 
agreements and activism in other policy areas and trade agreements. A second section presents 
briefly what is known about transnational activism, and in particular, what we can conclude from 
existing literature about activism in relation to international economic policy-making in the field of 
International Relations and Political Science. A third section examines critically existing theoretical 
frameworks and their suitability to understand transnational activism related to trade agreements 
among unequal partners.  Identifying what is known, what remains unexplored and the (in) 
appropriateness of existing analytical tools helps to identify the theoretical, methodological and 
social relevance of the proposed study. The aims, research questions and approach adopted in this 
study are framed in order to help address the identified gaps and shortcomings. These aims and 
questions are presented and explained, followed by sections which detail the process of defining 
the research scope, building an analytical framework and choosing appropriate methodological 
tools. The chapter ends by describing the structure of the book.  
Transnational activism and free trade agreements
A large part of existing literature about transnational activism (e.g. Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, 
Ropp and Sikkink, 1999) highlights the importance of shared values and clear messages to guide 
actions when promoting human rights. In most countries, it is widely accepted that basic human 
liberties should be protected – at least on paper. Yet, studies remain scarce and inconclusive 
when the message used in actions and campaigns is ambiguous and there is no clear consensus 
about what or who is right and wrong. One noteworthy example is the on-going debate about 
what economic and social policies are the healthiest for social development and economic and 
environmental sustainability. There is a consensus about the need to secure civil and political rights 
and the legal means to protect them, however there is no such a consensus about how states should 
guarantee social, economic and cultural rights. 
This debate gains relevance in the face of the many challenges posed by processes of 
globalisation,  that is, increased flows of information, persons, goods and services with the 
accompanying markets integration and regionalisation processes. These processes have meant 
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economic growth and opportunities for some, yet, social exclusion and risks for others. Poverty and 
economic inequalities remain ever-present features of the world. This is a pressing area of concern 
for all countries: how to be inserted into the world economy, grasp some of the opportunities of 
globalisation while facing competition. The challenges of markets integration and competion are 
even greater for countries which are ill-equipped to sustain minimum political stability and meet 
their population’s survival needs. 
Free trade and markets integration have been promoted as a tool for development since 
the 1980s by the Washington Consensus. It has become a major development discourse: countries 
should trade their way out of poverty. In this context, aid agendas accommodated schemes to 
support and enhance trade (e.g. Aid for Trade, WTO 2010). Aid for trade was proposed as a tool to 
help countries help themselves, get integrated into the world economy and end their dependency. 
But it remains contentious how trade liberalisation contributes to sustainable development and the 
full realisation of rights. 
The social and economic implications of markets integration and liberalisation are manifold. 
They include both the increase of opportunities for some and their loss for others. For some economic 
sectors, a free trade agreement could mean access to new markets given necessary investments and 
conditions. An enlarged market could be an incentive for job creation and growth. At the same time, 
new conditions could create the displacement of less competitive sectors, with the consequent loss 
of jobs and traditional livelihoods. Market integration not only in the flow of goods but of services 
and other behind-the-border regulations (e.g. public procurement or intellectual property rights) 
could also have negative consequences and expected and unexpected adjustment costs. These 
possible negative implications could be more serious for weak economies which do not have the 
capacity to address such costs adequately. This is why van Reisen (1999) argues that trade is one 
of the most important policy areas for developing countries. Lives and rights are at stake; thus, it 
is no surprise citizens are concerned, decided to take action and have organised across borders to 
enquire about and challenge the negotiations of free trade agreements (FTAs). 
The most notorious examples of transnational activism have been around multilateral trade 
negotiations in the context of the WTO. Among these, the most remembered action was the one 
which blocked entrance to the conference’s venue in Seattle in 1999 and the popular protests 
against ALCA (Free Trade Agreement of the Americas). With the WTO Doha Development Round of 
negotiations stalled since 2001, there has been an increase in negotiations of bilateral FTAs, that is, 
agreements between two countries or two regions. Activists have followed these new developments 
and linked their resistance to neoliberal economic models to their resistance to FTAs. At the same 
time, the financial and related economic crisis which started in 2008 has stirred debates about 
the fitness of neoliberal policy prescriptions, including trade liberalisation and market integration 
efforts. Yet even more profoundly, the material ecological sustainability of current modes of 
production has been put into question in the context of the debates about climate change and 
growth strategies. These debates, however, seem not to have challenged the same foundations of a 
market-led growth-oriented economic paradigm. The search for profound alternatives seems to be 
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marginal as evidenced in global leaders’ discussions and resolutions such as those of the G20, the 
UN in the context of the Millennium Development Goals Campaign and the OECD, to name a few. 
In brief, a variety of individual citizens and organisations have expressed their unrest, anger or 
uneasiness towards these developments. They have notably organised actions across borders. Yet, 
their power remains largely unexplored and unexplained. 
Transnational activism and power in the field of International Relations
Transnational activism is often portrayed by mainstream media as episodic and spasmodic: a 
protest – often with a violent incident – at the doors of a high profile conference, a temporary 
outburst of anger with no realistic proposals. The media coverage of the recent (2011-present) 
Occupy movement is one example. On the contrary, academic literature in the field of International 
Relations (IR) in the late 1990s and 2000s has been quite hopeful and positive about the prospects 
of a strong global civil society (GCS) (e.g. Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor, 2001). A deeper look at the 
phenomenon of transnational activism takes us beyond popular understandings sensitive only to 
visible (often violent) outbursts and well-intentioned yet, naïve forecasts. 
IR literature indicates that transnational activism has a role in shaping the normative contents 
of global politics. Basically, activism contributes to determine what norms and rules are perceived 
as correct and proper by the international community.  ‘Transnational advocacy networks’ have 
been successful in advancing civil and political rights and contributing to waves of democratisation 
in the 1980s and 1990s (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999). Non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) have important non-material capabilities to shape values and norms of the 
international system (Holzscheiter, 2005). Several global campaigns have illustrated this. Campaigns 
about children and women’s rights, the need to eliminate landmines, the need to protect the 
environment and reduce external debt of poor countries to name a few (Edwards and Gaventa, 
2001; Kumar et al. 2009, Gaventa and Tandon, 2010; Moksnes and Melin, 2012). 
Yet, Nelson and Dorsey (2007) indicate that the capacity of citizens’ actions to shape normative 
contents in areas of economic policies is unclear. It remains limited to a few exceptions, such as the 
WTO 2003 decision on access to drugs, and literature on these exceptions is inconclusive (e.g. Gold 
and Morin, 2010; Thomas, 2002).  Civil and political rights require the state to guarantee freedoms 
legally, but economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR) require the state to take positive actions. This 
means, for example, managing material resources to secure health, education and housing rights. 
Nevertheless, there is no single ‘correct’ way to implement social and economic policies; there exists 
only policy trends that, in many countries, tend to be dominated by liberal economic paradigms, 
limiting the role of the state. Furthermore, states cannot be easily brought to international courts 
when they fail to secure ESCR. This is due to the principle of ‘progressive realisation’, that is, states 
can only commit to do as much as their possibilities allow them. However, it is difficult to determine 
whether a state could have been more efficient and effective in the management of its resources. 
In a context where ESC rights are being demanded by citizens, and state reluctance and inefficiency 
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to realise them persists, studies looking at the construction of the economic normative contents 
of globalisation are scarce. Exceptions are Epstein (2005), who looks at the role of discourse in 
environmental politics, and Trommer (2011) who explores framing strategies linking development 
and trade. 
A separate strand of literature on non-state´s actors influence within the pluralist-liberal 
framework focuses on interest groups (e.g. Milner, 2002; Halpin, 2005). Its limitation is that it narrows 
the motivation of groups to particular and defined interests. Thus, those groups that aim for value-
driven actions and without specific economic interests appear with limited influence (e.g. Dür and 
De Bièvre, 2007). This is why predominant pluralist-liberal accounts in IR are limited in explaining 
the power of transnational activism that attempt to shape the normative contents of economic 
global politics. There is not a one-way line of influence from interest-groups towards governments. 
It is the interactions among all involved – state and non-state actors - which influence perceptions 
and indirectly, behaviour.  Together, all actors contribute to sustain political and economic structures 
and rules, for example, the principles and rules of the multilateral trade system. The actions and 
legitimation strategies of all actors help sustain accepted norms and develop acceptance for new 
ones. 
An additional limitation in existing literature on transnational activism and non-state actors’ 
influence is the conceptualisation of transnational activists as engaged individuals (Della Porta and 
Tarrow, 2005) as the sum of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Trommer, 2011) and putting 
the focus only on the role of development NGOs (e.g. Rugendyke, 2007; Fowler, 2000). The way 
these organisations and their networks operate in coordination and the effects of the sum of their 
actions is not assessed. 
Existing studies do not look at the combined effects emerging from the dynamics of 
transnational activists, often working through coalitions formed by various actors dependent on 
their motivations and constituencies. More over, the different approaches to social change and 
activism are not accounted for. It is often assumed that activists choose either a dialogic or a 
contentious approach, but overlook that many often use both.  
Activists choose within a wide repertoire of action (Tarrow, 2005). They engage in dialogue 
with governments, wearing formal clothes – a suit, a tie1, a dress – and, in other moments, 
they organise rallies and street-protests with banners, coloured t-shirts and slogans, often with 
contradictory messages. Dress codes symbolise their efforts to make their ideas appear alternative 
and acceptable. It appears that transnational activism on economic policies is less compact and 
‘tidy’ than often assumed. There are organisations both wearing ties and t-shirts or coalitions in 
which members adopt widely different strategies. It is necessary then to look into the effects of the 
combination of ‘ties and t-shirts’ strategies.  
Studies that take into account the dynamics of coalitions and networks assume that these 
networks depart from a normative consensus and that their forms, constituencies and approaches 
1  I am aware that the title of this book is not gender sensitive. Yet, it reflects the reality I observed. 
Most of the interviewees were male and they were typically in positions of higher responsibility.
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to activism are similar. Activists find incentives to form transnational and diverse coalitions: access to 
information on policy process scattered in space (national, regional and global spaces), combination 
of sources of legitimacy (expertise, representativeness, values) and the pooling of scarce financial 
resources. However, memberts of these coalitions do not always share the same views. On the 
contrary, they are diverse in terms of their ideas and strategies for action. They depart from common 
concerns and face several challenges when trying to work together. 
Understanding the power of transnational activism with these characteristics poses challenges 
for analysis. It is unclear whose resources, strategies and actions lead to success. It is difficult to 
assess the effects of the combination of often contradictory and simultaneous actions. Analysing 
untidy activism is a challenge for researchers as well as for involved individuals and organisations 
which want to evaluate their own work in terms of effectiveness and their contribution to make 
citizens’ voices heard.  
Social relevance
This thesis addresses two related on-going debates among advocacy organisations, citizen’s 
associations and policy makers: 1) the legitimacy of civil society as the voice of citizens and its 
contribution to the democratisation of trade politics and 2) the effectiveness of advocacy 
interventions. 
The first debate is related to the normative democratic implications of civil society being 
perceived as or being de facto influential. It deals with the question of representation and of 
political systems being able to constructively channel societal demands, especially those that 
concern the excluded and neglected. This debate becomes decisive if we consider that trade policy 
has deep and serious implications for the livelihoods of most people in developing countries. Given 
the upswing in disenchantment with traditional party politics, new forms of citizen engagement 
are emerging. Citizens look for alternative ways to express their concerns and demands because 
they do not feel represented by elected officials. Although political parties may reflect political 
tendencies present in society, they do not present alternatives to predominant views on trade and 
development. If there are no alternatives, elections become less relevant for those who believe 
that more fundamental shifts in state policies are needed. The public discursive sphere in which 
different groups can participate becomes important, though not free of exclusionary barriers. Is this 
phenomenon positive for democracy and, if so, in what ways? 
The second long-lasting debate is related to the role of advocacy for sustainable development, 
especially when supported by public funds. (e.g. Edwards, et al. 1999; Coates and David, 2002). The 
added-value of advocacy as one of their development intervention strategies is put into question. 
It is difficult to assess highly contentious political activities in terms of ‘performance’ or ‘objective 
results’. This is of particular concern for those organisations commonly known as Northern 
Development NGOs or private aid agencies. These organisations support and join transnational 
coalitions and have to account for results to their back-donors which are governments, foundations 
or individual supporters. The tools for advocacy impact assessment are scarce and any impact 
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evaluation exercise appears as a costly endeavour, often not prioritised against the need for urgent 
actions.
This study may offer useful reflections for those involved in policy processes, either as part 
of governmental bodies or other involved actors who are concerned with effects and democratic 
implications of the involvement of a particular type of non-state actors. In light of my research 
findings, I offer reflections on these debates and their practical implications for organisational 
practice in Appendix 5. 
Aims and research questions
In the previous paragraphs, I have argued that there is a phenomenon of transnational activism 
around the negotiation of free trade agreements. Activists coordinate actions across borders 
without sharing a clear message or departing from a neat normative consensus. They are concerned 
about the social and development implications of free trade agreements but their proposals vary 
greatly in content. Yet, there seems to be a limited understanding of this phenomenon both in 
academic studies and among involved organisations. It remains unclear in which ways transnational 
activists are able to shape trade and development politics. 
This thesis examines the ways transnational activism has contributed towards shaping 
trade and development politics in the context of negotiations of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) in 
conditions of economic and political asymmetry among the negotiating parties. It is guided by the 
following main research questions: 
• How has transnational activism contributed to change the process and outcomes in the 
selected cases of free trade negotiations?
• What strategies were used by transnational activists in their attempt to affect negotiations?
• What explains the contributions of transnational activism to the process and outcome of 
the negotiations? 
These questions may appear vague and broad if the conceptualisations used in this thesis are not 
well-explained or understood. The first question contains the concept of transnational activism. This 
term is preferred over others commonly used such as campaign or NGOs because the phenomenon 
studied is composed of a set of related transnational actions undertaken in collaboration between 
different types of organisations. Rather than being a homogenous force or single-issue campaign, 
transnational activism provides the conceptual flexibility to encompass a set of related forces 
operating across borders. Traditional approaches attempted to assess the effects of a single 
type of organisation (e.g. interests groups) or of a campaign with defined goals and messages. 
Alternatively, this thesis analyses the combination of different strategies and actions undertaken by 
transnational activists organised through open networks and formalised coalitions. Had a traditional 
approach been adopted (either short-term influence of interest-groups on decisions or long-term 
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contributions of movements to changes of paradigms), only a part of the phenomena would have 
been captured, missing important explanatory force.  
Second, the first question speaks of contributions to the production of changes in the 
negotiations. Categorically attributing changes to transnational activism is not the main purpose 
of this thesis. Although links between transnational activism and its effects are assessed through 
the triangulation of opinions and methods, the emphasis is on analysing the combination of factors 
which contribute to certain decisions. 
Third, the first question aims to establish the kind of contributions to changes to the 
negotiations – changes in important decisions, in the ideas discussed and the ways of conducting 
negotiations as an established social practice. Decisions include those adopted by the negotiating 
parties or non-decisions which imply changes in the process of negotiations. Examination of the 
negotiations processes broadly is relevant given the context of long, highly technical and complex 
negotiations involving multiple actors and levels (national, regional and international). 
A nuance worth mentioning is that the question is phrased in the present perfect tense 
implying that the process is not yet over, and that there is a link between the past and the present. 
Despite the fact that, in one of the cases, an agreement has been signed, the link to the present 
infers that there may be effects on the identities and practices of the parties which may influence 
their decisions in other concurrent negotiations or those in the future.  
Rather than asking if transnational activism has contributed to changes, I preferred to use a 
‘how’ question and a second question about strategies used to guide a descriptive exploration into 
the forms of transnational activism and its role in the negotiations. These are central questions given 
the important explorative nature of this study. The second question aims to look into transnational 
activism attempts or efforts to affect negotiations, that is, their strategies, actions and messages. 
Although describing and analysing unexplored phenomena was necessary, this thesis also 
aims to explain why such contributions to changes were possible or, put differently, to state the 
combination of factors which led to some effects and not others. This is the purpose of the third 
question. 
Finally, the answers to these questions have important normative implications for democracy. 
Thus, a fourth question underlies this study: Taking into account the ways transnational activism 
affects negotiations, what are the implications for the democratisation of trade politics? This 
question will be analysed in the light of current theoretical debates about the democratisation of 
trade politics, especially from the angle of deliberative governance (Dryzek, 2010).  
Defining and choosing case studies
The scope and purpose of this study was defined after a series of explorative observations and 
interviews in 2008. Originally, my attention was on global coalitions following multilateral trade 
negotiations. But given that actions were organised in relation to the many negotiations taking 
place, I decided to attend a few key events in order to map and assess basic characteristics of recent 
and on-going activism. 
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In April 2008 I attended the XII United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) in Accra, Ghana, and activities of a week of actions on EU FTAs in Brussels, this latter 
organised jointly by virtually all groups working on trade and development issues. In June 2008, 
I attended the Civicus World Assembly in Glasgow, Scotland and I proposed a workshop on trade 
and development as a strategy to identify organisations and discuss preliminary ideas. These were 
valuable opportunities which offered me an overview of participating actors and helped to shape 
my research focus. In Accra, a Civil Society Forum was organised prior to the conference and an 
NGO Centre was set close to the conference venue where parallel sessions were held (17-25 April 
2008). I mapped organisations, conducted preliminary interviews and identified the main debates. 
I soon realised that many groups had shifted their attention to the EU FTAs given the European 
trade agenda which involves issues including investments and other ‘behind the border’ regulations 
(Young and Peterson, 2006) and the trend towards policy coherence in the EU (Hoebink, 2010) 
which calls for all external EU policies to be coherent with each other, e.g. trade and development 
cooperation. Moreover, there were concerns about the implications for developing countries. The 
negotiations of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) were on-going and many organisations 
were involved in them directly. These were ambitious negotiations in terms of the width of topics on 
the agenda and involved the EU and 75 African Caribbean and Pacific countries. 
The organiser of the UNCTAD Conference’s Civil Society Forum, Third World Network 
Africa and coordinator of the Africa Trade Network, was one of the organisation most involved in 
following the EPAs negotiations. It became evident that activism on these negotiations had been 
and still was a major effort in comparison to activism on other FTAs. One of the reasons why they 
have been so contentious is the high political aspirations the negotiations aroused. The previous 
agreement between the EU and ACP countries which set the frame of the negotiations, the Cotonou 
Agreement, made explicit that development goals should be central and at the same time that the 
new trade agreement between the EU and ACP countries had to be WTO-compatible (consistent 
with WTO existing rules which aim to remove barriers to trade respecting the principle of non-
discrimination). But there were different interpretations of what this meant. Several ACP countries 
and organisations assessed that for the EU what was being negotiated was a reciprocal FTA under 
one interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which 
governs regional trade agreements concluded by WTO members. Article XXIV stipulates that free 
trade areas must remove duties on ‘substantially all the trade’ within a ‘reasonable length of time’. 
These terms, however, remain loosely defined by the WTO, and ACP countries argued for a flexible 
interpretation to account for asymmetry of economic development and position in international 
trade. 
At the same time, a number of Association Agreements were being negotiated or planned 
with other regions. I decided then to focus on the negotiations of FTAs between the EU and Central 
America. My choice was due to the fact that power asymmetries would exist in both cases: the 
negotiations with West Africa and the negotiations with Central America. At the same time, in both 
cases there are important development cooperation relations between the EU and these regions 
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and countries. Thus, issues of good and proper state conduct linking trade and development 
could be observed. The content of a ‘development-friendly’ free trade agreement had to defined 
and negotiated. These were clear cases where no normative consensus existed neither among 
negotiators nor activists.  
Following the choice for campaigns and activities around EU FTAs, a series of initial 
observations were planned. One of my first observations was the week of activities in Brussels 
in which several networks from all regions involved in FTAs with Europe met (7-11 April 2008). 
Activities included internal meetings, a public hearing at the European Parliament and a street 
demonstration in front of the European Commission’s building. Through my observations it became 
clear that the commonly used distinction between ‘insider’ strategies– those that chose lobby and 
dialogue activities -  and ‘outsider’ strategies – those of a more contentious nature such as protests 
-  was blurred in practice. There seemed to be no incompatibility between the strategies that sought 
dialogue with those that appealed to media, including large numbers of people and banners in the 
streets. I realised that it would be theoretically interesting to explore the effects of this combination 
of strategies: a puzzle, however, not easy to solve. 
Building an analytical framework
I contrasted preliminary observations with existing analytical frameworks. Existing frameworks 
were based on assessing influence of interest-groups or NGOs (e.g. Dür and De Bièvre, 2007), and 
I observed a diverse organisational landscape, including small-scale farmers associations, trade 
unions, research NGOs and private aid agencies. Second, my observations in Accra and Brussels 
pointed to those coalitions that attempted to influence aspects of the negotiations in more or less 
coordinated ways, with a pseudo-internal ‘division of roles’. This had intended and unintended 
effects on the overall process which defied a linear-thinking approach and intervention-expected 
result. Existing frameworks studied international negotiations that had defined starting and end 
points (e.g. Betsill and Corell, 2001) or were equipped for national settings. Trade negotiations 
involved several states, regional and international organisations and took place in different locations 
and over long periods of time. In these frameworks, the problem of attribution was mitigated by a 
triangulation of perceptions. But in the case of negotiations of FTAs, defining a concrete set of actors 
and conducting the interviews proved to be a challenge given that the negotiators, policy makers 
and activists were scattered in time and space, and highly mobile due to the nature of their work. 
These limitations led me to build an analytical framework based on the idea that incremental 
changes in decisions (or non-decisions) take place in the context of longer-time discursive struggles 
over the framing of rules that enable or constrain those decisions (e.g. Doty, 1993 and 1997, 
Epstein, 2005 and 2006, Fierke and Wiener, 1999). Following Dryzek’s work on deliberative global 
politics (2006 and 2010), it seems necessary to explore the contending (economic) discourses and 
approaches that take place in the realm of global civil society where the normative contents of 
global politics are shaped. In examples given by Dryzek, transnational activism appears as a force 
operating in GCS. 
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GCS is not understood here as a single coherence force, but rather, a set of related forces 
engaging in the arenas and fora of GCS where power struggles take place (Del Felice, 2012a). 
Understanding GCS as both an arena and forum means that reasoning and dialogue are constrained by 
processes of exclusion and inclusion of certain groups and their perspectives. This conceptualisation 
of GCS is closely linked to thinking of power as a multi-layered concept in which material resources 
and interests cannot stand without discursive legitimation processes. 
To capture the various characteristics and strategies of activism, power was conceptualised as 
a multilayered concept, but mainly focusing on two dimensions: its material and discursive aspects. 
Interests and material resources do have a more direct and visible effect on decisions. At the same 
time, actors interests and decisions are continuously re-defined and shaped in discursive legitimation 
processes or in Doty´s words, in the ‘play of practice’ (1993).   In brief, power was observed in the 
interplay between decisional and discursive power. Networks of transnational activists are formed 
by both groups with material capabilities and defined economic interests who do have more visible 
influence on state decisions, and groups of non-material capabilities who influence the normative 
contents of debates and identities and ultimately, the context in which decisions are made. 
This conceptualisation of power helps to observe effects in outcomes (decisions) and processes 
(discursive practices as forms of communicating and making policy). 
The concept of power was operationalised with the help of the concepf of discursive practices 
(Fairclough, 2003 and 2009). Decisions, discourses and ways of communicating were observed in 
discursive practices. These are more or less stable social practices, that is, accepted forms of acting 
and speaking in a social situation, in which points of views are expressed through the use of different 
texts and oral formats, articulation of systems of ideas and styles. 
A social practice mediates between a rather regular and stable way of doing things, with the 
re-crafting of action by agents. In order to be able to assess changes in negotiations beyond influence 
in decisions, I decided to look at social practices with a strong emphasis on discourse, understood 
as language and texts in action and in context. Discourse is a socially constituted linguistic practice 
through which agents shape social practices, identities, spaces and structures (Milliken, 1999). As a 
linguistic practice, discourse considers that agents draw from abstract but socially shared systems 
of ideas, and craft and re-signify ideas according to their aims in specific socio-cultural-political 
contexts. Change occurs in this ‘play of practice’ where actions can thus reproduce or/and alter 
power relations (Doty, 1993). It is in these discursive struggles where identities, interests and norms 
are shaped, consequently setting the boundaries of possible actions. 
Important practices analysed were the civil society dialogues’ in which governmental 
representatives and activists interacted. It is in these stable interactions where the interplay 
between discursive and decisional aspects could be observed. In the discursive practices analysed 
both the material and non-material capabilities of activists could be traced: who was able to follow 
meetings and mobilise in time and scale and whose ideas were voiced and in which ways ideas were 
disseminated, encoded, accepted, rejected or perceived. Decisions were analysed in their discursive 
context. This meant understanding what were the boundaries and scope of options for decisions 
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created by the discursive environment. Analysing key events, meetings and public hearings as 
discursive practices allowed to analyse key decisions in a medium-term and historical perspective. 
Research design choices
Due to the nature of the phenomena I opted for a case-oriented and comparative research design. 
I chose to study activism around two sets of similar negotiations, and similar campaigns but with 
apparent different outcomes. I studied activism around the negotiation of Economic Partnership 
Agreements between the EU and West Africa (2002-2008) and the negotiations between the EU and 
Central America (2007-2010) reaching an Association Agreement, or ‘Acuerdo de Asociación’ (AA) in 
2010. Although the negotiations have different histories and drivers, they have commonalities which 
allow for a richer comparative analysis. Moreover, the perceptions among activists and negotiators 
were that the EPAs campaign had been quite influential, while those activities around the AA were 
not. Despite the facts that similar policies of liberalisation and trade openings have been advised 
for and implemented in Central America and West Africa, and that both regions are in construction 
and share tragic histories of civil wars, comparisons between these two regions are rare. My choice 
of case studies was confirmed by the fact that two key coalitions were open to collaborate with me 
and allowed me to access their files and participate in their meetings. 
Tools of analysis
Methods were drawn from case-oriented research in political science and discourse analysis and 
related practices to the flows of relations and spaces through which these practices are realised. 
The approach to focus on the relations between semiotic and other elements of social processes 
was adapted from Fairclough (2003; 2009). The case studies were analysed first separately using 
process tracing to make a simple story line of the negotiations. Secondly, discursive practices were 
identified and analysed.  
Data on these practices consists of selected texts (official documents, speeches, policy 
papers, campaign materials) and data on the political contexts of the negotiations. The context and 
meanings that agents give to their practices is studied on the basis of interviews and observations 
of key events and meetings. I also interacted with some organisations and attended their internal 
evaluation and planning meetings. For the case of Economic Partnership Agreements, I collaborated 
with an evaluation project of Oxfam International, managed by Oxfam Novib, mostly taking place 
during 2009. In the case of the Association Agreement with Central America, I collaborated with 
CIFCA (Copenhagen Initiative for Central America and Mexico), a network of European solidarity 
groups and private aid agencies based in Brussels. I followed some of their meetings and activities 
since the end of 2009, mostly in 2010 and until the beginning of 2011. Originally, my intention was 
to experiment with an action-research approach. Though several activities and analyses were done 
in collaboration, I did have limitations to join advocacy actions, especially those in which possible 
interviewees could confuse me as part of the organisation’s staff. With these limitations, in both 
cases, the collaboration proved fruitful thanks to the openness and flexibility of organisations. 
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It allowed me to observe interactions among different organisations and access organisational 
documentation that otherwise would have been difficult, if not impossible, to collect. Details on 
data collection appear in appendices 1 to 3. 
Structure of the book
The book is structured in five chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the implications of changes in the nature 
of power and global governance. In this context, the concepts of civil society and transnational 
activism are examined, as well as the contested concept of GCS, which is understood here as more 
than a sum of organisations and networks, but rather as an arena of struggles and, at the same 
time, a forum of deliberation where ideas are shaped. Chapter 2 explains my research design 
choices. It provides an operationalisation of the basic concepts used and the methods of analysis. 
Chapters 3 and 4 present the empirical materials of both case studies. They provide information on 
the context in which activists work: historical trade and cooperation relations among negotiating 
parties, general state identities and approaches to the negotiations, the issues at stake and the 
opportunities for participation of civil society. The chapters describe the main organisations involved 
and the combination of strategies, with emphasis on the use of official consultation spaces or, 
rather, the creation of new spaces and more contentious types of activism. The ideas and tensions 
within coalitions are examined. Chapters 3 and 4 also analyse the effects of activism on official 
discursive practices and decisions. Chapter 5 compares the two case studies and aims to explain the 
factors and conditions that enable or constrain the power of transnational activism. The conclusions 
presents key findings that respond to the research questions, explain the theoretical contributions 
of this thesis and offer ideas for future research. 
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Chapter 1
1.1 Introduction
This chapter examines and offers a discussion on the theoretical accounts of the roles and power 
of transnational activism in the context of contested forms of global governance and processes 
of globalisation. First, it considers the changing nature of power: how it is dispersed and remains 
elusive. Decisions are made in various political arenas by networks of actors who often escape 
public democratic scrutiny. Second, it explores the ways in which governments have attempted to 
address these legitimacy deficits. Third, I review the theories of civil society in relation to power in 
International Relations literature. Fourth, I link my understanding of civil society and power to the 
concept of global civil society as both an arena and a forum. Finally, I examine transnational activism 
through forms of coalitions and networks. They are the microcosms where the normative contents 
of politics are discussed and shaped. It is within these coalitions where small steps towards change 
happen and thus, where the contributions to possible change in politics at large can be traced. 
1.2 Global governance 
In the context of globalisation, new forms of organising political power have emerged. Processes 
of market integration and increased trans-border flows of information, technologies and peoples 
have affected the ways we discuss and decide. These new forms can be grouped together by the 
term ‘global governance’ and have become increasingly complex in an attempt to respond to 
the sustainability and coexistence challenges societies face. Some authors have tried to describe 
the complexity of current policy making as ‘multi-layered governance’ (Ilgen, 2003), ‘network 
governance’ (Jones et al., 1997) and ‘global governance’ (Finkelstein, 1995; O’Brien et al., 2000; 
Rosenau, 2006). One of the main trends resulting from processes of globalisation is that new and 
global problems cannot be properly addressed by isolated national entities. The work of Castells 
(2010) on the network society points out to the new ‘spaces of flows’. This concept defies analysis 
of actors and actions attached to one physical territory. Current governance arrangements have 
experienced an increased delegation of competences to supra-national regional bodies and the 
emergence of ‘transnational, polycentric networks of governance in which power is dispersed’ 
(Hajer, 2003: 175). Consequently, the resulting arrangements suffer from massive democratic 
flaws or ‘democratic deficits’ (Nanz and Steffek, 2004; Scholte, 2007). Citizens have less control on 
decisions that largely affect their lives within formal representative-delegative forms of democracy. 
This deficit is deepened by the growing discrepancy between established rules and practice given 
new actors, new configurations, needs and demands. How can we understand power when rules 
of the game seem to be rapidly changing and thus, escape our analysis? Hajer explains the need to 
focus attention on processes of deliberation, where actors shape new rules: 
Constitutional rules of the well-established classical-modernist polities do not tell us about the 
new rules of the game. In our world the polity has become discursive: it cannot be captured in the 
comfortable terms of generally accepted rules, but is created through deliberation. (…) As politics 
is conducted in an institutional void, both policy and polity are dependent on the outcome of 
discursive interactions. (2003: 176)
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Dryzek coincides with Hajer on the increasing relevance of discursive interactions to fill the void. 
Rules are constantly re-made and tensions and conflicts become more explicit. We live in a world 
in which certainties are increasingly contested: ‘[M]any if not most of the main axes of conflict in 
today’s world can be interpreted in terms of contending discourses’ (Dryzek, 2006, vi). 
Three sets of related phenomena characterise our present global governance. First, there 
is a dispersion of power in multiple layers going from the local level to the various supra-national 
ones. Second, networks of actors operate across levels and create and re-create rules often escaping 
and overlapping with representative actors, raising questions about democratic accountability. And 
third, there is an important discursive aspect in the capacity to create and sustain new rules and 
political projects. In this context, what is the role of the non-state actors? 
The institutional void and the limitations of representative democracy open opportunities 
for the engagement of non-state actors in global politics. Dryzek argues there are more possibilities 
for a greater variety of actors to participate in discursive struggles, among which civil society actors 
are not negligible. On the contrary, their contributions appear essential to shaping the contours of 
global governance in new directions. Civil society actors are considered among the less constrained 
and even best equipped to meaningfully engage in future-oriented problem-solving in the face of 
complex global challenges. This thinking falls within the deliberate approaches to enhancing the 
democratic legitimacy of global governance through improving the quality of deliberation and 
decision-making spaces. Some authors forward the idea that civil society actors can contribute 
to addressing these flaws. For example, Nanz and Steffek argue that organised civil society has a 
high potential to act as a ‘transmition belt’ between deliberative processes within international 
organisations and emerging transnational public spheres (2004: 323). Scholte argues that the 
potential of civil society to enhance the legitimacy of global governance has been partially realised: 
‘civil society activities concerning global regulation have so far made visible only a fraction of the 
total mass of possibilities’ (2007: 2). 
However, it remains to be defined what all these possibilities are. Critics of increased 
involvement of civil society actors say that they are neither representative nor accountable and 
that there is no democratic deficit as it is elected representatives who negotiate new regional and 
supra-national arrangements. But these critics fall in the trap of equating civil society actors with 
necessarily representative bodies such as parliaments or executive elected officials. Legitimacy is 
widely and confusingly equated with or solely possible if emerging from representation. Peruzzotti 
(2006:50) points out that ‘civil society is not a representative instance, but a constituent one. Being 
on the constituent side of the equation, civic actors cannot be subjected to the same yardstick 
employed to evaluate political parties or parliament’. Following this reasoning, groups do not need 
to be representative of a certain constituency to be legitimate as their bases of legitimacy can be 
different from membership numbers, such as performance and moral legitimacy (Brown, 2008). 
In conclusion, patchy and in-the-making global governance opens space for the involvement 
of civil society actors, as well as other often more powerful non-state actors such as multinational 
corporations. Their involvement in the public sphere can be meaningful in terms of participating 
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in discursive interactions and struggles. However, their involvement does not suffice to address 
legitimacy and accountability challenges (Steffek and Hahn, 2010). At the national level, representative 
democracy is limited to reflect all citizens’ concerns. At supra-national levels, the distance between 
citizens and decisions becomes even larger.  How do these general trends play out in trade politics? 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
1.3 Trade policy making and democratic challenges
In the past decade governments have responded to criticisms on the quality of democratic decision 
making with attempts to improve transparency and dialogue with (a broadly defined) civil society. In 
the area of trade, two examples are the WTO-organised public symposia since 2001 and an annual 
public forum since 2006. It is also noteworthy that the WTO website includes a section for NGOs 
which in its texts uses NGOs as a synonym of civil society, encompassing ‘representatives from 
environment, development, consumer, business, trade union and farmer interests’ (WTO, 2010). A 
third example is the establishment of a Civil Society Dialogue organised by the Directorate of Trade 
of the European Commission (European Commission website, 2012a), one of the first structured 
consultations of this type in the history of EU institutions. In this case, civil society is also broadly 
defined as non-governmental organisations working on topics as diverse as consumer protection, 
environmental protection, animal welfare, human rights and humanitarian aid, as well as organised 
labour and employers’ associations and the European Economic and Social Committee. 
The discourse of civil society – which will be further analysed in the following sections – had 
already entered mainstream policy-making circles. It was argued that more involvement of the 
public could have good prospects for enhancing the public image and credibility of the institutions. 
But there are opportunities and limitations of these ‘invited spaces’1 managed by goverments 
(Gaventa, 2006). 
A group of scholars (e.g. Scholte et al.. 1998; Esty, 2002; Steffek, 2003; Collingwood, 2006; 
Beyer, 2007) looked into the governance flaws and legitimacy needs of institutions and how involving 
civil society has been used as a way to address flaws and the opportunities and dangers that this 
institutional response implies. Cornelia Beyer (2007) proposes an explanation for the openness to 
non-governmental actors, especially after the ‘Battle of Seattle’ and protests which criticised the 
democratic deficit of institutions such as the WTO. She writes: “The intention in including NGOs in 
the work of international organisations is to make their political and practical potential available to 
increase the efficiency and the input-legitimacy of international organisations”. 
Governments and inter-governmental organisations believed non-governmental actors’ 
participation were needed to fill their own legitimacy gaps. But this internal need did not mean that 
governments perceived all non-governmental actors as legitimate, necessary or influential per se. 
Regardless of the reasons why invited spaces are created and sustained by governments, there is 
disagreement on to what extent they are meaningful and for whom. While some see opportunities 
(e.g. Jarman, 2008), others have criticised invited spaces for not being real spaces for dialogue (e.g. 
1 I use Gaventa’s distinction between closed, invited and created spaces (2006) as depicted in Figure  2 
2 Closed and invited spaces are controlled by state actors, while created spaces are organised by the 
initiative of non-state actors.
Assessing Power And TrAnsnATionAl AcTivism 
37
1
Action Aid, Solidar and Friends of the Earth Europe report by Bizarri and Iossa, 2007). What is then 
the role and power of civil society? If civil society actors are needed by governments to address their 
legitimacy deficits and have better access to policy-making processes, can we then assume they are 
powerful? The next sections discuss varying conceptualisations and accounts of civil society’s power 
in international politics.  
1.4 Civil society in International Relations theory
Despite International Relations (IR) scholars having largely focused on the behaviour of state actors in 
the realist and neo-realist traditions, non-state actors are not insignificant in IR and Political Science 
literature (Arts, Noortman and Reinalda, 2001). Studies have focused on various types of non-state 
actors and organisational forms, ranging from multinational corporations and their related think 
tanks, to Diaspora communities, interest groups, religious associations and transnational social 
movements. In relation to trade politics, studies focused mostly on the role of business associations 
and trade unions which formed interest groups organised at the national level and in international 
federations (e.g. van Schendelen, 2002). In some cases, these were referred to as ‘social partners’ 
and their relations with the state as ‘the iron triangle’ or the ‘closed policy community’ (Halpin, 
2005).  
A second strand in the literature concludes that the role of non-state actors has been to 
shape the normative contents of global politics. Authors refer mostly to associations of citizens, 
Human Rights NGOs and private aid agencies.  These organisations are seen as new comers in the 
area of trade politics although many have related their HR and development-oriented work to 
the effects of trade liberalisation since the 1980s. Keck and Sikkink’s work (1998) on transnational 
advocacy networks highlights the effects of value-driven activists in shaping HR standards especially 
in processes of democratisation, and not in relation to trade and development politics. In the same 
vein, Holzscheiter (2005) stresses the non-material but important capabilities of NGOs, again, 
in setting normative HR standards in international law.  Authors like Dryzek give these myriad of 
civil society actors a critical role in global politics. Dryzek forwards the idea that in global politics 
characterised by discourse contestation, civil society actors are less constrained to undertake diffuse 
reflexive action, the kind of action that allows qualitative social change. Although the actions of civil 
society actors may be less visible, the ‘cumulative weight of small interventions in the discursive 
field can be substantial’ (2006: 125). 
In the next section, I examine various accounts of civil society, a commonly known but 
also confusing term with various interpretations and uses. I consider the term in its relation to 
conceptualisations of power and thus also deal with the contested concept of global civil society, 
which is understood here as more than a sum of organisations and its networks but rather as an 
arena of struggles and a forum of deliberation. This conceptualisation of global civil society is closely 
linked to power as a multi-layered concept in which material resources and interests cannot stand 
without discursive legitimation processes (Arts and van Tatenhove, 2004; Barnett and Raymond, 
2005). 
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1.4.1 Accounts of civil society
There is seldom a meeting in policy making circles which lacks an appeal to civil society as the 
panacea to societal ills or a reference to an NGO on an article on development challenges. Civil 
society has become part of the development talk and there is now an established civil society 
discourse. However, civil society is an ill-analysed concept that carries diverse meanings depending 
on the user and the socio-historic context. The term has long been in the history of Western political 
thought. For Aristotle it was ‘the good society’. For Tocqueville the idea of civil society was inspired 
by his observations of those numerous voluntary associations which arose in the United States in 
the nineteenth century. These associations acted as ‘gene carriers of the good society’, where values 
like tolerance and cooperation and skills to live a democratic life were forged (Edwards, 2009). 
Scholars working with the concept of social capital (Putnam, 2002) also considered associational 
life inherently positive. Theories inspired by Tocqueville’s and Putnam’s work were used to derive 
policy recommendations: to promote voluntarism and associations. Their increasing number was 
interpreted as a sign of a healthy civil society. In the field of IR this understanding fitted well with 
liberal-pluralist perspectives which became mainstream thinking evidenced by many studies which 
were conducted on the role of interest-groups (e.g. Halpin, 2005). 
This conceptualisation of civil society, however, as the sum of associations and neatly legally 
and operationally separate from the state and the market, assumes that associationism is inherently 
good, highlighting in contrast, the limitations and flaws of the state and the market (Bebbington et 
al., 2008: 6). In this sense, this conceptualisation can be easily linked and matched to (neo)liberal 
economic theories which highlighted the need for freedom and removals of barriers to private 
initiative. 
This ideological atmosphere contributed to the emergence of a ‘civil society discourse’ 
(Howell and Pearce, 2001; Kaldor, 2003). The state was inefficient, expensive, bureaucratic, 
thus, individual entrepreneurship channelled through economic activities and through citizens 
associations understood as a ‘civil society sector’ were presented to be the key to social ills (Salomon, 
Sokoloski and List, 2003: 2). With the start of implementation of neoliberal policies in the late 1970s 
and 1980s in many countries, the state shrunk, accompanied by processes of privatisation and 
decentralisation. A variety of forms of associations and not-for-profit organisations both took up the 
initiative to fill in the gaps in the provision of social public services and responded to opportunities 
to obtain government contracts. Democratisation and economic liberalisation went hand in hand 
with the ‘civil society as the panacea discourse’ (Munck, 2002: 357).
Immersed in this atmosphere, the field of development cooperation and global politics 
witnessed what some scholars call the ‘NGO decade’ in the 1980s (Bratton, 1989). Under the label 
of NGO all kinds of organisations, were lionised and perceived by donors as better channels for 
development aid, by UN diplomats as the moral saviours of humankind, the voices of citizens, 
or representatives of ‘the people’. Some leaders praised the work of NGOs in statements. One 
of the sources of their legitimacy in the eyes of policy makers was their extensive experience in 
service delivery, humanitarian work or human rights advocacy (Edwards et al., 1999). They gained 
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recognition and slowly took part in consultation processes as recollected by Götz (2008). Other 
leaders and states remained more cautious and suspicious about this growing role of NGOs, alleging 
the unrepresentativeness of these organisations. 
The discourse of civil society also entered the field of trade politics as exemplified by the case 
of consultation spaces opened by the WTO and the EU. These spaces were introduced with the 
implicit hypothesis of the liberal-pluralist perspective: the more input and consultations, the better 
the policy.  This perspective influenced the creation of several consultation and dialogue spaces 
in recent decades, also as an attempt to address the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ of regional and 
global governance institutions. It is therefore necessary to examine the underlying assumptions 
of pluralist-liberal accounts in IR and spell out their strengths and limitations, followed by an 
examination of other accounts in IR in the sub-sequent sections. 
For practical purposes I have bundled IR accounts of civil society and power in roughly three 
groups: liberal-pluralist, critical and social constructivist. This is done with the acknowlegment that 
there is a certain simplification in this summary. Despite the risks of misrepresenting a diverse and 
dynamic field, the perspectives chosen appear as the most relevant and suitable to capture the 
main approaches to this topic. 
1.4.2 Liberal-pluralist accounts
Pluralist-liberal accounts share the basic assumption that it is healthy for a society to count a diversity 
of groups with different preferences which are expressed and discussed with policy makers. In the 
case of trade policies, most studies look at the preferences of domestic groups (either for protection 
or for trade liberalisation) as a factor in explaining trade policy decisions (e.g. Milner, 2002; Dür 
and De Briève, 2007; Beyers, 2004; Halpin, 2005). These scholars see trade policy as shaped by the 
preferences of the strongest groups in domestic politics. Power is related to the type of interests 
represented, the size of the constituency and the value of the information that these groups bring 
to a policy process in the eyes of policy makers. In general, most attention has been given to what 
are called traditional ‘social partners’ (Halpin, 2005), that is, business associations and trade unions. 
These two groups have clear positions and ‘concentrated interests’ and foresee that there are 
concrete benefits or threats at stake when deciding on a particular trade policy which will protect 
them to some extent or not. However, not all inputs are valued the same. Those of businesses 
and trade unions are highly valued by policy makers as they are the ones actually trading and 
producing the goods, who could be directly affected by new market conditions. They are followed 
by consumers, usually less well organised but also prominent. What happens with those groups that 
do not have these resources?
Those that do not have defined economic or sectoral interests are ‘diffuse interests’ groups 
(Beyers, 2004; Dür and De Briève, 2007) and encompass organisations such as human rights 
NGOs, humanitarian and private aid agencies and other forms of citizen organisations. Groups of 
concentrated interests are theoretically considered more influential as they have valuable resources 
to exchange with policy makers, such as information on market conditions. On the contrary, diffuse 
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interest groups have undefined constituencies and scarce resources, thus they face more difficulties 
getting organised. Knowledge becomes a resource that can be mobilised to influence public debates 
via the formation of epistemic communities: ‘...a network of professionals with recognised expertise 
and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge 
within that domain or issue-area’ (Haas, 1992, p. 3) or advocacy coalitions which mobilise technical 
knowledge within a certain policy sub-system or domain (Sabatier, 1998). However, the assumption 
is that ‘better’ knowledge (objective, rational, credible) will have greater influence (Gaventa and 
Cornwall, 2007:70). 
The liberal account offers a useful distinction on these different kinds of interests, rightly 
pointing out the challenges of collective action and incentives to mobilising resources. This 
framework is suitable for analysing influence in short and medium term policy processes that take 
place in democratic societies where civil and political rights are generally respected. However, it has 
four important limitations, particularly in explaining the role of ‘diffuse interest groups’. 
First, consideration of the level of diffuseness or concentration of these interests as 
determinant elements of policy influence neglects important factors such as (economic) constrains 
to participation and other less visible aspects of power. For example, there is great disparity in the 
availability of financial resources to undertake lobby activities in a sustained way. Concentrated and 
diffuse interests groups may be able to organise and mobilise individual members, but they may 
not be able to do so to the extent that resourceful groups often linked to wealth economic sectors 
can. Some groups are strong in terms of deployment of professional lobbies, organisation of costly 
events, and in some cases, they offer gifts or other illegal financial incentives (bribes). 
Second, there is a strong assumption that every group that wants to participate does so. 
Consequently, this assumption does not take into account the diversity of mobilisation approaches 
and the politics of non-engagement (Newell and Tussie, 2006) and the ability of some actors to keep 
issues out of the agenda (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). It also excludes from the analysis organisations 
which oppose trade liberalisation and chose not to participate or engage in dialogue at times, but 
whose actions may have an indirect influence on the process. 
Third, there is an overall reliance on human rationality in deliberation: better information and 
evidence leads to better decisions. Although this is in principle true, deeper power struggles can be 
overlooked if information is easily considered ‘neutral’ and ‘objectively more scientific’. Groups of 
concentrated interests but limited resources and ideologically far from official or dominant positions 
may find that their ability to influence is also limited. The links between information, knowledge, 
ideology and power deserve problematisation.  For example, the British Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI) work on policy influence highlights the quality of the evidence and of the policy 
making process in terms of consultation and participation of all stakeholders as central (e.g. Pollard 
and Court, 2005 and Court, Hovland and Young, 2005; Carden, 2009). Although it is recognised 
that knowledge has to be analysed in the context of power relations (Jones et al., 2009), their work 
is based on the premise that more evidence and increased involvement of relevant stakeholders 
leads to better policies. It is consensus-seeking and assumes that the conciliation of interests and 
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cooperative problem-solving is achievable. 
Fourth, liberal-pluralist accounts take each organisation’s position as unitary and do not see 
the role of networks and coalitions of groups formed by both concentrated and diffuse interests 
operating in multi-level governance arrangements. In the policy area of international trade, 
coalitions have to necessarily operate both in the North and in the South which has implications 
for the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements between asymmetric regions. Thus, observing 
individual organisations or sectors in terms of their preferences, often in domestic politics only, 
provides only a partial picture of more complex dynamics. The material and ideological dimensions 
of civil society thus remain elusive to the liberal-pluralist approach. 
1.4.3 Critical accounts
Critical IR accounts of civil society inspired by the writings of neo-Gramscians and post-structuralists 
(e.g. Cox, 1999) use the notion of civil society as a space of construction of hegemony, and thus, 
put material and ideological dimensions in a central place. Gramsci (1971) uses the concept of 
hegemony to explain how the capitalist state can rule not only by using force but because citizens 
consent to that rule. Hegemony encompasses those processes that, through ideology, discourse, 
beliefs and values, persuade subordinates to accept or consent to certain rules and systems. Power 
then is not only coercion, but domination by consent, and consent is achieved through ideology and 
discursive strategies (Cox, 1999: 5). 
The importance of the concept of civil society in neo-Gramscian traditions is that civil society 
is understood as a realm where consent is built, and where both the reproduction of hegemony and 
the construction of counter-hegemony could and should take place (Katz, 2006: 345; Munck, 2002: 
355). It is civil society which can contribute to naturalise or de-naturalise an unjust social system. In 
these processes Gramscian ‘organic intellectuals’ play an important role. Nowadays, we could think 
of organic intellectuals as those qualified individuals working in research institutes, foundations, 
think tanks, associations of trade lawyers, associations of traders and chambers of commerce. 
Although trade rules are agreed upon by – in most cases – representatives of democratically elected 
governments, they are first made known and legitimised through various social practices. These 
practices are, for example, the design of universities curricula and expert advice to traders and 
negotiators often given by think tanks consultants and experts. Critical IR scholars point out that 
trade liberalisation is part of the current hegemonic order. In most cases, institutions adopt an 
approach supportive of trade liberalisation. Inspired by the Chicago School of Economics, there is 
currently an agreement among economists that trade liberalisation has overall more benefits than 
negative effects for developing countries (e.g. Bernstein, 2008). There is, however, also evidence 
challenging mainstream views about trade liberalisation and poverty reduction (e.g. Wade, 2004 
and 2010). 
Most importantly, the trade system and its rules becomes part of a hegemonic order and it is 
sustained as such. Teivainen explains that the hegemonic order is sustained via active efforts in the 
‘politics of economism’ (Teivainen, 2002). He explains that ‘Apart from presenting the ‘economic’ 
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as its own sphere, removed from the reaches of democratic control, the politics of economism also 
tends to subordinate other social spheres to its normative supremacy’ (2). The politics of economism 
put certain ideas out of the discussion and exclude the possibility of questionning the status quo. 
It is important to be attentive to these power dynamics which help to sustain beliefs and systems. 
Through the politics of economism, trade and development politics get mutually locked in. They 
are both part of a dominant ‘sensible’ and ‘objective’ market-oriented, highly-technical economic 
approach. If these approaches are so unquestionably right, democratic scrutiny by those who 
cannot engage under the same normative and technical terms becomes difficult. The predominance 
of the ‘best’ approach to trade and development is also reinforced by the inexistence of alternative 
policy approaches, especially as attempts to challenge the liberal model of world market integration 
proved – for different reasons – unsuccessful in the 1960s through the 1980s and present attempts 
for alternative regionalisms are still open processes (e.g. Alianza Bolivariana para las Américas). 
Yet, the politics of economism have not managed to neutralise conflicts and criticism. 
Phenomena such as the emergence of the ‘global justice and solidarity movement’ (Waterman, 
2005) indicate that the patchy global governance system articulated by international economic 
institutions such as the WTO, the World Bank and the IMF, have to face challenges. These are 
challenges to both their democratic credentials and their performance in terms of bringing about 
prosperity for all, and not only for a few. In short, international economic institutions have to face 
challenges to their legitimacy. The Washington Consensus has been already largely contested, and 
thus, not a consensus any more as argued by Dryzek (2006) and Stiglitz (2006). At the same time, as 
emerging alternative visions of development have been marginalised as ‘non-scientific’ or ‘démodé’, 
they still offer hope for ‘cognitive justice’ (de Sousa Santos, 2003). 
Though neo-Gramscian and post-structuralist accounts of civil society pay attention to the 
interplay of material, political and ideological dimensions of civil society, they also face several 
limitations. These limitations are mainly in relation to the understandings of the interplay between 
structure and agency as discussed by Icaza (2004: 82). 
1.4.4 Social constructivist accounts
An important strand of literature refers to the role of non-state actors with no material capabilities, 
namely citizens’ associations and HR NGOs (e.g. Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Holzscheiter, 2005). It 
demonstrates their role as important in shaping the normative contents of global politics. Activists 
as ‘discourse entrepreneurs’ (Holzscheiter, 2005) promote the identity of states, for example as 
promoters of liberal values and democracy, reinforcing the constructivist point regarding the 
inseparability of identity and interests. Interests, instead of being given and stable, are constructed 
in historically specific circumstances and change depending on the context (Fierke and Wiener, 
1999). Rational state behaviour is not only influenced by material interests but is also constrained 
by value-based norms of legitimate statehood and proper conduct (Schimmelfenning, 2000), even 
in those realms where economic interests have a strong influence (Epstein, 2006). 
Risse’s three logics (2000) at play in international politics helps synthesise what is observed 
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simultaneously in trade politics: 1) the logic of consequentialism, in line with pluralist-rationalist 
accounts; 2) the logic of appropriateness, proper conduct being defined by principles of fair trade 
as those underlying WTO rulings and agreements; and 3) the logic of arguing, especially when the 
right thing to do in terms of policy is defied by the social impact concerns of trade liberalisation/
protectionism. Given that policy making and participation spaces are mostly regulated and 
dominated by powerful actors, it becomes more relevant to look into the quality of deliberation 
spaces. It is within a transnational public space where non-state actors can enter deliberation forums. 
Often, there are no conditions for deliberation and little dialogue and exchange of arguments takes 
place, becoming a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ (Weller, 2008). Interactions can be then best described as 
an arena of discursive struggles. Rather than a neat exchange of reasons, various groups advance 
their goals discursively in a ‘messier’ manner. Non-state actors engage in these discursive struggles, 
drawing from their resources (material and non-material ones, such as linkages to state and market 
actors, information and moral standing). 
Social constructivist accounts assume that the communication taking place in public space, 
in which all actors in principle can participate, influences decisions. In Dryzek´s work there is a 
distinction between public space and empowered space, that is, the space ‘home to deliberation 
among actors in institutions clearly producing collective decisions’. And there is a transmission 
instance, ‘some means through which deliberation in public space can influence that in empowered 
space’ (2010: 11). These means could include campaigns and activities of social movements which 
promote chances in ideas and attitudes. Dryzek (2006) sees non-state actors as less constrained 
to propose new ideas and actions. They propose new ideas, while state and market actors are 
constrained by the preferences of voters and market actors respectively. Dryzek proposes that 
action for qualitative change in a context of discourse contestation requires reflexive intelligence: 
Reflexivity requires sensitivity to the extent to which key entities and actors, their interests 
and goals, the shared norms that constrain them, are themselves continually constituted and 
reconstituted. (…) reflexivity never forgets that structures and discourses are constraining as well 
as enabling, and cannot be transcended. (85)
Intelligent reflexive action requires a developed awareness of the consequences of one’s actions. 
Based on Giddens (1986) and Beck et al. (1994), Dryzek distinguishes between reflexive and 
instrumental action. Reflexive action is constitutive action, while instrumental action applies means 
to immediate ends. While the first transcends and creates new situations, the latter tends to lead 
to short-term outcomes. He explains: ‘Seen through the prism of the capacity of civil society actors 
for constitutive reasoning and reflexive action, transnational resistance movements take on added 
significance’ (Dryzek, 2006: 124). He refers to the numerous actions questioning market liberalism 
and de-constructing the Washington Consensus as the ‘cumulative weight of small interventions in 
the discursive field’. 
An additional dimension to the conceptualisation of reflexive action could be added from 
conflict transformation literature. The proponents of the Transcend Method argue that dialogue 
should move actors beyond compromise agreements. For conflicts to be truly transformed, it is 
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necessary to find transcendent solutions through which a new situation is created which not only 
meet parties’ expectations, but also exceeds them. This is possible by ‘…eliciting from all parties 
joint creativity to find ways of transcending the incompatibilities’ (Galtung, 2000:4). In this sense, 
reflexive action is able to bridge distances between positions and be constituent of a new narrative 
and possibly, future reality. Even though Dryzek and Galtung provide empirical examples, these are 
exceptional cases. In the context of trade politics, to my knowledge, these frameworks of analysis 
and conflict transformation practice have not been applied. Consequently, the idea of reflexive 
action as a transcendent deliberative mode is a theoretical construct and an ideal form of dialogue 
and democratic decision-making. 
A discursive/dialogue approach also opens the door for analysis of trade negotiations in a 
‘transnational discursive democracy’ lens (Dryzek, 2006; Icaza, Newell and Saguier, 2008). Efforts 
towards democratisation have pointed out towards increasing representativeness of the groups 
involved, more citizens having access to formal consultations, a closer interaction between citizens 
and their elected representatives. But is it democratising if they all think alike? By analysing the 
scope of dialogicality in discursive practices, it is the diversity of discourses and interactions among 
them that become central and important for a healthy democracy. 
A discursive approach to democratisation efforts in trade politics emphasizes the qualitative 
differences among views, rather than only on the majority/minorities in numbers. In this sense, 
minorities of views become important. It is the quality of deliberation in terms of allowing all 
perspectives to be expressed and discussed. This is why it is useful to examine the idea of agency 
in terms of meaningful participation in discursive interactions in a transnational public sphere. It 
is in the quality of engagement in these discursive interactions where the power of civil society 
actors could be exerted.  In the following sections, I discuss how this happens by examining 
conceptualisations of global civil society and transnational activism. 
1.5 Global civil society through a discursive lens
Global civil society (GCS) has become a common and often overused term in contemporary global 
politics. In the past decade, its normative claims and analytical power has become an important 
subject of debate. As the term civil society became part of mainstream discourses, so too did ‘global 
civil society’, suffering from ‘concept inflation’ (Munck, 2006, Taylor, 2002). First descriptive attempts 
have equated it to the increase in numbers and types of organisations active transnationally, the 
‘global associational revolution’ (Salamon et al., 2003). It has also been understood as a ‘reality in 
the making’ (Anheier et al., 2001) and as ‘an ideal type’ (Keane, 2003). Liberal cosmopolitans and 
pluralists consider international civil society actors are value-driven, forward a human rights agenda 
and contribute to improving accountability in institutions of global governance (e.g. Kaldor, 2003; 
Florini, 2000; Scholte, 2005). 
Others argue that pluralists take for granted a shared normative agenda among activists when 
the reality is a euro-Northern centric and universalistic project which subsumes particularisms 
(Anderson and Rieff, 2004); GCS can also be a place of ‘incivility’ (Colas, 2004). Those who follow 
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the Gramscian idea of civil society as a space of struggle over hegemony propounded the idea of 
GCS as a means of building a ‘globalisation from below’ to counter the dominant ‘globalisation from 
above’ (Falk, 1999; Lipschutz, 1992). Those supposedly value-driven actors are in fact ‘implementers 
of a neoliberal agenda’, thus, of one certain interpretation of values.  GCS is then a space that has 
to be re-conquered for real alternatives to market-oriented development models (e.g. Waterman, 
2005) or ‘little D’ alternatives (Bebbington et al., 2008). Those perspectives that signify GCS either 
as promoting hegemony or forging resistance to it share a normative perspective: GCS is a space to 
build what is ‘good’ for our common future. 
Debates have limited the analysis of GCS in a dichotomous way (promoting change or not) and 
fail to grasp the more complex dynamics in the creation of a variety of alternatives.  Katz’s analysis 
of network infrastructures (2006) suggests that both Gramscian-inspired models (hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic) are possible. On the one hand, GCS is structured hierarchically and reinforces 
inequalities. On the other, there are an increasing number of subaltern group coalitions, dense and 
more egalitarian interactions, and inclusive structures. Katz advances that GCS is in a transitional 
phase in the search for more hopeful futures.  
What do these hopeful futures mean for the diversity of groups and their interests that 
compose this realm? Magis’ study (2010) explores how groups deal with diversity and propose the 
idea of ‘convergence’ which allows these groups to act collectively. Magis defines GCS as ‘an ideal 
type to describe and explain the endeavours of civil society groups collaborating internationally to 
promote the public good’ (Magis, 2010). However, this definition is problematic as it assumes that 
groups tend to collaborate more than conflict with each other. Second, it proposes that the ultimate 
purpose of GCS is to promote the public good; however, this public good is left undefined. On the 
contrary, Amoore and Langley (2004: 108) put more emphasis on the ‘contested nature of GCS as 
a platform for diverse political struggles’ and argue that ‘it is the perpetual struggle to define the 
terms of the movements that, in large part, constitutes the politics of GCS’.
GCS is understood here as a site where political discursive struggles take place, that is, 
struggles over meanings of what a ‘good’ global society should look like. If discursive contestation 
in international public spheres plays a central role, the importance of civil society should not be 
mainly related to the participation of organisations of this realm in formal decision-making. Rather, 
it should look at the contributions to deliberation and formulation of policy proposals made by 
various actors. 
In this sense GCS is a realm where deliberation takes place and various forces interact. These 
forces constitute and shape other discourses. It is often assumed that one discourse ‘wins’ over 
another, becoming predominant and pushing others to the margins. However, more intricate 
mechanisms are in play when actors texture and rearticulate ideas of different discourses into their 
own. Often, apparently non-compatible concepts are re-grouped or re-arranged in compromises 
under a new logic. 
In sum, I look at GCS as both an arena where actors struggle over meanings and resources and a 
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forum for deliberation. The word arena refers to a space for sports and competition, originated from 
Roman public spaces where gladiators and other spectacles were staged. Thus, the connotations to 
this word are of fighting and struggle. Force, skill and luck are at play. There are performers and a 
passionate crowd.  Today groups fight to advance their aims using all the resources at their disposal. 
The word forum refers also to a public space, but in Roman times it was used for business and 
discussions. The connotations of the word are related to exchange of arguments, and thus, a place 
for reasoning and ideas. 
Why is a concept of GCS needed in this dual sense? I argue that it is a helpful category – 
understood as above – as it helps to account for the actions and interactions undertaken to address 
the changing characteristics of governance in a globalised world. Citizens become more aware of 
their common and related problems and risks and of the interdependences that ignore borders 
(Biekart and Fowler, 2009). Thus, they see the need to advance their aims and act together to 
address their particular and also their common challenges. But how do they reason, deliberate and 
act together? Are humans equipped with ‘communicative competence’ to reach understanding in 
the line Habermas proposed (1984), or are they driven by their fears and interests? 
Citizens are, most likely, driven by both ideals and interests. This is why the public sphere cannot 
be understood either as a forum for deliberation where agents are detached from their material 
constrains, or as an arena deprived from any possibilities of joint collaborative understanding alone. 
An extra challenge is posed to agency and the capacity of citizens to understand, discuss and act 
together. Citizens and their representatives face complex problems and their understanding about 
these is limited. They are constrained by and need to deal with patchy, fragmented, and changing 
decision-making structures. The emergence and dynamics in the arena and forum of GCS are the 
other side of the changing nature of power and governance. These dynamics can be best observed 
in a micro-cosmos of GCS (Magis, 2010), that is, in the interactions within diverse activist coalitions 
and transnational networks. 
1.6 Transnational activism
I use the word activism to refer to all individuals and organisations that mobilise around an issue 
or a cause. In a broad sense, all active organisations undertake political activism, either to sustain 
and deepen some aspects of the status quo or to change it in more or less fundamental ways. The 
term activism, usually associated with more contentious forms of activism, is understood here in its 
broader sense, as political activity by those affected or concerned by an issue. Advocacy is a form 
of activism which implies engaging politically on behalf of others, though, it can be on behalf of a 
group of which the person is member.2 Organisations choose different ways to implement political 
activities. A distinction is commonly made between insiders as those who support and work within 
existing structures and rules and outsiders who contest them (Spalding, 2007). However, this 
distinction is defied by studies that show how organisations use a combination of strategies and 
2  The relations between NGOs and local groups and social movements, and the implications for 
accountability and advocacy have been examined, for example, by Jordan and Van Tuijl (2006) and Borras (2008). 
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approaches depending on the situation (Tarrow, 2005). Some organisations may choose to engage 
in policy debates invited by governments and, in other moments, decide to exclude themselves 
from some of these spaces in a deliberate attempt to de-legitimatise them and seek change in 
alternative manners. While some organisations are criticised by others for being too much of the 
reformers type, too accommodating and timid for demanding profound structural reforms; others, 
are criticised for being too radical and unrealistic in their proposals. 
Studies of transnational activism have been much influenced by social movement scholars. 
One of the most prominent strands of this literature has been established by Keck and Sikkink’s 
work on ‘transnational advocacy networks’. They define these networks as groups of organisations 
working internationally on an issue, bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and 
dense exchanges of information and services (1998). These networks ‘carry and re-frame ideas, 
insert them in policy debates, pressure for regime formation, and enforce existing international 
norms and rules; at the same time they try to influence particular domestic political issues’ (1998: 
199). In a similar vein, Cohen et al. (2001) speak of advocacy as consisting of organised efforts and 
actions based on the reality of ‘what is’ towards what reality ‘should be’. These organised actions 
seek to highlight critical issues that have been ignored and submerged, to influence public attitudes, 
and to enact and implement laws and public policies so that visions of ‘what should be’ in a ‘just, 
decent society’ become a reality: 
Advocacy has purposeful results: to enable social justice advocates to gain access and voice 
in the decision making of relevant institutions; to change the power relationships between 
these institutions and the people affected by their decisions, thereby changing the institutions 
themselves; and to result in a clear improvement in people’s lives. (2001:8)
The work of Keck and Sikkink has been mostly based on empirical evidence related to the 
advancement of civil and political rights and Cohen et al., refer to ‘social justice’ with an implicit 
rights-based approach without specifying what the reality should be as long as rights are guaranteed. 
Although the idea of contentious activism is implicit, it becomes more prominent in the work of 
other scholars like Tarrow (2005) and Della Porta et al. (2006) who define transnational activism 
or transnational collective action as ‘coordinated international campaigns on the part of networks 
of activists against international actors, other states, or international institutions’ (my emphasis, 
2005: 2-3). The term activism is then associated with more contentious types of actions, against 
institutions and unfair decision-making structures.  
Networks are referred to as ‘protest networks’ (e.g. Della Porta et al., 2006). They have 
increasingly organised transnational due to the changes in governance structures: growth of 
international and regional institutions. These institutions are perceived by activists as co-responsible 
for creating or perpetuating injustice, thus, they become the targets of mobilisation. But at the same 
time, this ‘complex internationalisation’ offers new opportunities for action, which these authors 
link to the concept of ‘multilevel opportunity structures’ (Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005:235).  
While Keck and Sikkink depart from the idea that networks share principles and discourses, 
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later work on transnational activism shows that there is much more diversity and conflict within 
networks. There is a coexistence of insider and outsider approaches. The first tend to favour 
working with formal institutions or governments, thus, making use of ‘invited spaces’ (Gaventa, 
2006) and favouring cooperation. The latter are often more critical and ‘either denied or choose 
not to make use of those institutionalised channels of engagement or invited spaces’ (Newell and 
Tussie, 2006: 12). For some these approaches cannot be mixed; for others, they are – although 
not free of contradictions – complementary. Della Porta and Tarrow observe a shift from the 
1990s to the 2000s when different forms of actions were seen as complementary (2005: 241). 
Activists show ‘multiple belongings’, are active in different organisations and networks, and have 
flexible identities that are not fixed to one shared value or idea. Rather, their ‘identities [are] 
characterised by inclusiveness and positive emphasis upon diversity and cross-fertilization, with 
limited identifications that develop especially around common campaigns on objects perceived as 
concrete and nurtured by search of dialogue’ (Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005: 237). This diversity has 
a number of implications. 
Although there is coordination, the repertoire of contention is wider and more hybrid, with 
bridges between traditionally perceived barriers. Proposing the concept of convergence, Magis 
goes a step further to argue that organisations find common ground to act collectively so as to effect 
change despite diversity; “The challenge, study participants stress, is not to resolve or homogenize 
diversity, but rather to conserve diversity and to discover convergence across the difference to 
enable effective voice” (Magis, 2010: 325).
Diversity is presented as a resource which can be harnessed for success. Magis’ emphasis on 
compromises and commonalities, however, overshadows the fact that coalitions manage conflicts 
and coexist with contradictions, rather than resolving them, which may hinder joint actions. 
1.7 Conclusions
This chapter reviewed theories of global governance in which discursive interactions appear to 
have a central place. Policy-making is increasingly shaped by discourse contestation in the public 
sphere, and less controlled by citizens due to the limitations of representative designs. There is 
democratic deficit in global governance which has been insufficiently and inadequately addressed 
by governments through their attempts to involve civil society. The civil society discourse – the 
belief in civil society as the panacea for all the ills of global governance – is ever present. In this 
context, the spaces created for civil society participation have offered opportunities for engagement 
for some. Spaces were opened and a new language of commitments became used. However, civil 
society is not a homogenous sector or force. Rather, it is a set of related and conflicting forces which 
do not always depart from shared values nor share the same approaches to action. Some groups 
purposely choose not to participate to deligitimate certain spaces. In consequence, the official 
spaces of dialogue with civil society become only part of the picture. 
This chapter attempted to address these challenges by defining the contours of a transnational 
activism beyond a set of individuals or organisations and beyond the dichotomy of insiders and 
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outsiders. From preliminary observations in this study, it became evident that shared values and 
principles could not be assumed when looking at activism on trade and development politics. 
Second, the level of coordination among activists became a challenge. Thus, at first sight, it seemed 
a mixture of coexistence, co-acknowledgement and collaboration. A tidy joint campaign can also not 
be assumed. Third, given the growing complementary among different types of actions, it would be 
more prudent to speak of repertoires of action rather than speaking of a repertoire of contention. 
Transnational activism is more fluid and more or less contentious according to the circumstances. 
Chapter 2 proposes an analytical framework to assess the power of transnational activism taking 
into consideration the described trends and changes in global governance.
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2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, policy-making was described as increasingly shaped by discourse 
contestation in the public sphere. In this context, transnational activism gains relevance given its 
role when engaging in debates. Activists aim to bring forward their ideas in the international arena. 
They collaborate across borders using a variety of strategies. Given the diversity in activist networks 
and coalitions, they work towards convergence in common messages to manage their differences 
and attempt to increase their influence. However, there is little research and analysis about how 
exactly this happens. How do different ideas and discourses coexist in one strategy? Is this the main 
feature of transnational activism in our empirical cases? And what are its effects on negotiation 
practices and decisions? Exploring these questions is key to answering our main how question of 
efforts and effects of transnational activism on negotiations. To answer them, this chapter spells out 
the analytical framework used in this study and provides details about the methodological choices 
made. 
The first three sections examine the concepts of power, discourse and discursive practices. 
This is followed by an explanation of the four main dimensions of discursive practices analysed: a) 
the context as the enabling and constraining rules and structures for transnational activism; b) the 
organisational forms designed by agents and the types of actions planned, especially seen from 
a discursive lens; c) the mobilisation capacity; and d) the ideational dimensions of transnational 
activism. A short review of existing economic policy paradigms relevant to understanding 
transnational activists’ ideas is provided. The last sections explain the analytical framework in detail 
and discuss how these factors help explain transnational activism power.  
2.2 Conceptualising power
In chapter 1 it was noted that diversity is one of the main features of  transnational activism (Della 
Porta and Tarrow). Activists have multiple belongings, ideals and use multiple strategies. Some prefer 
dialogue as the main tool of advocacy, some prefer contentious activism. Some seek fundamental 
changes while others aim for changes in decisions in the short-term. 
To capture the various characteristics and strategies of activism, power was conceptualised as 
a multilayered concept, but mainly focusing on two dimensions: its material and discursive aspects. 
Interests and material resources do have a more direct and visible effect on decisions. At the same 
time, actors interests and decisions are continously re-defined and shaped in discursive legitimation 
processes or in Doty´s words, in the ‘play of practice’ (1993). In brief, power dynamics can be observed 
in the interplay between decisional and discursive power. Networks of transnational activists are 
formed by both groups with material capabilities and defined economic interests who do have 
more visible influence on state decisions, and groups of non-material capabilities who influence 
the normative contents of debates and identities and ultimately, the context in which decisions 
are made.  This conceptualisation of power helps to observe effects in outcomes (decisions) and 
processes (discursive practices as forms of communicating and making policy). A more elaborated 
analysis of power operating trough discursive practices is presented in the following sections. 
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2.3 The power of discourse
The concept of discourse has been defined in multiple ways from different perspectives and social 
sciences traditions ranging from linguistics to sociology. Commonly, the word discourse is used to 
refer to sets of ideas that shape our views of the world and consequently, guide our actions. In IR 
literature, there has been an increased interest in the role of discourse, yet, there is no common 
understanding or approach (Milliken, 1999). Rather, there is a diversity of approaches applied to 
policy change (e.g. Hajer, 2003; Schmidt, 2008; Dryzek, 2006).  Dryzek offers a simple definition: 
‘Discourses are sets of concepts, categories, and ideas that provide ways to understand and act in 
the world’ (2006: vi). Importantly, he adds the idea that discourse is not only language, words and 
meanings, but actions and practices: discourses are a matter of practice as well as words, for actions 
in the social realm are always accompanied by language that establishes the meaning of action. So 
practices help constitute, reconstitute, and sometimes challenge discourses (Dryzek, 2006: 3). The 
examples provided are market liberalism, globalisation and sustainable development, to name a 
few. He does not explain however, how language shapes actions and how actions shape language. 
How discourses, as structures of signification, construct and produce social reality has been 
examined by IR scholars. Discourses are productive in various ways: 1) making intelligible ways of 
being and acting; 2) defining subjects authorised to speak and to act; 3) defining knowledgeable 
practices; 4) disciplining and controlling social spaces and 5) producing common sense (Milliken, 
1999:229). The more accepted and taken for granted these ‘stories’, the more powerful: 
When different discourses come into conflict and particular discourses are contested, what is 
centrally contested is the power of these preconstructed semantic systems to generate particular 
visions of the world which may have the performative power to sustain or remake the world in their 
image, so to speak. (Fairclough, 2003: 130)
Doty emphasises the linguistic construction of reality through her ‘discursive practices approach’. 
She argues that language has a force of its own and that power is inherent to those practices by 
which agents are constructed and become articulated within particular discourses (1993: 302). But 
she also allows room for the role of agency: 
What becomes sayable, doable, imaginable within a society results from a process of discursive 
repetition and dissemination. However, because discourses are inherently unstable, open and 
often contradictory, as are the subject-positions that are made available within them, there exists 
the possibility for variation in this process of repetition and dissemination. Herein lies the possibility 
for agency. (Doty, 1997: 385, my emphasis)
Discourse is then defined as socially constituted linguistic practice through which agents shape 
social practices, identities, spaces and structures and, indirectly, decisions. But how does this 
happen? How do ideas shape actions? It is necessary to unpack the various dimensions of discursive 
practices. 
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2.4 Discursive practices: bridging discourses and decisions
Discursive practices can be analysed through texts in action and in context by looking at the kinds 
of texts produced and used in a particular social and political contexts. Discursive practices are 
a sub-set of social practices in which voices or points of views are expressed through the use of 
different genres, articulation of discourses and styles. Genres are different formats of expression 
and communication, such as a newspaper article, a letter or a policy brief. These formats reflect the 
purpose of the text and the characteristics of the producer and user of the texts. These texts contain 
different discourses or systems of ideas. Agents draw from abstract but socially shared systems 
of ideas (ideologies), craft and re-signify ideas according to their aims in specific socio-cultural-
political contexts, and transmit them to others through written and oral language, or other visual 
symbols. In the process of text production, agents are constrained and enabled, in and by power 
relations. And thus, position themselves in reference to others and to existing rules, anticipating 
and assuming others’ frames of reference and their possible and allowed reactions. In this ‘play 
of practice’, actions can thus reproduce or/and change these power relations. It is in the dynamics 
of practice re-signification and reproduction that both stability and change can be observed. 
Discursive practices are rather stable social configurations in which agents, constrained by rules and 
structures, re-craft and articulate ideas in language to shape their actions. Decisional power and 
discursive power are two aspects of the same process. Decisional power appears more visible and 
linked to expression of interests whereas discursive power is subtler but more pervasive and, as in 
a constructivist perspective, shapes identities and interests; thus, affecting the frameworks within 
which decisions are taken.
 
2.4.1 Analysing discursive practices
Discursive practices can be analysed through four dimensions: 
a) Rules and structures. These refer to existing trade law, agreements and rules, and related aid, 
debt and financial regulations which constrain and enable actions; 
b) Agents. The emphasis in this study is on organisations in and active through transnational 
networks; 
c) Actions. Actions are observed in concrete events in specific points in time and place; 
d) Ideas. These refer to systems of ideas or ways of representing different aspects of reality. 
Based on this basic conceptualisation, Figure 1 depicts how these concepts are related. Agents 
are constrained by existing structures. They draw from existing ideas to craft new ideas and 
advance them through actions. These actions shape discursive practices. By shaping discursive 
practices, they can contribute to setting the boundaries for possible new decisions. Some 
clarifications are needed of these four dimensions. 
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2.4.2 Enabling and constraining structures
Structures refer to existing sets of trade law, agreements and rules which enable and constrain 
actions in international politics. These rules are contained in WTO and regional agreements and 
regional institutional processes such as ECOWAS and UEMOA, and SICA and SIECA for Central 
America. They are enabling as they provide opportunities for participation and set a framework 
for discussion. They are constraining as they limit the scope of topics that can be discussed, define 
who is able to participate and to what extent and set the timings and spaces of decision-making. 
Existing laws and agreements are the product of governmental decisions and (inter)governmental 
institutions are responsible for ensuring their applicability and implementation.
2.4.3 Agents and networks in transnational activism
What are the organisational forms through which agents shape discursive practices? In this section, 
I summarise basic characteristics of organisational forms to which I have been alerted by existing 
literature. This helps to apprehend agents in the elusive and often messy organisational landscape. 
A diversity of organisations engages in transnational activism on trade, defying stereotypes which 
range from representations of them as trouble-makers to lobbyists that compromise too much. 
They can be categorised according to: a) whether they are membership-based or not; b) the type 
of interests they represent, that is ‘concentrated’ or ‘diffuse’ depending on how well-delineated 
Decisions 
Transnational Activists 
• Mobilisation capacity 
• Network and coalition building 
capacity 
• Discursive capacity 
States 
• Positioning in international trade 
• Historic bilateral/bi-regional 
relations 
• Negotiations set-up 
• Policy paradigms 
• State-society relations 
• Spaces for citizens participation 
Discursive 
practices 
Agents 
Policy 
Paradigm 
Laws 
Structures 
Figure 1. Analytical framework
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their interests are in economic terms, like associations of producers in a specific sector, or on the 
contrary, if the organisation promotes general ‘diffuse’ public interests (Beyers, 2004); c) the type 
of activities in which they engage – service-delivery, research or advocacy; d) their approaches to 
social change and their relations to the state – collaborative, contentious, or even most commonly 
a mix of cooperation and conflict; and e) their location, based in so called developed (North) or 
developing countries (South). 
Confusingly, the term NGO is (too) often used to refer to all kinds of organisations. Götz’s 
(2008) genealogy of the term NGO, tracing it to the 1950s in the United Nations debates, elucidates 
the political nature of its birth and use in the following decades. The term has encompassed various 
types of organisations and often organisations defy efforts for tidy categorisations and are in reality 
hybrids. In this study, I have bundled organisations in five groups of organisations: 1) Associations 
of small and medium size producers and farmers;1 2) Associations of businesses and industries; 3) 
Trade unions; 4) Private Aid Agencies;2 5) Association of citizens (students, women, professionals)3; 
6) Research and advocacy NGOs/ Think-tanks.4 Therefore these terms are preferred over the 
general and ambiguous term of NGO. 
The nature of current governance arrangements has forced activists to undertake and 
experiment with various kinds of strategies and organisational forms. To do this with limited 
resources, they have developed what could be called ‘network infrastructures’. One striking feature 
1  Associations of producers, farmers, businesses and industries gather for-profit firms and cooperatives 
with the aim of defending their sectoral interests. They are understood as ‘concentrated interests-groups’
2  Private aid agencies, also commonly referred to as Development NGOs, are ‘non-profit organisations 
based in Northern countries purporting to relieve suffering and promote development in poor areas, especially 
in Southern countries’ Sogge et al (1998:3) and as used in Biekart (1999). This term is preferred because it 
refers to organisations that are part of the international aid system (Tvedt, 2002), thus based in one of the 24 
countries that are members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD)  and channelling funds of ODA. They are usually governed by a board and 
in some cases, have a loose constituency in the form of individual private donors. These organisations are also 
commonly known and referred to as ‘Development NGOs’ or ‘International Development NGOs’ (e.g. as used 
by Edwards, 2009; Tvedt, 2002; for an in-depth examination of the conceptual confusion related to the concept 
of ‘Development NGOs’, see Tvedt, 1998). 
3  I refer to associations of citizens as organisations which convoke individuals upon a specific aim, 
which is not mainly economic, as those of employers, producers or workers. Their activities can be of a social, 
educational and political nature. They unite people with a common concern, characteristic or profession, such 
as women’s associations, or associations of environmentalists. 
4  I have grouped together research and advocacy NGOs and think tanks though these two names may 
be used and preferred differently for their connotations. While the first are associated to HR organisations, the 
second are associated to foundations that provide services to governments and corporations. Though the latter 
are not perceived as engaging in ‘advocacy’, specially, not contentious types of activism, both are non-profit, 
non-state organisations that conduct research and use knowledge to advance social and political aims. Their 
main source of legitimacy is expertise and their credibility as independent providers of ‘evidence’. They may 
allege being detached from sector or particular interests, yet, they vary in terms of the levels of independence 
from other organisations such as political parties and business federations. While some are created and funded 
by groups of individuals, some may be closer or further from governments, businesses and other organisations 
in terms of their funding and ideological linkages. Though they are perceived as detached, neutral and rational 
and make deliberate efforts to be perceived that way. They have been promoted their ideas actively through 
lobby work, holding press conferences and writing policy briefs. Rich states ‘Many experts now behave like 
advocates. They are not just visible but highly contentious as well’ (2004:4) 
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of the organisational landscape is the number and density of networks, often overlapping, which 
transcend national boundaries. They are rather decentralised sets of organisations which are linked 
aided by new information technologies (Anheier and Themudo, 2002). Organisations do bundle in 
federations but, at the same time, they communicate, coordinate, and exchange valuable resources 
(information) and work in various forms of informal networks and coalitions. In this study, networks 
are understood as more or less stable connections among organisations, often very loose, which 
have facilitating functions in organisational strategies. Networks of organisations are characterised 
by fluid and open relations among actors and tend to be a more decentralised and a less hierarchical 
organisational form.
I propose three types of networks reflecting the level of strength of the relationship: a) open 
network: the only link is mutual perception of importance/irrelevance, acknowledgement, contact 
and communication; b) functional network: open coalition, eventual coordinated actions and 
collaboration; c) coalition: formalised coalition and jointly planned implementation of actions, in 
some cases, a joint campaign under one single message.
 
2.4.4 Actions, spaces and genres
Decisions and actions are observed in events which occur in specific places and points in time. In 
these events we can observe ‘plays of practice’ (Milliken, 1999) and the disciplining, privileging 
including and excluding of some actors and actions over others. What kinds of actions are 
undertaken? Who designs, implements, participates, funds and evaluates these actions? Where do 
they happen and how? 
The type of chosen actions express the underlying ‘theories of change’ in relation to power 
and effecting change as well as the type of resources available to activists. Usually organisations 
combine different types of actions, from public and mass mobilisation to direct meetings with 
policy makers. The implemented actions help access, shape and create social spaces. This is why it 
is important to pay attention to the spaces of action: capital cities or remote areas, North or South, 
face-to-face and on-line spaces: where and when does action happen? How are the ‘spaces of flows’ 
used? Who participates and who is excluded? I use Gaventa’s distinction between closed, invited 
and created spaces (2006) as depicted in Figure 2. Closed and invited spaces are controlled by state 
actors, while created spaces are organised by the initiative of non-state actors.  Closed spaces are 
linked here to the concept of empowered space as those spaces in which collective decisions are 
made (Dryzek, 2010: 11). 
The assumption is that there is a transmission belt between what happens in invited and 
created spaces and what happens in closed or empowered spaces. Though states shape their 
positions and negotiate in closed spaces, they do not do so in complete isolation. I attempt to 
analyse this transmission belt – the links between closed, invited and created spaces.5 Figure 2 aims 
5  On a methodological note: given that closed spaces are difficult to access and observe, analysis of 
this is limited to the perceptions and recounts of policy makers through interviews and their written and oral 
statements about the negotiations. On the contrary, interactions in invited and created spaces are observed. 
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to help trace these links. Actions by different organisations are analysed in relation to the kind of use 
and involvement in these spaces. Their approach to activism, or way of acting, is described through 
their use of invited and created spaces. This conceptualisation aims to overcome the rigidity of 
commonly used term of insiders and outsiders. Rather than either/or approaches to activism, it is 
more important to analyse the changes in ways of acting and the changes in social practices.
Actions are often accompanied and supported by written texts and oral utterances (e.g. policy 
briefs, power point presentations, press releases, speeches). This is related to what Fairclough calls 
‘ways of acting’ or ‘genres’, which is analysed using genre analysis in combination with analysis 
of the producers and recipients of the texts as well as the places in which they are produced and 
circulated. A variety of genres and chains of genres are used in social practices and can appear in 
particular events as mixed genres. Given the type of structures, practices and events related to 
trade negotiations, I have made a distinction of genres that are commonly used within closed and 
invited spaces and those that are used outside of them.6 These genres are mainly international 
agreements, negotiation mandates, policy papers, official guidelines and Terms of Reference for 
Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIA), transcribed public official speeches and transcriptions of 
official meetings. Those genres that are produced, used by non-governmental agents and beyond 
their control are mainly news articles, briefing papers and campaign materials, activities reports and 
press releases produced by different organisations or coalitions. 
The importance of analysing spaces is that they are the sites of discursive social practices. 
Once these spaces exist, they allow, facilitate or constrain the rhetoric encounters. Factors such as 
the physical venue (e.g. hotel, street, intergovernmental building), the geographical location (capital/
periphery), those who were able to participate (financially and through invitation) and those who 
chose not to participate, all carry symbolic weight to constitute what may be perceived as proper 
and legitimate actors and ideas. It is the kind of space which will also shape the interactions, either 
as an arena or as a forum. This is why Figure 2 relates the kind of actions and spaces to the various 
ideas and ways of representing economic reality. 
2.4.5 Ideas, signifying discursive practices
The power of ideas lies in the way they can be used and re-shaped by agents in political action. To 
understand the way transnational activists have engaged with ideas, it is necessary to distinguish 
them as they appear at different levels of abstraction. It is also necessary to provide a short 
historical background and summary of the main ideas discussed in international trade debates. 
Policy paradigms provide the basis for the elaboration of stories, messages and positions in specific 
texts and events. This may seem unnecessary for acquainted readers. I have decided to clarify how 
ideas take different forms and the basic significations of theories, policies and messages in this field. 
Ideas can be grouped in more or less sophisticated systems of ideas in order to represent 
views of the world or aspects of it. In this study, I refer to different systems of ideas according to 
6  Although the distinction may not always be clear, here I consider texts that are produced, used, 
controlled or steered by governmental agents as part of genres of invited or closed spaces.
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the level of abstraction and stability in time. First, ideologies and meta-theories are those systems 
whose core elements are usually stable. Second, policy paradigms are related to meta-theories 
but mostly linked to a government or groups of institutions in medium term time frames. These 
are often stories and sub-theories created by organisations in a sub-field of work. Third, messages 
and positions are found in short-term time frame, are less stable, depend on social and political 
conjunctures and usually reflect a simple and core idea of a policy or campaign. Ideas appear in 
these various forms and are subject of processes of re-signification and re-articulation from abstract 
ideas to concrete messages. These processes involve reconceptualising interests, positioning the 
subject in relation to other actors and objects, framing, and finally, crystallising these ideas in 
concrete texts (speech, documents, campaign documents and messages). 
In the area of trade and development policies a few meta-theories (liberal, structuralist and 
protectionist-industrialist) have emerged in relation to the specific historical processes. Meta-
theories underlie policy choices. In the late 1980s, governments tended to restate the principles 
of reciprocity and non-discrimination (Uruguay Round negotiations, 1986-1993) drawing from the 
theory of comparative advantage. Though beliefs in trade liberalisation have become dominant in 
both trade theories and practices until the present, these did not remain completely unchallenged.7 
Developing countries contested the principle of reciprocity. Their demands in the 1970s were 
recognised. The Generalized System of Preferences was given formal recognition in the late 70s 
with the inclusion of Special and Differential Treatment clauses being incorporated into the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), and limits in the scope of issues being negotiated such as 
agriculture, services, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), subsidies and investment. 
During the negotiations of the Uruguay Round one could observe the materialisation of 
the neoliberal paradigm in trade policies which proposes trade liberalisation and an integrated 
world market as the road to economic growth and development. These ideas are related to the 
implementation of the Washington Consensus policies geared towards reducing public spending, 
privatisation and, overall, the predominance of market-oriented economies. During this period, the 
idea of integration into the world market as a path to development was deepened, emphasising the 
potentials of trade and pointing out the limits of development aid and debt relief. A strong neoliberal 
discourse linking trade and development appeared globally as exemplified in this statement by 
Ugandan President in 2003: 
Africa does need development assistance, just as it needs debt relief from its crushing international 
debt burden.  But aid and debt relief can only go so far.  We are asking for the opportunity to 
compete, to sell our goods in western markets.  In short, we want to trade our way out of poverty 
(President Museveni, Uganda, 19 May 2003, The Guardian)
7  For example, economists Hans Singer and Raul Prebisch work argued that specialisation was not 
always beneficial for those countries that produced primary commodities as the terms of trade tended to 
deteriorate against those of manufactured goods. Stern (2007:6) explains that during the 1970s and 1980s 
countries opted for different strategies and practices outside the GATT and for bilateral free trade agreements 
(FTAs).
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However, the basic idea [more trade = economic growth = development] is contested and the 
level of discontent was made evident to a global audience when protesters physically blocked the 
entrance of delegates to the WTO Ministerial Meeting in 1999 (BBC, 1999). 
The Doha Development Round launched in 2001 aimed at emphasising that trade liberalisation 
had to serve the interests of developing countries. However, the Doha Round has been stalled by 
differences among members as became evident by the failure of the talks in Cancun in 2003. At the 
same time, and since the early 1990s, industrialised countries such as the United States, Japan and 
members of the EU, have been promoting bilateral free trade and investment agreements (UNCTAD, 
2007). This trend seems to be accentuated as the direction and pace of WTO talks remain uncertain. 
Bilateral trade agreements have tended to attract far less attention than WTO negotiations, and 
yet their provisions often reach further than existing trade liberalisation commitments made at the 
WTO, by including other areas such as public procurement and liberalisation of services. 
Several policy paradigms on trade and (economic) development can be identified from 
existing studies in the field of international trade. Desai and Said (2003: 66) elaborate a schematic 
categorisation of policy paradigms/positions observed in transnational activism around multilateral 
trade negotiations. This categorisation is proposed as a starting point: 
a) Supporters support global market integration and WTO. Neoclassical economics provides 
evidence for trade liberalisation which leads to increased overall outputs. Although there are 
winners and losers, overall more who benefit (e.g. Chicago School of Economics). This group 
supports the predominant and hegemonic project of neoliberal globalisation and articulates the 
trade and development discourse; 
b) Regressives accept global trade as ‘good if in our terms’. This position can be linked to 
discourses that argue for ‘policy autonomy’ or ‘policy space’ (e.g. Girvan, 2006); 
c) Reformers believe that trade can and must be made more equitable; that the WTO can be 
reformed and re-distributed policies should be put in place. I link this position to rights-based 
approaches and fair trade schemes; 
d) Alternatives suggest that the state and corporations are the problem, not global trade per se; 
e) Isolationists agree that the state should be re-empowered and the WTO abolished. 
There are also economic thinkers who propose non-growth, environmentally friendly economic 
alternatives, such as those linked to the New Economics Foundation or Tim Jackson, who wrote 
Prosperity without Growth (2009), much influenced by debates on environmental sustainability and 
climate change. 
In conclusion, actions and related genres, that is, ways of acting, can be placed along a 
spectrum between the uses of invited and created spaces. The same actions can also range between 
those that are more open to the benefits of market integration and those that, on the contrary, see 
more challenges and problems as the result of liberalisation. This is graphically depicted in Figure 2 
and this tool is used to map organisations and actions of the two case studies examined in Chapters 
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3 and 4. Most importantly, the tool helps to visualise how actors deploy their discursive capacity – 
how they position themselves in relation to others and how they attempt to manage the distances 
between their economic ideas and those of others, whom they attempt to persuade. 
The analysis of the movements and fluidity between the use of spaces and actions and the 
various ways of representing ideas will also be an indicator of whether discursive interactions 
conform more to the idea of arena or forum. If views struggle to be heard, and at best are juxtaposed 
and acknowledged, discursive practices will appear as arenas. If quality deliberation takes place, 
that is, an honest exchange of reasons and arguments, practices could be described as a forum. It 
is assumed that is in a forum where the most advanced and deepest levels of dialogue, bridging 
between different ideas, and important level of persuasion could be achieved. 
Discursive practices 
W
ays o
f actin
g
  
Neoliberalism 
Global markets 
integration  
Isolationism 
Protectionism 
Ways of representing  
economic reality  
Invited spaces 
Closed spaces 
Created spaces 
Figure 2. Actions and Ideas (based on Gaventa, 2006)
2.5 Towards an analytical framework: assessing power in international trade 
negotiations
A framework for assessing power of transnational activism is constructed and summarised in 
Table 1. It brings together the theoretical insights of Chapter 1 and the conceptualisations and 
operationalisations discussed in this chapter. The framework summarises the main indicators to 
assess the transnational activism efforts and its effects in the negotiations. Efforts of transnational 
activism are assessed in terms of mobilisation, network and coalition building, and discursive 
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capacities. Effects are assessed in terms of outcomes in the negotiations and changes in official 
discursive practices. These are examined in relation to the contexts of the negotiations. The 
framework consists of three main parts: efforts, effects and context. 
2.5.1 Context
Without a contextual analysis, indicators may appear meaningless. Negotiations and discursive 
interactions take place in historical and institutional contexts. Important elements in this context 
are the history of relations among negotiating parties, existing agreements, cooperation policies 
and structural positions in international trade (asymmetries in material and non-material resources 
distribution) and the negotiations set up (bi-regional negotiations). These agreements give shape to 
structures and institutions that enable and constrain citizens’ actions such as consultative spaces. 
These agreements reflect parties’ positioning in international trade (e.g. developed/developing 
country which determines rights to preferential treatment) and may reflect more or less explicitly 
general meta-theories or orientations towards international trade and state approaches to trade 
policy (e.g. liberal/protectionist). According to realist theorists, the material and national interests 
define the positions of negotiating states and these are the main determinants of decisions. These 
motivations and drivers are those that activists aim to influence towards the realisation of their 
goals. If they do not mobilise, the pre-existing national and regional policies – presumably shaped 
by governments’ technocrats and influenced by the most relevant economic sectors – would 
determine the outcomes of negotiations. But following the theoretical considerations in Chapter 
1, governments do not decide policy positions, negotiate in isolation, nor are they simply driven 
by national or sectoral interests. Even if material factors are important, the identities of states are 
moulded by values and norms, thus, also contributing to the composition of national and regional 
negotiation interests and agendas. 
2.5.2 Efforts and strategies
Transnational activists aim to shape those identities, interests and agendas in a number of ways. 
To assess their efforts the concept of mobilisation capacity is used. Activists mobilise by joining 
forces and engaging in discursive struggles. Activists are able to assemble human, financial and 
other resources to take action. The first step in mobilising is to convince their constituencies and 
supporters of the worthiness of their cause. They need to manage infrastructures, logistics and 
spaces, as well as human resources. Human resources may mean training skilled advocates as staff 
or volunteers who are able to motivate others for action. This is not an easy task when actions need 
to take place in various capitals, be sustained over time and in a coordinated manner. 
The efforts of activists to affect negotiations are also assessed through their capacity to build 
networks and coalitions for coordinated action. These networks need to link local, national, regional 
and international groups. Each of these groups has a function depending on its strength and the 
kind of resource it is able to offer (knowledge, representativeness, mobilisation capacity). Local 
groups may know the reality on the ground and aggregated in federations offer an important source 
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of legitimacy: it is not only a small isolated group which is concerned, but the scope of mobilisation 
transcends a particular space. 
Groups also need to build networks and coalitions with two types of actors: first, it is vital that 
they establish communication channels and develop relations with state officials, either informally 
or most importantly, through gaining access to institutionalised advisory and consultative bodies 
in which civil society can participate. It is not only access what matters but the kind of relations 
and rapport they build with state negotiators that becomes critical. Second, groups need to build 
networks and coalitions with those with whom they share (or could potentially share) similar 
concerns. The fact that more groups are linked means more access to information in several 
countries and locations. These information flows can run across more open networks to make 
formalised coalitions. The key is that the information flow is established. Finally, linking groups of 
concentrated interests and diffuse interests enhances the weight of any of demand. A general social 
or environmental concern is married to specific demands linked to easy-to-determine losses in terms 
of jobs, income or livelihoods. A human rights advocate with knowledge about international law 
works together with numerous associations of consumers, farmers or workers. It is then assumed in 
this model that these types of combinations make the demands stronger. 
The mobilisation capacity together with the capacity to build networks and coalitions make 
possible the participation in multiple and simultaneous invited spaces as well as the creation 
of different created spaces. The network composition, the kind of relations established with 
negotiating states, and the approaches to activism adopted all influence the ways of acting in the 
negotiations as depicted in figure 2. These indicators help to observe movements and dynamics in 
relation to the kinds of uses of discursive spaces. As explained, the physical spaces, the location and 
the participants of discursive interactions – the material how of exchanges – carry symbolic weight 
and shape their contents as well. This is why these two first groups of indicators are considered 
enabling of discursive capacity. 
The third group of factors is related to the ideational dimensions of discursive interactions, 
that is, the discursive capacity. Discursive capacity is examined through three indicators. The first 
is the capacity to use and mix different types of communicative means or genres as appropriate 
vis-à-vis the intended audience and context. These can range from a report of a sustainability impact 
assessment to a press release and from a poster to a speech circulated via Internet. The movements 
in the use of genres can go from technical to political and from political to technical. It is assumed 
that the best use of means and channels helps the message to reach its intended audiences. The 
second indicator is closely related to the first one. It is the capacity to make use and shape discursive 
spaces, both invited and created. The fluidity, dynamics and complementarities of participation in 
spaces and creation of new ones is referred to as ways of acting, graphically depicted in figure 2. 
Finally, the third indicator is the capacity of persuasion, to bridge the distance between 
different ways of representing economic realities. The positions and relative distances between 
ideas are captured graphically using the tool shown in figure 2. Transnational activists as a group 
are able to position themselves in a discourse and, at the same time, are able to engage with other 
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discourses and ideas. This becomes visible in the diversification of economic ideas and the quality of 
proposals in terms of resonance to existing states identities; for example, reinforcing the identities 
of states as guarantors of human rights and promoters of development.
A qualitative distinction is made between two kinds of deliberative modes. They may be able 
to use means to their ends, express their demands and engage in instrumental actions. This would 
involve at least the presence of their ideas in spaces, juxtaposed with those of others and gaining 
weight according to the importance of the message carrier and the interests represented. But a 
higher level of persuasion may be achieved if agents can bridge existing distances between ideas. 
This may be done via problem-solving, future-looking and constituent action, which is, engaging 
in reflexive action. They may be able to imagine new realities which transcend sectoral interests 
by proposing new situations. These would not only meet most, if not all, sectoral interests but 
also achieve better overall societal outcomes (Galtung, 2000). This out-of-the-box thinking is a 
theoretical construct as it does not exist empirically, at least in the context of trade politics. This is 
why it is not considered in the possible ideas to be illustrated through the ‘Actions and Ideas’ tool 
(Figure 2) and based on the mapping of existing policy paradigms in section 2.3.5 (Ideas, signifying 
discursive practices). 
2.5.3 Effects
Efforts by transnational activists may have multiple effects but in this thesis I aim to find links 
between their efforts and changes in decisions of states in the context of the negotiations (short to 
medium term) and changes in discursive practices (medium term). Observable changes in discursive 
practices are changes in the ways of communicating, that is, the use of spaces and genres, as well 
as changes in the ideas communicated. Ideas diversification and dialogicality are used as indicators. 
Dialogicality is the extent to which one document makes references to other documents, actors and 
ideas (Fairclough, 2003 and 2009). It is assumed that at least acknowledgement of others’ ideas is 
a precondition of dialogue and persuasion, although the adoption of new ideas or paradigms often 
happens slowly. 
2.6 A case-oriented comparative study and the research process
This study adopts a case-oriented comparative approach. This approach was adopted because I 
struggled with unexplored and disconcerting phenomena. Available conceptualisations did not 
help me to fully understand the dynamics of groups and organisations coordinating activism across 
borders in bi-regional negotiations. Was I witnessing a campaign, a lobby group, a network or an 
advocacy coalition? There was some theory guiding my first observations, yet I felt a different 
interpretative and explorative approach was needed first to define and conceptualise what I 
was observing. There was literature about parts and aspects of the phenomena I was trying to 
understand: the influence of NGOs in negotiations, the formation of transnational networks, and 
discursive power. But these alone did not allow me to understand the dynamics of groups and 
coordinated actions in their historical contexts. In practice, my path iterated between a deductive 
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and an inductive approach. I moved back and forth among existing theories, theory development 
and the empirical investigation (Six and Bellamy, 2012: 118). Some existing theories guided aspects 
of my observations but, at the same time, failed to account for others. Thus, different causal theory 
emerged from my empirical findings. 
The case-study approach allowed me to look at the process as a whole, as well as its dynamics 
and sequences in their context. Trade negotiations are special historical processes influenced by 
multiple factors; thus, analysing in-depth a few cases allowed me to explore a wide range of them, 
and the combination and configuration of possible causes (Ragin, 1994). In brief, I decided for a 
case-study approach and process tracing extensively used in Political Science and International 
Relations. This choice provided me with the space and tools to focus on the exploration and 
conceptualisation work necessary to develop theory about what seemed to me at the beginning of 
my research to be disconcerting and puzzling.   
My first challenge was then to define these processes as cases. Cases often coalesce in the 
course of the research through a systematic dialogue of ideas and evidence (Ragin, 2004: 127). 
What were these sets of coordinated actions a case of? My observations run parallel to a not-so-
tidy and back-and-forth process of conceptualisation. I was not considering phenomena which I 
could compare between national units (comparing activism between country A and country B). 
Actions took place across borders and were coordinated nationally, regionally and bi-regionally at 
the same time. They were coordinated in different layers and ways, for a variety of reasons, and did 
not compose a typical single-message campaign. This is why I defined the cases as transnational 
activism, which in turn offered me space to define the features and reasons why there was 
coordination of actions, yet without formalising one single coalition or message. To some extent, 
the EPAs campaign was defined by some of its participants as a campaign, yet, as will be explained 
in detail in Chapter 3, there were on-going discussions about the message and the campaign 
coalition remained open and changed in its composition.  
The second step was to select cases. Through an Internet search I attempted to list existing 
groups working on trade issues which I completed with organisations identified during my field 
work. Most organisations seemed to be following thematic areas, the stalled WTO negotiations and/
or the numerous on-going bilateral negotiations. The EU was one of the most active in proposing 
and conducting bi-regional agreements following its Global Europe strategy and its faith in regional 
integration and, at the same time, having put in place new trade arrangements with ACP countries 
due to the expiry of a WTO waiver on its preferential treatment to these countries. 
Although it may seem biased to variable-oriented researchers (Della Porta, 2008) cases 
were selected purposefully. My puzzle was that although global civil society and campaigns 
were portrayed as influential in literature, there were doubts about how influential activism was 
in challenging economic policies and their neo-liberal orientation. In particular, there was little 
evidence of its influence in trade negotiations. 
Assessing Power And TrAnsnATionAl AcTivism 
67
2
I was puzzled by the apparent positive case of the EPAs campaign: actions and mobilisations 
which were apparently having an influential effect on the negotiations. These were not ordinary 
negotiations; ethical and ideological dimensions had emerged visibly. It was a case of negotiations 
with a high power asymmetry, between developed and developing countries. The negotiations 
touched upon principles of fairness in terms of competition and in terms of the realisation of 
the idea of development as the agreements were presented as trade agreements to be tools for 
development. Moreover, the EPAs campaign appeared in the eyes of both activists and policy 
makers to be very influential, positively or negatively, depending on the perspective. Numerous 
actions and organisations were involved and the negotiations seemed to be quite controversial. 
But the EPAs campaign did not seem to be equally influential in all the negotiating regions, 
nor did similar mobilisations gain as much attention in other bi-regional negotiations. The EPAs 
campaign seemed to be quite exceptional. Thus, it seemed theoretically relevant to compare it with 
a similar mobilisation, but one with different results or apparently less influence (Mill’s Method 
of Difference or Most Similar System Design). Though it may appear erroneous to choose cases 
based on their apparent success/non-success (in the terms of variable-oriented research, on the 
dependent variable), the choice is based on the assumption that comparing two different outcomes 
of similar cases would be helpful for finding the features that explain the independent variables. 
Activists around the Association Agreement between the EU and Central America were more 
pessimistic about their level of achievement of their advocacy goals. I decided to take this as a second 
case. The two negotiations were similar in important aspects: they involved the EU and a region of 
developing countries (asymmetrical negotiations); they aimed to bridge trade, development and 
political dialogue aims, and were influenced by the European Commission’s ambitious agenda and 
emphasis on regional integration. 
Yet, they were also different in significant ways: their drivers and motivations were partially 
different, as were the number of countries involved and the historical and geo-political context. 
Additionally, it is rare to find comparisons between West Africa and Central America though they 
share important similarities. They are both regions in construction, composed of smaller and medium 
economies with important exports of agricultural products, having faced waves of liberalisation and 
opening of their markets. In both regions, countries faced civil wars and reconciliation processes, 
and subsequently a constant effort to build and strengthen democratic institutions. Yet, they are 
distinct in terms of their languages, cultures, religions, colonial pasts, and continental dynamics of 
Latin America and Africa. There are also some differences in the scale of negotiations. While one 
negotiation involved more organisations, resources and countries (75+EU, in West Africa 15+EU), 
mobilisations around the AA were more limited, but still relatively important considering that 
fewer countries were involved (5+EU). There were parallel negotiations with other regions in Latin 
America, most notably the negotiation of an Association Agreement with the Andean Community, 
which led to more organisations dedicating resources and efforts to follow EU-Latin America 
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relations more broadly. In that sense, there is a similarity between the two cases; both are inserted 
in larger regional dynamics: West Africa within Africa and ACP as a group, and Central America in 
Latin America. 
Although there were differences in terms of negotiations set-ups and outcomes, approaches 
to transnational activism seemed to share important similarities. The groups which followed these 
negotiations in Europe were nearly the same; thus, there is a great similarity in the approaches to 
activism and underlying value-orientation that motivated them. There were also lessons learned 
shared among activists in different regions. There were obviously more connections among activists 
in different ACP regions – the reason why I tried to look for a mobilisation in another region. Links 
among activists working on trade issues in different regions and topics remained fluid aided by 
existing regional and international networks and platforms. It was therefore unrealistic to find two 
neatly separated cases. As Vennesson explains: ‘Cases are often deeply connected to one another, 
even embedded in one another, and the task of the researcher becomes accounting for both the 
distinctive and the common dimensions of the cases’ (2008: 255). 
Defining and choosing these cases went together with choosing methods of analysis.  Methods 
are based on a combination of process tracing and analysis of discursive practices. For each case, a 
story or narrative was built which aimed to identify the complex patterns of conjunctural causation 
(Ragin, 1997: 8), yet in such a way that a pattern or simplified story emerged. These stories are 
found at the end of the chapters which analyse the cases (Chapter 3 and 4) and it is these richly 
descriptive stories that are compared in Chapter 5. 
The stories contain broadly two areas of analysis. The first area of analysis is the negotiations 
in terms of how they were organised: a)  the main negotiating parties, its motivations and drivers, 
its main policy orientations and positioning in international trade; b) the intra-regional negotiations 
set up: the regional institutional history, existing agreements which are conducive or constraining 
of certain dynamics in the negotiations, including the space for the participation of civil society, and 
finally, c) the bi-regional set up and history of bilateral and bi-regional relations: existing agreements 
and background of the negotiations. It is important to depart from this contextual information, 
which enables or conditions the role of transnational activism following the analytical framework 
in Chapter 1.
The second broad area of analysis is the characteristics of transnational activism or how 
actions attempted to influence negotiations and what was implemented as a strategy. Three main 
aspects are identified in the analytical framework presented: a) mobilisation capacity; b) network 
and coalition building capacity, with a special emphasis on relations with negotiating states; and c) 
discursive capacity. 
The analysis of cases and the comparison between cases which appears in Chapter 5 is 
structured and guided by these two broad areas and these dimensions of both negotiations and 
transnational activism. The similarities and differences are explored. However, it is important to 
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note that each of these dimensions is not taken as a single factor that is present or not, nor does 
it assume stable relations among factors. One causal condition may be important in both cases, 
yet contribute in different ways. For example, similar ideological orientations of activists may 
both discourage and encourage communication with officials depending on the context and other 
intermediate factors. 
2.6.1 Gathering and analysing materials
Materials were collected via interviews, e-mail exchanges, documentation, on-line searches and 
observation of events and meetings. (The list of interviewees, events and meetings observed 
and key documents analysed appear in Appendices 1, 2 and 3.) Materials were mostly official 
documents produced by involved organisations. These materials allowed me to be able to describe 
the main strategies and actions and to derive from them the mobilisation and network capacity of 
organisations. Interviews were useful to clarify the main motivations for engagement in the case 
of the activists. Interviews with policy makers were used to triangulate opinions about perceived 
influence on decisions. 
Altogether, materials were used to build a narrative or story in each case. These are stories 
built on different views and my observations, aiming to capture a picture of reality. I aimed to re-
construct the sequence of events and used process tracing: Following Vennesson, process tracing 
based on intensive, open-ended interviewing, participant observation and document analysis helps 
to understand the meaning and role of established regularities, and can help to suggest ways to 
uncover previously unknown relations between factors (2008: 252). However, the process was in 
fact many processes interwoven and converging in bi-regional negotiations. The difficulty was that 
events took place over a long period of time, and in many different locations. Finally, I aimed to build 
counter-factual stories. Interviewees were asked if they believed the campaigns had been influential 
and if so, in which ways. They were also asked: What would have happened if there had been no 
mobilisation or campaign? These answers helped me to attempt a counter-factual analysis. 
The main ideas in documents and actions were reconstructed doing mostly predicative 
analysis (Milliken, 1999). The main concepts used and how they were signified was the centre of 
the analysis, especially the link between trade and development. These were related to concepts of 
regional integration, human rights, sustainability and policy coherence. The analysis aimed to look 
for the main ideas contested, their different and changing significations and their connotations as 
being positive or negative. The predicative analysis was done with the help of ATLAS.ti. I contrasted 
the emerging patterns with those categories already existing in the literature, which were 
mainly constructed based on mobilisations around WTO negotiations (Desai and Said, 2003: 66). 
Contrasting ideas emerging from the texts and interviews with existing ideas helped me to minimise 
bias towards pre-existing orientations and to observe continuities and changes.
70
Chapter 2
The analysis of texts includes the following steps: 
a) Analysis of vocabulary to identify the main concepts, objects and subjects present. What do 
agents speak about?; 
b) Predicative analysis: How do agents speak about these concepts? How are they qualified 
(adjectives)? What are the connotations and assumptions of the characteristics and behaviours 
of objects and subjects?; 
c) Identification of core binary oppositions: What is presented as right and wrong?; 
d) Identification of subjects and relations: Who speaks to whom and in which way? Who are the 
‘wes’ and the ‘thems’? Supporters, targets or neutral; 
e) Identification of legitimation strategies: How are ideas supported as true? (reference to 
authority, appealing to traditional values, science or presented as common sense). 
Furthermore, the scheme in Figure 2 was used to locate actions and ideas according to whether 
they were taking place within formal or invited spaces or outside of them in the vertical axis 
and in relation to the degree of desired market integration or alternatives to it on the horizontal 
axis. A preliminary plotting of actions and ideas was presented and discussed in a workshop with 
participants of CIFCA general Assembly in March 2010 to obtain more insights into the dynamics 
among different perspectives and approaches to activism. The results of this exercise are presented 
in Chapter 4. Unfortunately, there was no opportunity for a similar exercise in the case of the EPAs. 
Discourse analysis also included actions and genres analysis as indicators of changes in 
discursive practices. A distinction was made between genres commonly used within formal 
governmental structures used by governments and those that are used outside of them. Invited 
spaces are included as within formal spaces (Cornwall, 2002). Although the distinction may not 
always be clear, texts that are produced, used, controlled or steered by governmental agents are 
considered formal spaces genres. Variation in terms of genres used is then observed between 
texts of formal spaces (technical reports, statistics, and legal texts) and texts of non-formal spaces 
(posters, pamphlets, declarations). Discursive practices are then analysed through texts in action 
(how they were used) and in context (in relation to specific historical, political and social situations). 
Data was gathered in an iterative way combining documentation, interviews and 
observations. First, documents available in official websites were collected (European Commission 
DG-Trade, ECOWAS and member countries, campaign and other research NGOs). Although more 
documents were available on EU DG-Trade’s website, this method serves here only to indicate a 
movement towards diversification of genres used over time and these trends were confirmed in my 
observations of the documents used and referred to in interviews and events observed. To mitigate 
this limitation, of varying availabilities of documents via the Internet, documents were also collected 
asking interviewees and during observations. 
Even though trade negotiations are conducted by governments in closed spaces, this thesis 
does not analyse these practices. First, because negotiations are not open to the public. Draft 
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proposals, minutes, offers and counter-offers remain in principle confidential and provisional until 
an agreement is signed. Second, because the focus of this thesis is on the interactions between 
officials and activists, rather than on the interactions among negotiators. The outcomes of the 
negotiations are assessed in a limited way via the interviews with government representatives 
and official press releases and documents. Discursive practices are assessed via the analysis of 
observations, insights shared during interviews and documentation produced to prepare for these 
events or as an outcome of them. 
Two special collaborations were established with organisations. First, I collaborated with 
Oxfam International/Oxfam Novib, which had commissioned an evaluation of its contribution to 
the EPAs campaign. Oxfam and the evaluators agreed to share its documentation and, if public, 
partners’ documentation as well provided that individuals would not be mentioned.  To avoid bias 
in the collection of data, special care was put to contrast Oxfam-provided information with views of 
other organisations as expressed in interviews and in my own observations. The list of interviewees 
was composed preliminarily before the collaboration with Oxfam was established based on 
preliminary interviews with researchers and key observers. Due to practical limitations, information 
on local organisations not based in capitals is minimal. However, the main views were represented 
by national and international coalitions. 
Second, I collaborated with CIFCA (Copenhagen Initiative for Central America and Mexico) 
based in Brussels. I first came in contact with the organisation in July 2008 when I attended a 
seminar in Brussels which gathered groups active around FTAs. They were open and interested in 
assessing their own strategies and results. I started observing their activities at the end of 2008 and 
I joined more actively in 2009. They shared their documentation and insights. Most importantly, I 
was able to present my preliminary observations and findings in their periodic trade group meetings 
and general assemblies until May 2010. I received feedback and questions and exchanged ideas 
for analysis. This collaboration allowed me to gain a good overview of the actors involved, their 
relations and positions. 
2.6.2 A note on social network analysis
Given the fact that networks of activists and their links to governments is central in my research, I 
experimented with social network analysis. Centrality and periphery are important characteristics to 
assess the ‘potential influence’ (Anheier and Katz, 2004: 209). I aimed to assess perceived influence 
(centrality) (Bonacich, 1987), the density and structures of the networks (e.g. in-betweeness of some 
actors) and the views of central actors (ego-networks) (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). I collected 
data asking questions such as ‘which actors do you consider important in the negotiations? who 
do you seek advice from? who do you work with?’ using a name-elicitor technique. However, I 
found the data collection quite problematic given that either policy makers, trying to be politically 
correct, mentioned many actors or only a few, as I observed that they indeed worked with and read 
materials of actors whom they had not mentioned. Furthermore, limitations in the amounts of 
interviews I was able to conduct limited the extent to which I could assess reciprocity in perceptions. 
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The network diagrams and measures I was able to make were used only to add one element in my 
process of rich description. The network maps gave me a rather static picture that did not mean 
much without its context and meanings. I could assess relations but not the extent of influence or 
the strengths of these relations. It was a useful insight and exercise, yet, more sophistication in the 
use of these quantitative techniques in combination with qualitative analysis should be explored. 
2.7 Conclusions
This chapter explained the analytical framework and methodological approach adopted for this 
study, based on case-oriented and comparative research. Case-oriented research allowed me 
space to dwell on two bi-regional political and economic processes as complex and complete 
units. Processes involving several negotiating parties over a long period of time imply challenges 
for the researcher: the history, the number of actors involved, their motivations and actions seem 
often overwhelming. The approach adopted facilitated extracting the main story and ideas in such 
a vibrant process. This was parallel to the process of conceptualisation, of defining and choosing 
cases. 
To overcome the difficulty of the analytical dichotomy between negotiations of long-duration 
and short-term observable changes in decisions, I used a multilayered concept of power but focusing 
on two dimensions: its material and discursive aspects. Interests and material resources do have a 
more direct and visible effect on decisions. At the same time, actors’ interests and decisions are 
continously re-defined and shaped in discursive legitimation processes or in Doty´s words, in the 
‘play of practice’ (1993).   In brief, power dynamics are to be observed in the interplay between 
decisional and discursive power. Networks of transnational activists are formed by both groups with 
material capabilities and defined economic interests who do have more visible influence on state 
decisions, and groups of non-material capabilities who influence the normative contents of debates 
and identities and ultimately, the context in which decisions are made.  This conceptualisation of 
power helps to observe effects in outcomes (decisions) and processes (discursive practices as forms 
of communicating and making policy).
The concept of discursive practice is chosen as a mediating concept between short-term 
observable actions as part of particular events and discursive shifts taking place in longer time 
frames. An event such as a public hearing constitutes an enactment of a social practice which is at 
the same time subsumed in a set of established ideas and norms. 
A theoretical approach which puts discursive practices in the centre of analysis is helpful 
in tracing how agents aim to influence decisions through shaping ways of representing economic 
reality, through ways of being (identities) and through ways of acting (shaping ways and spaces of 
communication). Based on these considerations an analytical framework is built to assess the role 
of transnational activism in trade negotiations. It departs from the historical and political context in 
which the positioning of states in international trade, their orientations to trade policy, their material 
and national interests, and the state-society relations matter.  In this context, transnational activists 
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aim to influence negotiations. Three main factors are analysed: mobilisation capacity, network and 
coalition capacity and finally, and most importantly, their discursive capacity – the capacity to affect 
discursive practices in its contents and forms. 

TRAnSnATIonAL ACTIvISM AnD EConoMIC 
PARTnERShIP AGREEMEnTS
ChAPTER 3
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents and analyses the empirical findings of the first case study: transnational 
activism in relation to the negotiation of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), with a focus 
on the STOP EPAs campaign. Although actions addressed negotiations between the European Union 
and Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP), this study focuses more on actions related to the 
negotiations between the EU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the 
period of 2002 to 2009.  
This case is worth examining given its scale and the disparity in opinions about the effects 
of transnational activism. While one study about the EPAs campaign concludes that the influence 
of NGOs was limited (Dür and De Briève, 2007), another focusing on West Africa only concludes 
the opposite (Trommer, 2011). In general, perceptions among those interviewed for the present 
study were that actions had been quite influential (both in positive and negative manners). Initial 
indications of how controversial the issue had become were the amounts of articles produced about 
the topic and organisations involved. For example, Concord, the widest platform of private aid 
agencies and other development-oriented NGOs in Europe, mobilised and worked on EPAs within 
its working group on trade (CONCORD, 2004, 2009 and 2010). 
The first sections describe the main issues at stake, specifically the socio-economic and 
political structures that both constrained and enabled activism. This section includes the motivations 
and identities of negotiating states, the intra-regional set-up and a brief review of the history 
of bi-regional relations. Second, the organisational landscape of activisms, their organisations, 
motivations and networks are presented. Third, following these descriptive sections, actions are 
analysed from the discourse practice approach explained in chapter 2. The analysis is centred on 
how the observed formations of activism affected the negotiations and related discursive practices. 
Lastly, a story is composed with the main elements emerging from the empirical analysis, indicating 
the combination of factors that led to the changes in the negotiations. 
3.2 Parties motivations and negotiations set-up
3.2.1 The Cotonou Agreement and EU-ACP relations
The EU and ACP countries have cooperated formally since 1975 when the Lomé I Convention was 
signed. Since then, several subsequent Lomé agreements have been signed (1981, 1985 and 1989). 
The year 2000 was a turning point in the countries’ relationships with the signing of the ACP-EU 
Partnership Agreement in Cotonou, which entered into force in 2003. This agreement defines the 
relations between the two groups in areas of trade, aid and political cooperation with the aims 
of promoting democracy, economic growth and sustainable development. However, it implied 
profound changes. The EU had preferential trade relations as regulated by the Lomé Agreement; 
the Cotonou agreement implied a new approach to trade, from unilateral trade preferences to 
reciprocal trade arrangements compatible with WTO rules. There was a stronger emphasis in the 
integration of ACP countries into the global economy. The main elements in the new equation were: 
Poverty eradication + reciprocity in trade + governance + aid based on performance
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However, this formula proved difficult to realise. There are various views on the degrees of integration 
to the global economy that are conducive to poverty eradication and sustainable development. The 
idea underlying this shift is that trade preferences and aid does not suffice. It is necessary to support 
countries to ‘trade their way out of poverty’ with much emphasis on ownership, governance and 
targeted interventions in relation to performance. In this line of thought are initiatives such as 
‘Aid for Trade’. While ACP countries in general favoured preferences that took into account the 
asymmetry between the EU and ACP countries, the EU believed in openness supported by trade-
related assistance. Given that preferential agreements violate the principle of non-discrimination 
of the multilateral trading system, the EU negotiated a waiver with WTO members to continue 
preferences until December 2007. After this, a new WTO-compatible trade arrangement needed to 
be put in place.  
West Africa negotiated as one of six ACP regions, coordinated by ECOWAS which comprises 
15 West African countries, plus Mauritania which was added in the negotiating group. Out of the 
16 countries, three are non-LDCs (Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria – Cape Verde is in a transition 
phase), and thus could not continue trading within the Everything But Arms (EBAs) initiative.1 Though 
the negotiations started in 2003, ECOWAS countries were not fully prepared for them. There was 
confusion about roles, country and regional positions. It is important to note the existence of two 
regional institutions, ECOWAS and the ‘Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine’ (UEMOA), 
which made the process more complicated as they do not share a Common External Tariff (CET).
3.2.2 EU’s approach to EPAs negotiations
EU’s trade and development policies are complex, partly because they are the result of compromises 
among member states with different views on trade openness and internal protectionist policies, 
as illustrated by the debates on the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. The policy paper 
Global Europe: Competing in the World (European Commission, 2006a) denotes a clear direction 
towards a neoliberal policy paradigm in trade policy. Based on the theory of comparative advantage, 
it is assumed that more openness leads to increased efficiency in the use of resources and, overall, 
most stand to gain from the exchanges. This paper proposes an ambitious trade liberalisation 
agenda which combines commitment to multilateralism with the need to negotiate FTAs with major 
emerging markets. The EU has signed a number of bilateral free trade agreements, which have 
motivated enthusiasm, indifference and harsh criticisms especially in regards to their development 
dimension and implications for developing countries. Debates around the case of the EPAs were 
particularly heated. Bilal and Rampa of the European Centre for Development Policy Management 
(ECDPM) summarise the view of the European Commission (2005:2): 
1  In February 2001, the Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EC) 416/2001, the so-
called EBA Regulation (Everything But Arms), granting duty-free access to imports of all products from LDCs, 
except arms and ammunitions, without any quantitative restrictions (with the exception of bananas, sugar 
and rice for a limited period). http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/generalised-system-of-
preferences/everything-but-arms/
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For the European Commission (EC), and in particular the Trade Directorate General (DG Trade), 
EPAs will foster development mainly through trade liberalisation and the creation of the right policy 
framework for this and to attract investment. By creating free trade areas (FTAs) with the EU, the 
ACP regions will benefit from the standard gains from trade: increased market access to the EU for 
ACP exports, reduced prices of EU imports for ACP consumers and associated competitive effects 
should foster economic growth and hence development. 
Their view of the EU motivation confirms the formula above mentioned: a belief in the combination 
of policies to attract investment and foster growth. This approach does not invalidate existing 
unilateral non-reciprocal arrangements which are WTO-compatible such as the EBAs initiative open 
to LDCs and the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). 
Given this context, the main discourse of the EU to advance free trade agreements with 
ACP countries was that more trade would mean increased economic growth, and thus more 
development. In this way, the two aims of the Cotonou agreement would be realised based on the 
definition of good trade as ‘open and fair’. The actions can be summarised as: more trade = more 
economic growth = development. EPAs were presented as instruments for development above all 
(European Commission, 2010) and justified in various official texts and statements, such as the 
following: 
The Economic Partnership Agreement currently being negotiated with West Africa pursues an 
ambitious objective. That objective is to make West Africa an economic magnet that attracts 
investment and stimulates private enterprise, a hive of economic activity that guarantees sustained 
growth and drives more sustainable economic, social and environmental development. (Statement 
by EU Commissioner Mandelson (European Commission, 2005 - Emphasis added)
This extract is a representative example of texts in the period ranging from 2003 to 2008 where 
EPAs are always related positively to economic growth and development. This is indicated by 
the collocation of words such as: investment, enterprise, economic magnet, economic activity, 
sustained growth and development.2 Texts of this period present similar collocations of words and 
share the same basic assumptions: EPAs are the only and necessary path towards development and 
integration into the world economy. Reform and change is imperative to grasp the opportunities in 
a context of globalisation. There is overall both in discourses and the underlying neoliberal policy 
paradigm observed in the period when Mandelson was in office as EU Trade Commissioner and 
beyond (De Ville and Orbie, 2011). 
3.2.3 ECOWAS’ approach to EPAs negotiations
ECOWAS and its members, given their different situations (LDCs/non-LDCs/UEMOA members or 
not), did not share a common negotiation position. However, they did share some elements in their 
underlying policy paradigms. Though a belief in trade as a tool for development was maintained, 
2  For an analysis of the links between poverty alleviation and sustainable development in the Cotonou 
Agreement see Flint and Adrian (2008) ‘Marrying poverty alleviation and sustainable development? An Analysis 
of the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement’ Journal of International Relations and Development, 11:55-74).
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in their view, trade relations must receive preferential and differential treatment and maximum 
flexibility from developed countries. This had been a strong position of developing countries since 
the WTO Cancún Ministerial Meeting in 2003. The main discourse to advance this position was built 
on the centrality of EPAs as development tools and the ways this was signified. While for the EU EPAs 
were tools for development – they promoted openness, investments and reforms – for ECOWAS 
and most ACP countries EPAs meant a flexible interpretation of WTO article XXIV (‘substantially all 
trade in a reasonable period of time’). EPAs also meant important financial support to deal with 
adjustment costs and loss of governmental revenue. The main argument was that more trade would 
not necessarily mean more development. Opening their economies too fast without the necessary 
conditions could be, in their view, dangerous. This discourse is illustrated in a joint declaration of 
African Union Head of States, after three years of negotiations: 
[We] Re-iterate that economic partnership agreements with the European Union should be tools 
for the economic development of Africa. We express our profound disappointment at the stance 
taken by negotiators of the European Commission in so far as it does not adequately address the 
development concerns that must be the basis of relations with Africa. We urge our negotiating 
partners to clearly demonstrate the development content of the proposed agreements, and 
adequately address supply side constraints, infrastructure bottlenecks, and adjustment costs, 
bearing in mind that trade liberalisation together with the accompanying liberal policies, may 
not by itself deliver economic development. In this regard, we emphasise that the development 
content should include, inter alia, adequate financial and technical resources; full market access to 
the European markets for African goods and service providers; and policy space and flexibility for 
implementation of development programmes in Africa. (African Union Head of States Declaration, 
African Union, 2006 - Emphasis added)
The text explicitly appeals to the principle of partnership and to the commitments of the EU. The 
word development is mentioned six times in the paragraph. It is the content of development that is 
being contested and re-articulated to link it to ideas of resources, access to the EU market, flexibility 
and policy space.  These are the key words that campaign texts will also use, stress and signify in 
their statements. 
This type of statements and declarations are repeated over and over during the period 
stated. There is stability in story-lines and underlying policy paradigms before and after the 2007 
deadline. ECOWAS declarations continue to ask for centrality of the development dimensions 
as their main argument to remain in a strong position. An example to illustrate this stability in 
discourses is the Nouakchott ECOWAS Ministerial Monitoring Committee Declaration of February 
2008 in which Ministers: ‘reaffirm our attachment to development dimensions of EPAs which must 
be translated in the implementation of effective programmes to respond to regional concerns in 
terms of development and resource mobilisation for its financing’ (ECOWAS, 2008). Furthermore, 
Mr. Daramy, Head of ECOWAS, explains the reason for ECOWAS position:  
We believe we need to increase local processing to add value to our goods — we don’t want our 
factories to be closed and create unemployment and social instability. I must reiterate that confining 
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West African countries to the production of primary commodities amount to condemning them to 
remain locked in the commodity trap. West Africa is not negotiating for time — we are concerned 
with reducing poverty and development of our people — we’ll negotiate for the next 20 years if 
that is how long it will take to get our concerns addressed. (Declarations of Mr. Daramy, Head of 
ECOWAS, September 2009, My emphasis)
These declarations reinforce a development model that should combine export-oriented growth 
with local industry development. Thus, the significance of development is amplified beyond trade 
and external dependency and mirrored in strong positions and the decision to continue negotiations 
as long as necessary.
An overall stability in the main positions can be seen. ECOWAS did not sign as a region 
(to date, 2013) evidencing the important pending issues and intra-regional disagreements. This 
led to non-LDCs to search for paths that best suited their national interests. Cote D’ Ivoire and 
Ghana decided to initial Interim Agreements while Nigeria applied for the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP+)3. The main outstanding issues in the negotiations relate to the region’s market 
access offer on trade in goods, Most Favoured Nation (MFN)4 and rules of origin. With respect to 
market access in goods, the elaborations of a regional list of sensitive products and the adoption 
of an ECOWAS Common External Tariff have proven to be challenging. Negotiations continue after 
several agreed deadlines (GREAT Insights, 2012) and new deadlines were proposed by the EU, yet 
they were contested (Bilal, 2012).  
The set up of the negotiations and the divergence of positions created opportunities 
and challenges for transnational activism. They enabled the creation of alliances and discourse 
coalitions. But before explaining these, it is important to understand what the opportunities and 
constrains were for invited participation – that is, the established consultation spaces as well as the 
rules of engagement in terms of the legal provisions included in the agreement but also in practice. 
3.2.4 Opportunities and constrains for participation 
The agreement is regulated by a number of institutions, mainly the ACP/EU Council of Ministers, 
the Committee of Ambassadors and the Joint Parliamentary Assembly. There are also instances 
that relate to civil society participation. The Civil Society Follow-up Committee was set up in July 
2001. It is a mixed and informal committee to ensure the participation of civil society actors as 
foreseen by the agreement. However, this committee does not aim to be representative nor have 
any decision-making role. The Committee is composed by representatives of both governmental 
and non-governmental institutions from both ACP and EU countries.
There were also three ACP Civil Society Forums organised in Brussels in 2001, 2006, 2009. 
Both the EU and ACP countries agreed to promote a broad and inclusive approach to partnership 
3  The EC has rejected its request on the grounds that Nigeria does not satisfy the necessary conditions, 
in particular concerning the ratification of certain international agreements.
4  It is a status or level of treatment accorded by one state to another in international trade. The term 
means the country which is the recipient of this treatment must, nominally, receive equal trade advantages as 
the most favoured nation by the country granting such treatment. 
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in their relations. This was reflected in the Cotonou Agreement that clearly recognised the role 
of national parliaments, local authorities, and non-state actors named as ‘economic and social 
partners, private sector and civil society actors’. 
In 2002, the ACP secretariat took the initiative, with the agreement of the European 
Commission, to produce a user’s guide for non-state actors. It was assigned to ECDPM (See details 
about ECDPM in Appendix 4). It was published in November 2003 after a consultative process of 
gathering input. ECDPM was perceived as an organisation capable of undertaking this task for its 
technical and professional credentials and was in charge of organising several consultations in the 
process of producing the guide. 
The initiative departs from the fact that the Cotonou agreement opens room for a broader 
partnership, including the role of non-state actors in consultations and in the implementation of 
the agreement. ‘For the first time, the ACP countries and the European community have legally 
committed themselves to involving non-state actors in all phases of the cooperation process’ 
(ECDPM, 2003:26). The guide states that the relevance given to non-state actors within the 
Cotonou agreement is due to an important trend in development cooperation, that is, the need for 
‘participatory development’: ‘The Cotonou Agreement fully subscribes to this approach by creating 
space and opportunities for all possible categories of relevant non-state actors to participate in the 
formulation and implementation of ACP-EC cooperation’ (2003: 110). Therefore, the rationale for 
producing the guide was for these non-state actors to be fully involved in cooperation, they need 
to be well informed on the contents of the Agreement, and on ways and means provided to them 
to participate effectively (2003: 2). Non-state actors are defined in the guide to comprise social and 
economic partners (trade unions), the private sector and civil society actors (these include civic 
associations, NGOs and informal groups of citizens). This broad definition of non-state actors aims to 
encourage participation of all kinds of organised groups as a way to involve citizens in deliberations 
and policies. The stated need for involvement is that the Cotonou Agreement is about a wide range 
of economic and social policies that affect the lives of ACP citizens in various and profound ways: 
‘The Cotonou Agreement is too important to be left to governments alone’ (2003: 6). 
The text of the agreement refers to non-state actors mainly in three parts: a) Article 2 
defines participation as a ‘fundamental principle’ of ACP-EU cooperation; b) Articles 4-7, a separate 
chapter, define basic rules and principles for the participation of non-state actors; and c) Article 
33 acknowledges the need of institutional development of non-state actors. The wording in 
the several chapters speaks of non-state actors having to be - ‘where appropriate’ - informed, 
consulted especially on issues of their concern, and involved in implementation of the cooperation. 
This wording allows for various interpretations as it is undefined who and how to judge the scope 
and limits of information provision and consultation and when it is appropriate. Furthermore, 
the Cotonou Agreement does not specify non-state actor involvement in the EPA negotiations. 
Apparently, the room for participation is broad, yet, how could broad involvement be compatible 
with the nature of trade negotiations in which confidentiality of positions and exchange of offers 
requires certain limits to information sharing? This specific challenge is not acknowledged in the 
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guide. Yet, special challenges to participation in the trade pillar are mentioned: mainly, lack of 
expertise in the complex and technical area of trade negotiations.  
The guide explains that participation is monitored through the joint ACP-EC institutions, 
particularly the Joint Parliamentary Assembly. These institutions are mandated to assess the 
progress in the implementation of the agreement, including the participation of non-state actors. 
The quality of participation by non-state actors and levels of financial support are included as 
performance indicators in the review progress. However, assessing quality of participation remained 
quite a challenging task. 
Challenges in organising and evaluating participation are related to two different and 
conflicting perceptions of non-state actors’ roles. They can be service-providers and partners in 
implementation of programmes or as partners in dialogue (advocacy agents). In both cases, there 
is an ambiguity about their capacities. On the one hand, they are lionised as partners; on the other, 
there seems to be a strong assumption that non-state actors lack knowledge and skills. Statements 
like this put their role into doubt: ‘Non-state actors share the responsibility for making this [success 
in participation] happen, but first they may have to do some ‘homework’ in order to become 
credible partners’ (2003: 80). 
This is especially conspicuous in relation to engagement in the trade pillar in which a capacity 
deficit is identified. This is evidenced in emphasis given to the need for capacity building, for 
example, reflected in the list of capacity needs. The main needs are:  information on WTO rules 
and EPAs negotiations, management skills, planning, financial accountability, IT skills, motivational 
skills, networking skills, leadership/dialogue skills (e.g. how to take the lead on an issue; how 
to link up with the authorities; how to present a case to political leaders, and follow it up), on 
representative structures, on writing skills (especially proposals), analytical skills and institutional 
learning. However, this elaborate list of specific skills and knowledge is not matched with a strategy 
or defined proposal of how to provide capacity building. In practice, capacity building is provided by 
well-established think-tanks or consultants, usually financed by donor agencies with a mainstream 
liberal approach to development, trade and social transformation. 
ACP governments seem to have a different view. The guide refers to a policy paper issued in 
2002 by the ACP Committee of Ambassadors in which non-state actors gain much more relevance 
in the negotiations. They are presented as important partners who could help complement and 
enhance ACP groups’ negotiating obligations, position and strategy (quoted in Guide, 2003: 28): 
Non-state actors should also be seen as partners that possess a wealth of knowledge, experience 
and expertise, and a strategy for the participation for non-state actors must include the possible 
utilisation of non-state actors to enhance the ACP Group’s negotiating and lobbying capabilities 
and capacities. Non-state actors are important partners that could be effectively utilised to 
communicate the positions of the ACP Group to other interest groups, lobby for support, and to 
inform the grassroots levels of society. 
Floating in perceptions of being both knowledge providers and actors in need of capacity, there were 
several instances in which participation took place, but these opportunities varied from country 
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to country. These were: a) National consultations on trade; b) Participation in negotiating teams; 
c) dialogues at the regional level and ACP-level; d) DG-trade initiatives such as the ‘Civil Society 
Dialogue’ and consultations as part of the implementation of Sustainability Impact Assessments 
(SIAs); and e) indirectly through links to the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), an 
important interlocutor at EU level. The guide also provides information on accessing funding to 
undertake the new assigned roles. These channels are mainly European Development Funds (EDF) 
managed by ACP countries and EU budget lines on priority areas, managed by the EC but which can 
be accessed directly or indirectly through partnerships with European-based organisations. 
All of these possibilities faced a number of limitations and challenges in relation to the quality 
and inclusiveness of participation. While it is acknowledged in the eligibility criteria that ‘special 
attention should be given to small and grassroots organisations which have the capacity to reach 
and represent, isolated and excluded parts of the population’ (Criteria for access to funding under 
EDF, 25 February 2003), the rules of engagement tend to limit and even discourage participation. 
Those invited to participate should represent ‘real added value’ in terms of knowledge, skills and 
legitimacy. But which groups are identified as representative, knowledgeable and credible? 
First, eligible actors and programmes to access funds and participate need to be recognised 
by ACP governments. In the case of the EC, programmes for non-state actors were designed and 
actors were identified via a mapping study at the beginning of the process. This is usually done by 
independent local or international consultants. Thus, there is a bias towards organisations that can 
make themselves be on the map, via offices in capitals and websites in English or other European 
languages. Second, the procedures of accountability involved in accessing and managing funds may 
be demanding in terms of time and resources (including human resources able to write proposals 
in the ‘right’ way and in official languages). Third, organisations may both be instrumentalised by 
governments and at the same time organisations may choose to use opportunities for other political 
purposes outside the scope of ACP-EU relations. This challenge is identified in the Guide (2003: 41): 
Politics may interfere in the process. Participation of non-state actors can be a sensitive matter. 
This holds particularly true for countries with fragile democratic traditions, where the government 
may consider non-state actors as ‘opposition forces’ rather than as ‘partners to be consulted and 
supported’
There is an ever-present ambiguity between credible and acceptable ways of participating and 
politics connoted in a negative way. In short, there were spaces open for participation, and in 
constant re-definition. In the next sections, the ways activities took advantages of these spaces is 
described. 
 
3.3 Activism with banners and reports in a South-north campaign
There was a diversity of organisations that mobilised around the EPAs: private aid agencies, research 
NGOs and solidarity groups predominantly in Europe; farmers associations, trade unions, private 
sector associations such as traders and manufacturers associations in West Africa. Other groups 
involved were environmentalists, women, students and youth groups. Evidence suggests it was 
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West African organisations that took the initiative of starting a campaign and asking for the support 
of their Northern partners. It is also in West Africa where activists saw more opportunities for 
influence (Trommer, 2011). Groups adopted different approaches to activism, and not all of them 
adopted forms of contentious activism, even some would not consider their work as activism.  It was 
an activism with ties and t-shirts. 
As a brief historical introduction, it is important to note that only a few organisations monitored 
closely and in a sustained way the negotiations of Lomé Agreements and the Cotonou Agreement 
between the EU and ACP countries. In Europe and in West Africa a few can be highlighted: Eurostep, 
ENDA Tiers Monde, Third World Network and ECDPM. It was only at the end of 2004 that some 
organisations started to mobilise around EPAs. A landmark is the launch of the STOP EPAs campaign 
at the European Social Forum in London, UK, and at the African Social Forum in Lusaka, Zambia. 
Before then most organisations had been following WTO negotiations. Other organisations joined 
and shared coordination tasks including Third World Network Africa, which coordinates the Africa 
Trade Network. At this initial stage there were about 15 active groups in 13 countries. 
In 2006, there were 30 groups and in the peak of the campaign in 2007 there were at least 217 
groups in 49 countries comprising seven regional networks and four international organisations.5 
There were students, women, local associations and church-based groups who wrote letters 
and joined activities (e.g. World Council of Churches, 2007). The growth and intensity of actions 
as well as their coordination through several coalitions cannot be understood without looking at 
the single organisations and their roles in facilitating or joining transnational activism regionally 
and bi-regionally. It is important to understand which kind of organisations mobilised, their main 
approaches to activism and trade, and their roles, main actions and positions in relation to EPAs. The 
main organisations are described, because it would be difficult to include all organisations involved 
in the campaign. The ones included were the building blocks of various forms of coalitions, some 
were thematic, others national, regional and bi-regional. Thus, the process of coalition-building 
and arriving to common and/or coordinated actions and messages constitutes the analysis of the 
following sections.
3.3.1 Approaches to activism in West Africa: dialogue and resistance accompanying 
strong state positions
Among the organisations6 that followed the negotiation process on an on-going basis, even since 
the negotiations of the Cotonou Agreement in West Africa, we find: a) two research and advocacy 
NGOs, ENDA, an international development and environmental NGO with offices in Dakar, and 
the Third World Network, with headquarters in Accra for its African activities; b) associations of 
5  This is calculated based on signatories of three key statements: a) Six reasons to oppose EPAs, 
November 2004, signed by 15 groups, from 13 countries, comprising one continental network, two international 
ones, and national forums/ coalitions; b) Harare Declaration, March 2006, signed by 30 groups in 19 countries; 
and, c) STOP EPAs Day Statement, 27 September 2007, signed by 217 groups from 49 countries, comprising 
seven regional networks and four organisations of global scope.  
6  Please, refer to the organisational glossary for more information on the organisations mentioned. 
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peasants and farmers, ROPPA regionally, and in Ghana, Ghana’s Trade and Livelihood Coalition; c) 
associations of traders and manufacturers, mainly in Nigeria, NANTS and MAN; d) trade unions; and 
e) local citizen associations of women and students. This section explains their involvement and 
approaches to activism.
One of ENDA’s main activities in relation to EPAs was the coordination of the West African Civil 
Society Platform on the Cotonou Agreement. On this capacity, ENDA represented the platform on 
the official ECOWAS negotiating team. Its role was to bring the perspectives of the platform members 
into the negotiations as well as to inform members of the main developments. It was engaged in 
the definition and execution of strategies and programmes as well as coordinating the actions of 
members of the platform. It organised several informative and discussion seminars, participated in 
the elaboration of a manual to improve understanding of the Cotonou agreements and published 
a bi-monthly bulletin called Passerelles which provides information on WTO negotiations and their 
implications for African countries. Published in French, it aimed to contribute to a wider access to 
information since most publications were dominated by the English language. 
The position of the West Africa Civil Society Platform on the Cotonou Agreement was that, 
rather than signing an EPA, efforts towards regional integration should be the priority. However, it 
wanted to remain involved in the process and as aware that a ‘no’ position would be marginalising. 
The statements and actions of the Platform reinforced the need for an agreement that would be 
pro-development. While participating in invited spaces with this position, members of the platform 
also engaged in contentious activism, organising public events and demonstrations. The coordinator 
explained that the pressure ‘outside’ was needed in order to be effective ‘inside’. An important part 
of the strategy of civil society actors was to be part of consultation bodies and, if possible, be part 
of official delegations, so as to influence the process of policy formation.7
With a regional office in Accra, Ghana, The Third World Network (TWN) was most closely 
involved in the negotiations and coordinated the actions in relation to EPAs through the Africa Trade 
Network (ATN). The main position of TWN-Africa and ATN was that EPAs negotiations should be 
stopped. They explained: ‘From the start our position was STOP EPAs. There was only one EPA on the 
table: a free trade agreement. We did not need a free trade agreement to be WTO compatible. This 
was our starting point. For us it meant categorically, STOP EPAs’.8 With such a categorical rejection, 
TWN involved in contentious activism and, at the same time, was active in trying to influence agendas 
and positions. TWN-Africa’s strength was its insider strategies, and so it focused on intensifying the 
technical position and knowledge of the negotiators. Yet, TWN perceived that their actions were 
enhanced when backed by groups such as farmers and trade unions, which mobilised in numbers as 
they felt they would be the most negatively affected by an agreement. Thus, a combination of types 
of actions was implemented. TWN also developed relationships with journalists, providing them 
with briefings and explanations on complex issues. For example, it organised a radio debate with 
7  Telephone interview conducted by coordinator of regional African network in the context of the 
Oxfam evaluation, November 2009.
8  Interview with activist, Accra, May 2009. 
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other groups that were pro-EPAs. In sum, its engagement was on three levels: (1) mobilise so as to 
make the agreement too expensive to sign in political terms; (2) at technical level, their proposals 
were anti-free trade proposals which conflicted with predominant pro-liberalisation approaches 
and, (3) campaign and mobilise to prevent the agreement from being ratified – that is, engagement 
with parliamentarians. 
ROPPA (Réseau des organisations paysannes et des producteurs de l’Afrique de l’Ouest – in 
English, Network of farmer and peasant organisations of West Africa) was an active and central 
actor throughout the negotiations. Its approach to advocacy is based on dialogue and negotiation, 
using a variety of tools and strategies. It based their positions on consultations with their members, 
undertook specific studies in partnership with other organisations and used media, lobbying and 
public mobilisations to make their positions known. It prepared proposals which it submitted to 
authorities (e.g. ROPPA, 2006). Its strength lies in its representativeness of ‘concentrated-interests’, 
especially in economic areas such as agriculture so vital for the livelihoods of most West Africans. Its 
network’s aim is to strengthen farmers’ voice and capacity to dialogue with states. It joined forces 
and created a regional network composed of national member organisations that aim to defend 
the values and interests of family and small-scale agriculture in the region. The funders of the 
network identified changes in their context that required mobilisation and joint regional responses: 
processes of regional integration, the demands to compete and integrate into global markets and 
processes of decentralisation. These changes created new configurations in state structures and 
therefore, both opportunities and constraints for dialogue. 
Magha Mohamadou, ROPPA’s coordinator, explained9 that it considered itself as a partner 
of the STOP EPAs campaign, that it understood advocacy at its own pace and with its own goals 
and autonomy. Because it did not say simply ‘STOP’, it insisted on discussing the conditions and 
characteristics of the agreement. He explained that to engage effectively in the negotiations 
ROPPA organised several training and information sessions for leaders. He explained that in 
certain countries, it had a direct, fluid and on-going dialogue with relevant ministries. For this, the 
organisation undertook several research studies. In one of them a methodology was developed 
to identify sensitive products. This shows that ROPPA did not limit itself to defend a certain list of 
products, but rather it looked at how the list was designed in the first place. An important aspect of 
its approach to advocacy is that it sees its work as on-going in longer-time frames and not organised 
as episodic or short-term campaigns. ‘We don’t work according to campaigns, we do not change 
of development paradigm every two or three years, we are in the continuity of our actions’ Mr. 
Mohamadou explained. 
In Ghana, one of the most active organisations was the Ghana Trade and Livelihood Coalition. 
Its coordinator, Ibrahim Akalbila, had been following the negotiations since 2002 as he had been 
the Trade Advocacy officer for ISODEC, one of the initiators of the platform. Mr. Akalbila followed 
the meetings of ATN since 2004. In this sense, he could recollect the continuity in their actions.10 In 
9  Telephone interview, November 2009. 
10  Interview with activist in Accra, May 2009. 
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2006 the Coalition joined the STOP EPAs campaign. Its actions combined a series of events, training 
seminars and dialogue with policy makers. Akalbila noted that it was not possible to mobilise on the 
EPAs without being able to have a certain language to make it relevant for people’s lives. It worked 
on sensitisation for about one year (2005). They used the analogy between EPAs and what Ghana 
has gone through – Structural Adjustment programmes under the advice of the IMF and World Bank. 
The Coalition developed a series of posters with strong images depicting a causal chain of negative 
consequences such as unemployment, bankruptcy and privatisation of public services as a result of 
implementation of liberalisation of markets. One of its posters appears in Figure 3 in which there is 
a strong and symbolic link between EPAs and slavery.  Mr. Akalbila explained that the Coalition was 
aware of how provocative the posters were but that it wanted to steer the discussions. It built on 
the experiences of farmers in this process and made inferences to the possible negative implications 
of signing a EPAs. It developed training materials to reach groups across the country. The focus was 
on linking the general process to real local situations. It organised workshops as a platform but these 
were then followed by workshops organised by the local farmer’s organisations themselves. This 
was the backbone of the strategy: to build up an informed and equipped constituency of farmers, 
developing their capacities to analyse the issues and to advocate effectively. Its aim was to build up 
the confidence of farmers and provide tools and spaces for them to interact with policy makers. It 
reached out to media as well. Events were publicised through the radio. At peak moments of the 
campaign in 2007 it estimated that, in a period of 4 weeks, every day there was a critical article on 
EPAs.
In relation to dialogue with policy makers, the Coalition had access to parliamentarians, but 
it was quite a challenge to access Ministers. Ikalbila explained that in some occasions only when 
mobilised to the doors of the Ministry, the Ministers then had no alternative to meet. ‘It is necessary 
to show the numbers to get meetings’ he noted. In one occasion, he recalls: ‘The Minister of Trade 
had to come to the Parliament to explain the state-of-play of the negotiations and Ghana’s position’. 
The Coalition took the initiative to engage with the government rather than the government to 
consult with civil society. Since 2009 the new government took the initiative to convene a meeting 
with civil society actors. When the government members were part of the opposition party, they 
had already been sensitised by activities at the parliamentary sub-committees. They assess that 
they contributed significantly to this process. 
The National Association of Nigerian Traders (NANTS) engaged in several activities in relation 
to EPAs. NANTS organised informative seminars and edited publications and news bulletins (Trade 
Policy Monitor). Two important aspects of its strategy was to form a Parliamentary Forum on Trade 
and to work with journalists, especially those covering economic affairs, providing them with 
training and up-to-date information. It also joined popular demonstrations such as the 1st May 
National Rally on Workers Day. Mr. Ukahoa explained11 that since NANTS was strategically based 
in Abuja, it assisted the West African Civil Society Platform, representing it in some occasions in 
ECOWAS meetings. It is also worth noting that NANTS’ office hosts the Federal Government of 
11  Interview with activist Abuja, May 2009. 
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Nigeria’s technical committee. It assesses its actions as successful in terms of affecting the content 
and process of negotiations. In Mr. Ukahoa´s view the keys to the campaign’s success were evidence-
based involvement in the policy process (studies, lobby) and pressure on the public opinion (media 
and demonstrations). The STOP EPAs campaign was very important. He highlighted how important it 
was to place itself in strategy consultation spaces in ECOWAS and working closely with the Nigerian 
government: ‘We made friends with those that some people only think are our enemies, we open 
channels of communication. Their (advocacy targets) eyes are open sometimes. Sometimes we 
recognise some of their points, in doing that people see it as an organisation that looks at things in 
a balanced manner’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Stop EPAs (Source: Ghana Trade and Livelihood Coalition)
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Rasheed Adegbenro12 of the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) explained that MAN 
did not join the STOP EPAs campaign, that it had different mandates and advocacy strategies in 
comparison with other organisations. It did engage in several activities. MAN’s advocacy is based on 
dialogue and so its main activities were workshops, trainings, publications and direct involvement in 
the negotiations. Through these activities it believes that different parties could understand better 
from where the other was coming and this can lead to changes in positions. For example, MAN 
received support from DFID to organise events such as the MAN-NESG (Nigerian Economic Summit 
Group) Workshop on EU-ECOWAS on Economic Partnership Agreement Negotiations of 15-16 May 
2008.  
Mr. Adegbenro considered that it was quite influential and that the government of Nigeria 
took up MAN’s concerns strongly. He noted: 
The government does not trade, it is companies that trade. The government has to promote a 
conducive environment for trade, and we are saying this channel is not conducive and it is not 
good for our development. No sector in Nigeria was for EPAs. Even subsidiaries of Transnational 
Corporations like Unilever and Nestle opposed EPAs. When there was a meeting with EC officials, 
all sectors sang the same song and the EC was made aware of the concerns and level of resentment
He believed that the EPAs had an EC-driven agenda and when asked they replied that ‘there is no 
plan B or no alternative’.
The last main group involved were trade unions. The national federations of trade unions were 
active in mobilising around EPAs in the three countries this study examined: the Ghana Trade Union 
Congress (GTUC), the National Confederation of Workers of Senegal (CNTS in its French acronym) 
and the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC). It is important to present some of their activities and how 
they joined or related to the EPAs campaign. GTUC in partnership with FES stated they were active 
in the West African Trade Union Working group on Trade and Development. They organised visits of 
trade union representatives to institutions such as ECOWAS, UNCTAD, WTO, the South Centre and 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation of EU members. 
The Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs du Sénégal (CNTS) is part of a committee of trade 
unions that follow the EPAs negotiations. This committee is within the platform and looks at issues 
particularly from the perspective of workers rights and employment. It also cooperated with Oxfam, 
Action Aid, and CONGAD to organise several activities. It has been engaged in the campaign ‘No 
to EPAs in their current form’. It organised workshops, mobilisation, manifestations involving their 
members and producers. In an interview with Sékène Gningue,13 the trade union leader explained 
that CNTS has to mobilise in a context of global crisis. He also believes much work needs to be 
done first to integrate markets regionally and later, to open up and negotiate with other regions. 
The EPAs would not reinforce regional integration in Mr. Gningue´s view.  The main difficulty for the 
trade unions was to share all the information they received with their members (avec les militants 
12  Interview with activist Abuja, May 2009. 
13  Interview with activist Dakar, May 2009. 
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à la base) and to make them involved. There is little real appropriation of the issue by members and 
even among some of the leadership. They did not understand how these negotiations would affect 
them directly, in their working conditions and employment. They focus on their sectoral – corporate 
demands (intérêts revendicatifs) and they have difficulties in making this link. They tried to face 
this challenge by dialogue and discussions. They tried to highlight the possible negative effects of 
already signed agreements and policies. It is a permanent dialogue and sensitization efforts. The 
EPAs contributed to make workers understand more and more the links between macroeconomic 
policies and their lives. According to the interviewee, the capacities of analysis have been enhanced. 
Finally, the NLC participated in the Nigerian Trade Initiative and mobilised in numbers on special 
occasions such as 1 May in Abuja and major cities.
The special role of CNTS was to be the voice of workers and their strength was that they could 
show numbers in the streets. They brought legitimacy to claims due to their representativeness 
at national, regional and international levels. Though in Europe it seems their engagement was 
more limited, in West Africa, especially since 2007, their support and involvement was crucial.  They 
received support from FES Stiftung and they developed links with other trade unions and type of 
actors.
Finally, there were various other associations involved though there is evidence only of their 
episodic participation in general campaign activities or in single activities of their own initiative. 
Among them, Oxfam evaluation documents refer to the APROVAL (Association des Professionnelles 
de l’Alimentation pour la Valorisation des Produits Locaux, in English, Association of Food 
Professionals for the Valorisation of Local Products), an association of women in Senegal, joining 
actions on 8 March 2007. APROVAL gathered signatures and walked with banners and messages 
to the National TV and Radio stations. An Internet search shows that associations of students and 
youth joined demonstrations in Senegal in January 2008. 
In sum, we find that in West Africa approaches to activism combined involvement in dialogue 
with policy makers, mobilisations in the streets with strong and critical positions. These positions 
accompanied and reinforced originally strong positions of West Africa as we have described at the 
beginning of this chapter. 
3.3.2 Approaches to activism in Europe: dialogue, network building and development 
In Europe the most active organisations were private aid agencies and development-oriented and 
solidarity organisations.  There were European federations and networks that took the initiative 
and coordinated main actions at regional and global levels and many organisations also organised 
activities at local and national levels. I describe here those of the ones that took up most activities 
in terms of events and publications and were perceived during the interviews as most central by 
other actors. 
Eurostep was among the first to follow closely the negotiations of the Cotonou Agreement 
and the first period of the negotiations14 together with 11.11.11. The Belgian platform dedicated 
14  Interview with Mirjam van Reisen in Brussels in May 2008. 
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the period of 2006-2007 to agriculture and in 2007 its main focus was the STOP EPA Campaign. 
However, 11.11.11. was among the first organisations to closely follow the negotiations. The person 
responsible for the trade policy, Marc Maes15, participated in the CLONG group (later CONCORD)16 
and followed WTO negotiations.  He recounts that few organisations were paying attention to the 
trade aspects of the Cotonou Agreement, which, in his view, was unfortunate. The first actions of 
the incipient coalition actions were to influence the mandate that the EC proposes for itself but 
which has to be given by the Council. On the launch of the negotiations on 27 September 2002 
there was a statement of CLONG in which it was pointed out to press present at the event about 
their concerns. After this, its focus was to build relations with other organisations and disseminate 
information, thus the EPA Watch Site was created. In April 2004 there was a meeting initiated by 
the Dutch organisation Both Ends at the offices of 11.11.11. in Brussels. Mr. Maes recalls that this 
was a key meeting in which the idea of the STOP EPAs campaign was born. It was a meeting to 
share analysis and to brainstorm on a joint message. The aim of the message was to STOP EPAs as 
proposed by the EC, a far-reaching free trade agreement. By 2006 the analysis made was that EPAs 
were proposed by the EC as ambitious free trade agreements when what was agreed in the Cotonou 
agreement was a WTO-compatible trade regime, which is not necessarily the same.  Marc Maes 
explained in a presentation on 12 October 2006 (11.11.11., 2006):
Civil society organisations would add [to ACP concerns] that while regional markets are being 
built, the Cotonou waiver could be extended or an improved GSP+ could be offered. Reciprocity or 
market opening should not be considered before regional integration is bearing fruit, intra regional 
trade has expanded, diversification has occurred and employment has grown.
In this way, one of the aims of the campaign was to highlight that there were options when the EU 
was stressing that EPAs were the only alternative. 
Since 2006, 11.11.11. played facilitation and coordination roles of the emerging coalition. 
As a representative of an organisation based in Brussels, it played a broker position among various 
kinds of organisations, large private aid agencies, small solidarity groups and organisations from ACP 
countries. The most visible activities were organised in September 2007 and this involved gathering 
signatures in support of a petition to the Belgian Government. Its aim was to raise public awareness 
for this problem and convince the Belgian government to reconsider its position on this issue. it 
organised a national STOP EPA-day on 26 October 2007. On that day, and in the following weeks, 
375 volunteer groups organised actions to invite people to sign the petition (in schools, and public 
places such as squares, markets and train stations). 
Oxfam International joined the campaign later than other private aid agencies. In 2002, 
Oxfam International had launched the Make Trade Fair Campaign. The main point was to challenge 
the unfair rules of the international trade system. For Oxfam, trade generates wealth and is a tool 
to fight poverty, yet poor countries are not benefiting as much as they could and are even losing 
15  Interviews in Brussels in March and April 2009. 
16  CLONG is the Liaison Committee of Non Governmental Development Organisations (NGDOs) set up 
in 1975. CONCORD is the new umbrella established in 2003 succeeding CLONG. 
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due to ‘rigged’ rules. Oxfam’s assessment is that rules favour rich countries, which are the ones 
who set the rules. Furthermore, rich countries are inconsistent; while favouring free trade, they 
highly subsidise certain sectors such as agriculture, constituting unfair competition for farmers in 
developing countries. This campaign was highly criticised for focusing too much on market access 
and promoting a paradigm of development centred in export-oriented growth (Walden Bello, Focus 
on the Global South, 26 April 2006) 
Their work on EPAs stemmed out of Oxfam’s Make Trade Fair Campaign. It was referred by 
interviewees that other organisations had started to mobilise on EPAs since 2003 and it was later 
that Oxfam joined an already existing campaign. Both Oxfam and its Southern partner organisations 
coincided on the decision for Oxfam to get involved was much influenced by their Southern allies 
and partners’ demands. This is significant as it was organisations in the South setting the agenda 
and priorities. It was a South-North campaign, rather than a North-South one, driven by Northern 
definitions of the problem. 
The main story-line in publications was that Europe, stronger in terms of technology and 
economic power and subsidised agriculture, was pushing for new trade rules to open less advanced 
ACP countries, which would then increase poverty, rather than reduce it. Oxfam is not against 
competition per se, but rather against unfair competition which would put the lives of vulnerable 
populations at higher risk (Oxfam International, 2010). 
As so often with unfair trade rules, double standards are at work. Europe promised that sustainable 
development would be at the heart of any new trade deal. Instead, its proposals will deny African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries the right to protect their new, future and established 
industries, a right that has been used over many years by rich European countries in building their 
developed economies. African, Caribbean and Pacific countries would prefer trade agreements 
that take into account their particular development needs, but Europe is not yet listening to their 
concerns (My emphasis).
The main ideas coming out of statements revolve around two central ideas: the first is about 
countries’ development needs and rights. The idea of the right to protect local industries and a 
language of rights in general is ever-present. The second idea is about the role of the EU. Statements 
reinforce its identity as a committed donor who should not use double standards and who should 
listen to its partners’ concerns. Statements appeal to European commitments in terms of policy 
coherence, human rights and support for development. 
The importance of the involvement of Oxfam lies in both its language of rights and 
development backed by its international brand and credibility and its financial support. Oxfam 
allocated important financial and human resources to the STOP EPAs campaign and due to their 
organisation being a federation it could be active in various ACP regions and capitals. Its engagement 
was guided by its internally agreed ‘Southern campaigning principles’ which stipulate that Oxfam 
should have a support and networking role in relation to its partners in Southern countries. Their 
role as advocates was to be unfolded in their own national policy spaces. Though different Oxfam 
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affiliates joined the campaign in different ways, Oxfam as a federation, was perceived as one of the 
most central network players. 
Other smaller foundations and agencies also joined the campaign and emphasised specific 
issue areas. The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) was not among the visible activists but organised 
and supported with funding several studies, seminars and informative sessions. For example, it 
organised the Regional workshop on International Economics and Regional Integration: Trade 
and Development in September 2004 in Benin, training and informative sessions for journalists in 
Bamako and Accra in 2005, workshops and meetings of trade unions in cooperation with GAWU and 
GTUC in 2005, and debates in the context of the UNCTAD XII Conference in Accra in 2008. 
Although European private aid agencies adopted different approaches, they shared common 
characteristics. Their main contribution was to be the main mobilisers and advocates in Europe, 
both nationally and in Brussels. They were among the first to produce easily accessible language 
materials for campaigning, translating difficult technical documents into manuals and booklets (e.g. 
CAFOD, 2004). They were able to do so because of their financial and human resources as well 
as their campaigning experience. A note-worthy example was the Manual on FTAs written jointly 
by Oxfam International, Action Aid and Christian Aid (2007) which facilitated the involvement of 
more actors. They played key information sharing facilitating roles which was possible due to their 
staff being multi-lingual and located in capitals in Europe and ACP countries as well as rural areas. 
They shared a rights-based approach, in some cases more explicit than others. But they all argued 
for central development dimensions in the agreements. They did not oppose EPAs per se; they 
challenged the definition of WTO-compatibility of the EU, as a rather ambitious reciprocal free trade 
agreement. 
Finally, ECDPM was an important and active actor. It did not join any campaign, but rather 
contributed to the process substantially and cooperated with some of the campaigning organisations, 
for example, in the study ‘Alternatives (to) EPAs’ (ECDPM, 2006). Its aim is to improve relations 
and cooperation between the EU and ACP countries. In this section, its main characteristics and 
approaches to advocacy are presented. ECDPM had facilitation, advisory and informative roles in 
relation to the EPAs negotiations in the context of its Economic and Trade Cooperation programme. 
It was a central broker of information among all actors, especially with close links to ACP countries. 
ECDPM’s teams produced numerous publications, contributed to and organised multiple type of 
seminars and managed various channels of information services. Its database of publications is rich 
and mostly consists of more than 100 discussion papers on all aspects of the negotiations, ‘InBriefs’ 
and study reports. They produced also important reference documents such as the User’s Guide 
for Non-State Actors commissioned by the ACP secretariat in November 2003 as described in the 
previous section on opportunities and constraints for participation. 
In 2006, ECDPM published the study ‘Alternatives (to) EPAs: Possible scenarios for the 
future ACP trade relations with the EU’ (Policy Management Report 11) (ECDPM, 2006). Though 
it is an ECDPM report commissioned by Oxfam International and Both Ends, it is disclaimed that 
the study does not reflect necessarily the opinions and policy positions of these organisations, the 
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responsibility being only of the authors. The aim of this collaboration was to present, discuss and 
clarify the range of options in terms of trade arrangements with the EU available to ACP countries 
so that the development dimensions would remain central. The study: 
explains why a reciprocal free trade agreement is not the only possible strategy to ensure a WTO 
compatible market access agreement between EU and ACP countries. It also notes that the WTO 
rules on free trade agreements and on preferential treatment are somewhat open to interpretation. 
Moreover, in principle those rules can be changed, or an extension of the current waiver from 
WTO rules can be negotiated. Besides, the study also clarifies that the different items proposed 
in the negotiations do not necessarily need to be combined in one comprehensive agreement. 
Thus, the issue of WTO compatible trade preferences does not need to be linked to agreements on 
investment or competition, or services.
For ECOWAS negotiators, these explorations and extra information was considered of high value 
in the definition of their positions as will be further discussed. The role of ECDPM was crucial in 
the provision of reliable, easy-to-use and timely information. In relation to information services, 
ECPDM, together with ICTSD, edited until December 2011 Trade Negotiation Insights a bilingual 
French-English monthly publication on the major issues faced by African and ACP countries in 
their international trade negotiations at the WTO and with the EU in the context of the Cotonou 
Agreement. It manages the website www.acp-eu-trade.org, ‘a non-partisan sourcing and knowledge 
sharing on ACP-EU trade’, together with ECORYS, CTA, and supported by DFID, and edited the ACP-
EU News Weekly E-Alert, since July 2009 turned into the ‘Weekly Compass’. These information 
services became a reference point for both negotiators and interested parties, creating a virtual 
space for position sharing and encounter. Its e-bulletins also included references to news and events 
of the widest range of actors possible. In all its activities, ECPDM stresses its independence and non-
partisan role, thus, attempting to make analysis available and bring all perspectives and voices to 
the fore so that ACP negotiators could make informed decisions. 
There were also international federations and associations with headquarters in Europe 
which were active, mainly trade unions and associations such as Friends of the Earth International. 
The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), and their members, ACP trade unions, 
the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU) and World Confederation of Labour (WCL), followed the implementation of the Cotonou 
Agreement since 2000. Their involvement and statements are worthwhile noting given their level 
of representativeness: ITUC is the main international trade union organisation, representing the 
interests of working people worldwide. It has 301 affiliated member organisations in 151 countries 
and territories, with a total membership of 176 million workers. In 2002 a joint trade union 
memorandum pointed out major challenges. Members of the EU-ACP Trade Union Group met with 
EU officials to discuss a number of concerns in relation to labour standards, the promotion of decent 
work, social dialogue, gender equality and migration. A joint trade union report was published 
and distributed among participating federations. The report stressed positive aspects such as the 
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opportunities for non-state actors’ participation. However, it also stressed concerns such as the 
limitations in meaningful participation as well as the fact that central issues such as decent work, 
social protection and social rights may not receive due consideration. Trade unions pressed for the 
inclusion of a qualitative analysis of the application of those articles concerning the participation of 
non-state actors; and a qualitative analysis of the social aspects of Cotonou’s National or Regional 
Indicative Programmes (NIPs or RIPs) in its mid-term review in 2005. In a speech delivered at the DG-
Trade organised conference in November 2006 by John Monks, General Secretary of ETUC (2006) 
criticises the apparent lack of coherence of the EC and the reluctance to include labour rights as 
part of the EPAs. Though he acknowledges that Art. 50 on labour rights is part of the Cotonou 
Agreement, he states that this article is ‘wholly promotional and has resulted in virtually no EU 
assistance on promoting core labour standards. He concludes: ‘solutions need to be found to stop 
the current delinking of trade policy from social, developmental and environmental considerations’. 
In April 2007, ETUC published a Guide and Trade Union Dossier for Boosting the Capabilities 
of ACP Trade Unions in the Economic Partnership Agreements (ETUC, 2007b). This guide aimed to 
be a ‘resource for negotiators from the trade unions by offering analyses of central points with a 
view to promoting the social and human dimensions of the EPAs’. In their analysis they question the 
reduced vision of development cooperation observed in the past years of EU-ACP relations which 
could not be reduced to the ‘gradual integration in the world market by the free market forces, 
the strengthening of competitive capacities of products and resources from ACP countries’. When 
analysing the Cotonou Agreement in particular, trade unions point out their concerns regarding 
some ambiguities and limitations in relation to the free-trade aspects that appear to prevail over 
other aspects such as political dialogue or cooperation. Their analysis also highlights the possible 
social and economic risks of trade liberalisation as well as the limitations in capacities to implement 
social objectives and consultation processes of a participatory approach. 
In terms of action, some trade unions organised public protests and joined key days of action 
such as the STOP EPAs day on 27 September 2007. On the same day, a joint public letter from 
ETUC and ITUC to Peter Mandelson requested an extension of the negotiation period given the 
lack of progress and the consequences a flawed agreement would have for poor countries (ETUC, 
2007a). The letter argues for maintenance of preferences given their belief based on precedents 
that WTO membership would not challenge this extension. They conclude: ‘It would also be the 
appropriate political message to send to those, both in Europe and in Africa, who are increasingly 
questioning the benefits of free trade’. Furthermore, at its General Council meeting in December 
2007, the ITUC adopted a resolution (ITUC, 2007) on EPAs denouncing flaws in the negotiation 
process, leading some governments to sign up to interim agreements that may undermine existing 
regional integration processes, cause serious employment losses and deprive governments of tariffs 
revenues vitally needed for public services and investment. In its resolution, the ITUC calls upon 
the EU to refocus its negotiating objectives towards obtaining real development for ACP countries. 
Several ITUC affiliates took part in the public demonstrations beginning in January 2008 
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organised in Dakar and Brussels. On this occasion, ITUC released a press statement expressing 
its strong view that EPAs ‘require fundamental changes in order to promote genuine trade and 
development opportunities for the ACP’. 
Last but not least, Friends of the Earth (FOE) brought an environmental lens to activism. FOE 
became involved in the EPAs both through groups based in ACP and European countries as well 
as through its office in Brussels, Friends of the Earth-Europe. From April 6-11, 2008, FoE Europe 
hosted the international gathering of activists on EU Free Trade Agreements in Brussels. The 
events, organised jointly by trade campaign networks from Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America 
were attended by more than 100 activists from 38 countries across the world. Campaigners had 
the unique opportunity to share experiences, exchange information and develop joint strategies 
to counter the increased number of European Free Trade Agreements. Activists also had the 
opportunity to present their views to members of the European parliament and build up support 
for their demands during a well-attended public hearing in the European Parliament. Social and 
Environmental Standards in EU FTAs - Presentation to the Special Committee on Globalisation of 
the Belgian Parliament, 20 June 2008 (FOE-E, 2008).  In 2008 Friends of the Earth UK published the 
Report ‘Undercutting Africa, Economic Partnership Agreements, forests and the European Union’s 
quest for Africa’s raw materials’. 
Friends of the Earth believes that Economic Partnership Agreements have the potential to seriously 
damage both the economy and the environment in ACP countries, especially in view of the fact that 
EPAs are likely to contain liberalisation commitments that could have negative impacts on forests, 
biodiversity and forest-dependent communities. As such, EPA negotiations should be stopped, and 
those agreements that have already been initialled should be repealed. Instead, the EU and its 
member states should focus on developing a real, equitable partnership with the ACP, ensuring 
additional financial and practical support to ACP countries so that they can develop genuinely fair 
and sustainable societies (My emphasis).
FOE argued that the EPAs were neither good for the economy nor for the environment. They based 
their position on the principles of fairness and sustainability, re-signifying them and supporting their 
statements with their own studies. The special role of FOE was to provide expertise on a particular 
thematic area: the environment. It shared overall concerns and was critical on liberalisation of 
services and behind-the-border regulations for development, but always emphasised the link 
between poverty reduction and environmental sustainability.  
In sum, organisations in Europe were mostly think tanks, private aid agencies and citizen’s 
associations with a special expertise and concern for development in ACP countries. They were 
active in the definition of what development should mean in practice and how it should be translated 
in the agreement. They mostly used dialogue and participation in invited spaces trying to influence 
the agenda and specially, the EU’s approach to the negotiations. They also supported financially and 
logistically the articulation of a South-North campaign.
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Table 2. Story-line of key actions in West Africa and Europe (2004-2008)
2004
January 2004. Briefing paper by CONCORD on EPAS
October 2004. Launch of the STOP EPAs Campaign at the European Social Forum in London and at the African 
Social Forum in Lusaka
November 2004. Production of paper ‘Six Reasons to Oppose EPAs in their Current Form’
2005
February 2005. Action Aid published report on EPAs
April 2005. Participation in Joint Parliamentary Assembly in Bamako. A speech is delivered by a Ghanaian 
trade union leader
July 2005. Representatives of the West African Trade Union Working group on Trade and Development meet 
officials of ECOWAS and the EU
December 2005. Events and demonstrations at the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting
2006
February 2006. Presentation of study by ECDPM ‘Alternatives (to) EPAs’, commissioned by Oxfam International
March 2006. Africa Trade Network launches global call for action against EPAs
April 2006. ROPPA issues proposal
April 2006. 2nd ACP Civil Society Forum in Brussels. 
27 September 2006. STOP EPAs Day. Actions in various locations
Launch of Briefing Paper ‘Unequal Partners’ by Oxfam International
October 2006. Farmers and workers tour in Europe. 
October 2006. Workshop hosted by South Centre and co-organised with 11 NGOs
October 2006. Demonstrations and workshops in Niamey
2007
January 2007. Various activities at the World Social Forum in Nairobi, Kenya. Collection of signatures 
March 2007. Meeting of organisations with EU Development Ministers in Bonn
April 2007. E-mail action - 21.000 people sent an email to Merkel and Day of Action targeting the German 
government (EU German Presidency)
April 2007. ‘A Matter of Political Will’ is published jointly by Oxfam International and Third World Network 
Africa
1st May 2007. STOP EPAs March organised in Abuja. Nigeria Labour Congress estimates 10000 participants
27 September 2007. STOP EPAs Day. Actions in various locations. 60000 signatures collected only in Spain
December 2007. Civil Society Forum and related events around the AU-EU Summit in Lisbon.
2008
January 2008. Demonstrations in Dakar and Brussels gathering 3000 persons each
9 April 2008. Public debate at the European Parliament and demonstration outside the European Commission 
April 2008. Various actions at XII UNCTAD Conference in Accra. Presentation of ‘Partnership or Power-play’
Publication of ‘Dialogue of the Deaf’ by ICCO
September 2008. Actions on the occasion of the 6th ACP Ministerial Meeting in Accra, including a caravan 
travelling across Benin, Togo and Ghana
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3.4 Characteristics of transnational activism
Approaches and actions of the main involved organisations have been described. These actions 
show how organisations combined insider and outsider strategies, both in the North and South 
and that the involved organisations were both of concentrated and diffuse interests. This section 
analyses the emerging characteristics of activism as a set of forces, that is, as an emerging 
phenomena resulting from the combination of more or less coordinated individual organisational 
actions. The analytical framework identified the primary factors affecting transnational activism as 
the mobilisation capacity, its network building capacity and its discursive capacity. In the following 
paragraph the weight of each of these aspects of activism in the case of the EPAs campaign is 
analysed. 
3.4.1 Mobilisation capacity
In the period between 2004 and 2008, numerous actions were undertaken both in Europe and in 
West Africa with a peak of activities in 2007 and gradually fading in 2008 as illustrated in Figure 4 
and the Story-Line (Table 2). Based on observed actions, activities can be grouped as follows: 
a) Public and mass mobilisation actions: These include petitions, demonstrations in the public 
space and usually, outside the buildings where important meetings were taking place; 
b) Use of media: Production of TV and video ads or content, publication of articles in newspapers, 
blogs and participation in radio and TV programmes, mailing of press releases to news agencies; 
c) Direct meetings with policy makers (lobby) and participation in invited spaces: These include 
participation in public debates such as the Civil Society Dialogues organised by DG-Trade or at 
the European Parliament; 
d) Research: Production of reports which are used and circulated among academics, experts, 
advisors and policy makers; 
e) Informative and educational activities: These include presentations, seminars and training 
courses of a public nature; 
f) Preparatory and coalition building meetings; and 
g) Issue of public statements and positions which are posted on the Internet and circulated via 
mailings, in most cases, electronically. 
These actions required important financial, human and logistical resources. A few organisations 
were able to sustain their involvement over the whole period. These were specialised organisations 
whose aim is to monitor EU development and trade policies.  These organisations were the key 
network builders. However, most groups joined actions in 2007. Their activities were mostly 
petitions, street demonstrations, and e-activism and faded away after 2008. The funding of major 
private aid agencies also moved to other campaigns after 2008.  The financial investment was 
substantial and it allowed making the topic controversial and visible in the eyes of policy makers 
beyond those that follow closely and directly these issues. 
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1.3.2 Building networks and coalitions
As illustrated in Figure 5, most actions were undertaken in some form of collaboration with national, 
regional and international networks and umbrella of coalitions. Only 12% of actions reported were 
organised by a single organisation. Although there may have been more activities at a local level 
done by single organisations which were not recorded, there is a clear trend towards working 
in collaboration with others and through established networks. There were important efforts to 
coordinate and implement joint actions. Networks and various forms of exchange and collaboration 
were built across geographical and ideological borders. This is why coalition formation and dynamics 
is described in this section.  
Figure 4. Actions per type and year
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Several platforms and coalitions worked on trade and development issues and decided to engage in 
and facilitate transnational activism on EPAs. Some were created to follow the Cotonou Agreement 
as a campaign platform. Pre-existing national and local civil society platforms such as the Senegalese 
Social Forum, the Nigeria Trade Initiative and PASCIB joined regional, continental and international 
networks and platforms. At the regional level in West Africa, the West African Civil Society Platform on 
the Cotonou Agreement, facilitated by ENDA, took up the leading role, supported and in cooperation 
with the Africa Trade Network, coordinated by TWN-Africa. According to Tetteh Hormeku (TWN-
Africa) one of the great achievements of the EPA campaign was the respectful cooperation that was 
generated among participants in the campaign, all over Africa. In Europe, organisations gathered 
around CONCORD, the European Trade Network and the Seattle to Brussels Network. 
The webs of coalitions and platforms can seem confusing. Yet it was a few key individuals that 
played the role of connectors. Actions were organised so that different organisations took up specific 
roles at their level of operation: awareness-raising at local level, advocacy at national and regional 
levels, and coordination at international levels. Individual organisations and platforms started to use 
already existing channels of communications and networks to exchange and discuss possible actions 
in relation to EPAs. For example, the World Social Forum, and its regional and national forums as 
well as trade related meetings served as a space for encounter and coordination. Through existing 
campaign such as the Make Fair Trade Campaign or ‘Our World is not for Sale’ connections among 
organisations and movements had been built already. In that sense, there was a strong continuity 
among those following WTO negotiations, EU policies, the Cotonou Agreement and the groups that 
finally mobilised around EPAs. 
A bi-regional (STOP) EPA Coalition emerged in 2004. Although the coalition was loose in its 
organisational form, there was a core coalition formed by key European and ACP groups, and a 
wider coalition including various networks and spontaneous movements. At the core, there were 
two research and advocacy NGOs from West Africa, ENDA and TWN-Africa, an association of traders 
based in Abuja, which facilitated European private aid agencies in Europe. European private aid 
agencies also provided funding. A wider set of groups converged on key days of action such as the 
Stop EPAs days in September 2006, 2007 and 2008. The regional and world social forums served as 
a meeting and coordination place. 
Regional network organisations played crucial roles in articulating the multi-regional 
network given their international work and connections and providing expertise. A bi-regional 
negotiation created opportunities and incentives for a bi-regional collaboration and coordination. 
A representative of a regional network explained:17 
Having this relationship [ATN] with European groups reinforced our positions and also reinforced 
our legitimacy. Because they are in Europe, they can speak to their governments to put pressure on 
European and African governments and come up with common positions. (…) We have analytical 
capacity, we all share these things in pursue of agreed political …But when the actual intervention 
comes, particularly in the South, we should take the lead. They take the lead in the North. We 
17  Interview in Accra April 2008.
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should create platforms in both places where we can (…). The way the work is organised starting 
from the assumption that the weight of the power in the EPAs is of course in the North and 
therefore they [Northern partners] have a very important role.
In this extract the activist explains how the South-North network was articulated and how groups in 
different regions had important and complementary roles to play. He makes explicit the assumptions 
of benefits in establishing these relationships: increased legitimacy, channels of communication 
with the different governments and augmented pressure if there were more groups acting together. 
Interviewees working for national organisations explained that, through participating in 
regional and international networks, they had access to resources and information, that otherwise, 
would have been difficult to access. For example, MAN in Nigeria explained that they ‘accessed 
research that otherwise MAN would not have been able to produce’ and ‘international organisations 
have been very dynamic and has supported and challenged the negotiation process at the same 
time. They have been very vocal. They brought credibility to our positions’. He mentioned how 
important was to get strong statements from European members of parliament such as Glennys 
Kinnock. 
What was decisive was the kind of relations with states this core bi-regional network was able 
to establish. First, Brussels-based actors could channel information to the other regions and vice-
versa; capital-based organisations could feed information about national and regional positions. Links 
to those West African states which seemed more concerned and reluctant to sign the EPAs proved 
helpful as they were more receptive to alternative ideas and studies. In this sense, the network and 
coalition building capacity was high and allowed flows of information and communication. 
However, working together also implied dealing with challenges. First, there were various 
understandings of the EPAs within each region. Organisations work within more or less explicit 
policy paradigms and intervention strategies. The basic positioning of organisations in relation 
to the type of their preferred strategies and ideas is illustrated in Figure 6. Second, there were 
tensions regarding roles and representation, still latent from the history of relations and nature of 
partnerships especially between Northern private aid agencies and its counter-parts in the South. 
3.4.3 The quest for a common message: what was transnational activism about?
Though several actions were undertaken jointly or/and in coordination, coherence or a single message 
cannot be assumed. The analysis of texts in the context of different actions shows us this diversity. 
Most texts put emphasis on the fact that ACPs were not ready to sign a free trade agreement, thus 
asked for flexibility, support to deal with supply-side constrains and one organisation highlighted the 
need for a study of differentiated impacts and gender.  
Broader open coalitions were led by ATN which explicitly challenged neoliberalism and the 
corporate-led agenda of the EU. Two inputs that are somehow differentiated from the general trends 
are those of Via Campesina and Friends of the Earth. Via Campesina statement explicitly challenges 
the underlying neoliberal principles of international trade and based their position on the need for 
a new system to secure food sovereignty (Via Campesina, 2006). FOE highlights the need to study 
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trade liberalisation in terms of the possible negative consequences on resources exploitation and 
privatisation of environmental services. The main approaches to activism in terms of actions and 
ideas are illustrated in Figure 6. Though this illustration may indicate that organisations had static 
positions, this was not the case. Rather, the aim of the picture is to show the main tendencies and 
distances between positions. But most importantly, the picture shows most organisations in the 
centre of the figure, combining different approaches due to context and time, rather than thinking 
of them as contradictory. For example, European private aid agencies are placed in the middle of 
the picture. They believed in the complementarities of strategies, combining public campaigning 
and dialogue. They also had overall reformist positions. Friends of the Earth and Via Campesina 
were groups that challenged the assumptions of the liberal economic paradigm, from the point of 
view of its environmental and social sustainability and proposing concepts like food sovereignty. 
Via Campesina also explicitly challenged some of the invited spaces and they chose deliberately 
not to participate in them. Since the process of coalition formation is more dynamic than simply 
the juxtaposition of different positions, a chronological analysis is necessary. It is important to look 
at how ideas were discussed, which argumentation strategies were used and how meanings of the 
EPAs and development appeared in joint texts and positions. 
A key starting-point text was the one jointly signed by both European and ACP groups at the 
beginning of the campaign in 2004, ‘Six Reasons to Oppose EPAs in their Current Form’. The purpose 
of this paper was to respond to and clarify the reasons for opposing EPAs in their current form, that 
is, as proposed by the EU. The text shows high intertextuality: it contains 18 direct quotes and 42 
references to non-campaign issued documents in a 6 pages document. However, it is striking that 
all of these quotes and references are related to official documents or persons with high academic 
credentials. No quote appears by either coalition members or related civil society groups that would 
be affected by the EPAs. Though it is a position paper, the voices of ‘we’ or ‘civil society’ seem to 
be hidden. The legitimation strategy of these arguments is not built only on ‘unreasonable’ claims 
from civil society, but mostly from references to many ‘official’ voices that support these claims. 
In this sense, legitimation is built by making references to authorities (most notably ACP officials, 
parliamentarians); and on rationalisation, appealing to existing agreed rules in the frame of the 
WTO and UN, and references to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
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The whole text is built to challenge the EU approach to the EPAs by presenting five myths that 
the EU wants to keep alive. Arguments for depicting EU’s approach as myths are built on several 
‘voices’: those of ACP and the same EU as expressed in the Cotonou Agreement, a selection of 
ACP Presidents and Ministers,  EU member states in the form of Prime Minister’s and Official 
Commissions statements, UN agencies, WTO provisions, African parliamentarians and an economist 
of the Financial Times. It is not what ‘civil society’ thinks, it is what governments and their own 
institutions have agreed upon. The message of the text can be summarised as ‘you are contradicting 
yourselves’ and ‘stick to your commitments’. The signatories appear as neutral and are portrayed 
as two ‘them’ vs. ‘them’ situations: credible economists and international institutions and rules 
which the EPAs are challenging and the EU versus ACP governments. The task of civil society appears 
to be to point out these inconsistencies. Most references are to official documents, demanding 
accountability rather than expressing directly the needs or positions of farmers, workers, women 
or citizens. So this first document shows a high intertextuality geared mostly towards highlighting 
different opinions within official circles and already existing agreements. References to opinions 
of possible affected groups are negligible in this early text. Texts of 2007 and 2008, when most 
actions take place, more and different opinions more strongly, for example, including quotes of 
representatives of farmers (e.g. Oxfam International, 2008). The emergence of different voices does 
not necessarily mean that the dialogicality in terms of the range of representations of economic 
reality increases, but it makes it more likely. 
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Figure 6. Actions and ideas: EPAs case (based on Gaventa, 2006) 
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Figure 7. Stop EPAs (Source: www.stopepa.de)
 
 
 
Though the first message adopted by the core coalition was ‘STOP EPAs in their current form’, 
there were different interpretations and uses. Thus an agreement on a common message proved 
elusive. Some understood stop EPAs as proposed by the EU, but not necessarily opposing a free 
trade agreement or negotiations. This was the main position adopted by most European private 
aid agencies. Others, such as members of ATN considered that the message should be ‘STOP EPAs’, 
as meaning, stopping any kind of free trade agreement, and proposing a cooperation agreement, 
as shown in Figure 7. This picture shows a banner of the African Trade Network in a demonstration 
before the European institutions in Brussels, accompanied by other Europe-based groups and anti-
FTAs activists. 
The primary ideas underlying the first position are already present in the ‘Six Reasons’ 
statement of 2004. It was that the scope and pace of trade liberalisation had to be put into question 
if development dimensions were to remain central in the agreements, resounding and reinforcing 
ACP countries discourses. EPAs are presented as equivalents of unrestricted trade liberalisation, 
which is connoted in a negative manner. EPAs are presented as a bad option through the use of 
negatively loaded lexicalisation: ‘devastating’, ‘damaging’, ‘major losses’, ‘undermine’. The main key 
words present and whose meanings are challenged are: ‘development’, ‘WTO compatibility’ and 
‘regional integration’. Yet, although EPAs are presented as a bad option, the texts do share basic 
assumptions with the EC propositional assumptions: ‘trade can bring benefits’, ‘it can be a powerful 
tool’, ‘a healthy economy is a competitive one’. However, the text mostly challenged the asymmetries 
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in power and that conditions are not such so that ACP, presented as poor and dependent, could 
compete with the EU, presented as rich and ambitious as is illustrated in this extract: 
While there is general agreement that trade can be a powerful tool for development, a growing 
body of literature argues that rapid trade liberalisation does not on its own automatically lead 
to positive development outcomes. Countries should be able to choose the trade-policy option 
that best suits their development priorities and needs. Trade liberalisation should not be seen as 
a substitute for a sound development strategy. Moreover, it needs to be timed and sequenced 
carefully: there are different optimal degrees of openness at different stages of development, and 
it is generally agreed that, in order for an open trade regime to bring growth and development, 
countries must first have certain necessary conditions in place such as healthy economic sectors, 
potentially competitive producers, reasonably well-developed market institutions, and effective 
state capacity. Yet ACP countries suffering from serious supply-side constraints generally lack these 
conditions, which is why they have asked for reciprocity to be applied only after development 
indicators have been met. (Six Reasons to Oppose EPAs (2004) My emphasis)
Though basic liberal assumptions are retained, it is the pace and scope of liberalisation which are 
contested in this extract, as well as the support for these economies to be able to deal with supply-
side constraints, reforms and adjustment costs. The role of the state, through socio-economic 
policies in general and supported by external aid, is important in addressing these constraints and 
costs. European private aid agencies and European groups’ coalition’s texts reflect overall a reformist 
approach which can be placed in the social/mixed economy paradigm. In this line of thinking, the 
scope of WTO-compatible policy alternatives was expanded.  There were attempts to re-define 
WTO-compatible alternatives.  One useful example is the 2006 ECDPM report ‘Alternative (to) EPAs, 
Possible scenarios for the future ACP trade relations with the EU: which showed WTO compatible 
options, not signed but financed by Oxfam. 
This line contrasts with texts of the second main position, which can be labelled as more 
‘isolationist’ in reference to (neoliberal) integration into the global economy. This position is present 
in declarations of the broadest EPAs coalitions and movements. A representative example of this 
type of declaration is one titled ‘Forward with the Struggle to STOP the EPAs’, a Declaration of 9th 
Annual Meeting of the Africa Trade Network as follows: 
Over the past two decades, this right of African countries to pursue their own individual and 
collective developmental agenda have been attacked and subverted by the countries of the North 
that dominate the world economic system, as part of their never-ending attempts to further open 
up the economies of African and other developing countries for the benefit of their transnational 
corporations. 
We therefore re-iterate our rejection of the Economic Partnership Agreements, and re-affirm 
our campaign objective to Stop the EPAs. We re-state our position that as free-trade agreements 
between two unequal parties, the EPAs are fundamentally anti-developmental. This is especially 
so in the particular context of Africa’s weak, fragmented economies, which have been ravaged and 
distorted by years of European and (other) external domination. This anti-developmental essence 
can not be reversed by means of the on-going attempts to inject some so-called development 
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dimensions into these FTAs. We also assert that any alternative to the EPAs can only be defined as 
the right of, and support for, African and other countries of the ACP to determine their own polices 
and agenda for development. (Extract Stop EPAs Declaration (2007a): My emphasis).
In these declarations there is a categorical rejection of EPAs as countries are meant to liberalise 
trade for the benefits of transnational corporations. EPAs are negatively signified as attempts for 
domination and in essence, anti-development. While European private aid agencies had a more 
reformist approach, some of their main partners in Africa opposed the negotiation of free trade 
agreements altogether including some groups within the Africa Trade Network. 
Though there were different positions on the EPAs, there were common concerns and thus, 
incentives for cooperation and coexistence. One campaigner from West Africa explained the need 
for compromises: ‘When you are clear about your positions, it is easier to be flexible about the 
tactics’. Campaigners needed allies in the other region as they could facilitate access to strategic 
information and analysis from the different regions, help address the challenge of scarce human 
and financial resources and enhance the overall legitimacy and credibility of actions. An interviewee 
from ATN recounts that reaching a ‘common position meant that the European groups who wanted 
a more accommodating to the EPAs found it difficult’. 
Some of the analysis isolationists made was that even if reformist approaches were put 
forward and successful, at least, they would delay the process. This shows the effects of groups 
opposed to trade liberalisation but which do contribute to the mounting pressure and overall mood 
in negotiations. The combination of reformist and isolationist approaches overall raised the profile of 
the idea that EPAs as proposed by the EC had to be questioned in terms of real development impacts. 
The main result of the coexistence of messages was that doubts were raised which conflicted with 
the predominant discourse of ‘trade liberalisation = growth = development’. Although without a 
coherent common message, there was a choir of voices highlighting that the necessary conditions 
for these apparently beneficial policy options to work were not in place: investment, reforms and 
policy space to deal with integration into the global economy according to national and regional 
priorities.  
3.5 Contributions to changes in discursive practices
3.5.1 Practices of invited spaces
As mentioned previously, there were opportunities for participation and consultation created by 
the Cotonou Agreement and facilitated by states, that is, invited spaces. One of the main aspects 
to analyse in terms of discursive practices and the productivity of discourse is which organisations 
populated and used these spaces. Who was authorised to speak? Who was seen as legitimate and 
thus, worth listening to? 
In West Africa, ENDA and TWN had an important role in coordinating regional positions and 
representativeness. At the same time, associations of concentrated interests, mainly farmers and 
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small industries were the best seen in the eyes of policy makers. Both ROPPA and GTLC have a 
predominantly small-scale farmers’ membership. Therefore, their demands and work focused on 
the key issue of sustaining the livelihoods of the most poor in the region. ROPPA as a regional 
platform made its regional outreach and composition based on national platforms its central 
strength. They were perceived as legitimate by policy makers because of their representativeness 
and well-preparedness on technical aspects. GTLC was perceived as a campaigning organisation 
and its controversial posters were not so well received by policy makers who believed it was going 
a step too far. At a national level, NANTS and MAN in Nigeria had close contacts with Nigerian and 
ECOWAS officials due to their location and the fact that they were part of technical and consultative 
committees. While NANTS joined the EPAs campaign and participated in rallies in the street, MAN 
focused its main strategy in dialogue based on technical inputs and the demands and situations 
of their members. In sum, in West Africa, there was a convergence of concerns and positions 
between national governments and organisations. In the eyes of West African policy makers, the 
representatives of their own civil societies and economic sectors were seen as legitimate and 
important. This created space for influence and reinforcement of common positions. 
On the contrary in Europe, organisations had a more critical stand in relation to the EU’s 
position and negotiation approach. Advocacy NGOs made consistent efforts to build up their 
credibility on their capacity to produce research and analysis on both technical and political aspects. 
Their main activities were to gather information, process it and devise strategies to feed the process 
with their inputs. They all put a strong emphasis on publications: books, reports, informative, 
booklets, policy briefs, website contents, magazines and electronic bulletins. ECDPM teamed up 
with ICTSD and produced plenty of materials in both French and English. 
The importance of these materials is that they (re)produced discourses. They conveyed ideas 
of proper state conduct and common sense: if EPAs were to be development friendly, livelihoods, 
employment and the economic structures of vulnerable economies could not be put at risk.  
The mentioned organisations used their strategic locations in capitals (Brussels, Accra and 
Senegal) to serve as information hubs and many seminars and events were co-hosted by them or 
under their auspices. They were perceived as references in provision of analysis by interviewees. 
The main difference among the three is that ECDPM made consistent efforts to contribute to the 
process and remain impartial in its opinions and statements. ENDA and TWN-Africa had a dual role; 
while they claimed that their technical analysis was their contribution, they also engaged actively in 
more contentious forms of activism and took up more explicitly political stands. They moved from 
the forum to the arena. They created and used new spaces. 
3.5.2 Practices of created spaces
Those that did not participate in invited spaces felt that the quality of deliberation was limited in 
them. Consequently, they felt it was necessary to make themselves heard in other ways. There were 
various spaces of exchange and reflection created by activists. On-line spaces played an important 
role in the dissemination of information across borders and languages. There were coalition 
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websites such as http://www.stopepa.de/ and http://epawatch.eu/ and organisational websites 
of regional networks and federations such as TWN-Africa/ATN and ENDA. The use of the Internet 
created bridges among formal and invited spaces and those who could not access invited spaces 
or did not want to participate: they could access information and at the same time, post their own 
positions and demands. They could be seen and heard in the online space. 
Public space was also space to be used to make voices heard. Demonstration in the streets, 
using banners and flags; and organising alternative seminars and events were how they created 
spaces to express concerns. The use of the stop symbol in red is an example of how EPAs were 
connoted in a negative manner, as something to be stopped and rejected. This was the type of action 
in front of institutional buildings often coinciding with important official meetings or negotiations. 
An example was the demonstration in front of European institutions buildings in Brussels on April 
2008. Numbers were scarce in comparison to demonstrations in West Africa as the European 
public’s interest about these issues is marginal. Yet, there was some media coverage. This took place 
in the context of a week of activities in Brussels which included a one-day session at the European 
Parliament (Figure 7). 
Two main effects can be observed as a result of transnational activism on EPAs. First, a 
diversification of genres and language in texts helped to bridge formal and non-formal spaces 
which allowed a broader politicisation of the negotiations, opening up closed spaces. These bridges 
facilitated the involvement and participation of different groups. Second, reformist and isolationist 
policy paradigms coexisted in transnational activism. They did converge on a general challenge 
to the predominance of neoliberal trade = development discourse. Although there were limited 
challenges to the underlying principles of a liberal framework of international trade, more spaces for 
other views were created (though views related to alternative policy paradigms remain marginal). In 
conclusion, the EPAs taken-for-granted development credentials were put into question. 
3.6 Contributions to changes in decisions
The changes observed in the negotiation process in terms of changes in ideas and decisions are 
manifold. A striking starting point is that negotiations which were set to end in 2007 continue to 
date (2013) with important outstanding issues. Though the EU showed signs of more flexibility, 
its positions remain largely unchanged. Important discursive shifts are the recognition of regional 
interests and rights to set their own agendas. ECOWAS positions also remained troubled by intra-
regional differences, but strong in limiting the scope and pace of liberalisation. In sum, the process 
slowed down and policy makers had to make extra efforts to advance their goals discursively. But 
what claims of attribution and contribution of the campaign can be made to these changes? 
Interviewees’ insights suggest that the campaign affected the process, and indirectly, 
important decisions were influenced. Though EC officials reported that the campaign had been 
biased and only emphasised negative aspects of the EPAs, all in all most EC officials perceived 
the campaign as influential (7 out of 8 EC officials interviewed). EC officials as well as their ACP 
counterparts described the campaign influence as extra pressure on certain issues: ‘They kept us on 
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our toes (…) it’s good to debate, because it might help to shape the whole thing further. You can’t 
negotiate in total isolation’, one official summarised. But they emphasised that they, as negotiators, 
had made the decisions. None of the EC officials interviewed acknowledged having changed their 
views on fundamental issues because of the campaign nor could they give proof about how their 
decisions would have been different if there had not been any advocacy activities. Nonetheless, 
when asked about the effects of the campaign, one EC explained: 
If they hadn’t done a ‘no EPA campaign’, maybe we wouldn’t have made the same effort of putting 
all these things on the exclusion list. I mean I still believe we would have done it, because we 
believe in fair trade and we want the best agreements. And they are not competitiveness driven 
agreements. It’s a different kind of agreement, it’s a development agreement. But still they kept us 
on our toes. So you could only come back with a deal that you could put into the narrative of why 
this serves development. And I wouldn’t meet an NGO twice if already the second time they would 
not yet have looked at the exclusion list and would come back with the old arguments which are 
simply not valid. (my emphasis)
EC officials concluded that the campaign made them even more conscious of a number of elements 
and how they communicated about these issues. More precisely, in terms of changes in the ways of 
acting of governments we can observe a shift in the number and kinds of genres used. These range 
from highly technical trade law documents to a diversification of formats to make information more 
available to a wider public. The effect of this was that those groups directly targeted most, such as 
parliamentarians and EU member states, explained they were made aware of possible negative 
implications, and thus asked for more information to the EC and other negotiating parties. This 
promoted the organisation of seminars, production of briefing papers, exchange of letters, and 
consultation meetings as illustrated in Figure 8. The fact that concerns were raised in a number of 
public debates forced negotiators to explain the development dimensions of the agreements and 
the reasons for their positions, in cases when possible benefits had been taken for granted. 
These activities, together with the presence of the conflict in the media brought the issue to 
the forefront and made it a contentious issue. There were documents and activities organised with 
the specific purpose of responding to the campaign and clarifying the need for negotiating the EPAs. 
Notorious examples of this are the ‘Open letter to anti-poverty campaigners of September 2007’ by 
EC Commissioners Michel and (European Commission, 2007a), the ‘Six common misconceptions 
about Economic Partnership Agreements’ (European Commission, 2008a) and ‘Fishing for the 
truth: Is Europe really destroying African fisheries’ industry?’ (European Commission, 2008b). Not 
only negotiating parties but also parliamentarians from both the European Parliament and ACP 
parliaments were asked to make statements and respond to questions. The existence of more spaces 
for debate and the inclusion of a wide number of sectors through the campaign and responses to 
it contributed to the expression of various opinions. Thus, in a way, dialogicality increased overall. 
Officials were pressed to respond to critics. 
It can be observed that the policy paradigm, and the underlying meta-theories supporting it, 
remained unchanged among European institutional actors. Only in the post-deadline period did the 
110
Chapter 3
overall stable discourses get tinged with elements of other policy paradigms. This can be noticed in 
texts of Commissioner Ashton as evident in the follow extract where she defends EPAs before the 
EU Parliament’s consent (Ashton, 2009)
Going forward, my vision for the negotiation of full EPAs is one where each negotiation reflects 
and respects the regional specificity of the parties to that Agreement – a flexible process. That 
means both looking at content – because the EPA has to work for its signatories but also the pace 
of negotiations. But it also means that EPAs should be dynamic not static – able to react to future 
events and to account for different regional interests and needs. In this process, the Commission 
will continue to inform and involve the European Parliament. And while we should be ambitious 
there must also be no imposed dialogue, which is why issues like government procurement 
have already been removed from some negotiations. We will also take the time – and provide 
support - to build up regional and national regulation as a prerequisite to further negotiation. Aid 
for trade and technical assistance will be key in that regard. And I can guarantee that there will 
be no opening of public services, no pressure for privatisation. The explicit right of the ACP to 
regulate their own markets will be recognised and there will be no limitation of access to essential 
medicines or collecting seed – in fact we would rather seek to strengthen than limit ACP rights and 
capacity in these areas. (Emphasis added)
In this section of her intervention, Ms. Ashton replies to most concerns and important discursive 
shifts can be observed. Though she states that ambition should not be compromised, there are 
several considerations which limit the underlying idea of trade opening as an inevitable choice. This 
is emphasised and repeated various times. The process has to account ‘for regional specificities’, for 
‘different regional interests and needs’, respect the ‘right to regulate their own markets’. The idea 
of rights and capacities of ACP countries to determine their agenda first is central, in contrast with 
the imperative of reform and opening to catch up with opportunities. Arguing for the reinforcement 
of governmental capacities goes against, at least discursively, arguments for more market-centred 
strategies. This suggests a first shift in dialogicality. Second, flexibility, dialogue, provision of 
information and involvement are promised to improve the process of negotiations. This somehow 
implies that this had not been the case, or at least, that some ACP partners perceived this had not 
been the case. Third, there are references to contentious issues. Ashton informs that government 
procurement was removed from some negotiations and that there would be no opening of public 
services. This indicates that the EU realised that its original ambitious trade liberalisation agenda 
had to be limited. Overall, this text provides indications of increased dialogicality in terms of policy 
paradigms, ways of negotiating and acknowledgment of critics.
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Table 3. EU Negotiation Discursive Practices
Period 2002-2007 2008-2009
Genres Technical Diversification
Discourses EPAs as tools for development. There is 
no alternative to EPAs
EPAs as tools for development with 
promises of maximum flexibility. 
EPAs have to work for regional interests 
and needs
Predominant policy 
paradigm
Neo-liberal 
Rules-based multilateral trade 
(Supporters)
Neoliberal, rules-based multilateral 
trade (Supporters) + recognition of the 
regulatory rights of the state (elements 
of regressives) 
Dialogicality in texts Related to ACP agreements. Campaign 
proposed alternatives are not real 
alternatives.
Considerable acknowledgement and 
direct response to critics
Positions Ambitious trade liberalisation, including 
Singapore issues
Respect for partners interests and 
needs. Careful in negotiation of public 
procurement, liberalisation of public 
services. 
Key decisions The EU did not apply for an extension 
of the WTO waiver. Introduction of 
Interim EPAs as stepping stones towards 
comprehensive EPAs
Continuation of negotiations at a slower 
pace
In West Africa, a point of agreement was that officials believed activism contributed to highlighting 
the economic asymmetries between the EU and the region. In that way, it indirectly, reinforced 
and strengthened their positions. Campaigners claimed to have had a significant influence on the 
position of Nigeria which was quite critical of the EPAs as proposed by the EC and which decided to 
apply for the alternative trade arrangement of SGP+. Nigeria’s position remained strong even to be 
described by Mandelson as ‘the elephant in the middle of the road’. Its position was further shaped 
by a committee, which included NANTs, an association of small and medium size enterprises. One 
Nigerian government official explained (in relation to the role of European private aid agencies): 
‘Their arguments, analysis and statements brought to sharper relief the challenges of the EPA 
for Africa. Their analysis and researches provided handy/ready insights to backstop the dearth of 
studies, needed to guide African negotiators’.
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Table 4. ECOWAS Negotiation Discursive Practices
Period 2002-2007 2008-2009
Genres formal limited diversification
Discourses EPAs as tools for development. 
Development concerns must be 
addressed
West Africa cannot remain trapped 
in producing only commodities
Predominant policy paradigm Supporters+regressives Supporters+regressives
Dialogicality in texts Limited Limited
Positions Interpretation of substantially all 
trade: Limit market openness of 
WA.
Interpretation of substantially all 
trade: Limit market openness of WA 
to 60%, at most 70%
Key decisions Strong emphasis on a development-
oriented agreements
2 out of 16 countries initialled 
Interim Agreements
ECOWAS remains strong in 
positions
Evidence suggests that the campaign contributed to the maintenance of original cautious stances. 
In Ghana, the overall perception was that if it had not been for the campaign, a full EPA would 
have been signed instead of an Interim one.18 A trade union leader interviewed described it as ‘it 
seemed it was going to be one more agreement’ meaning that there was not a deep understanding 
of the risks of signing among government officials and among think tanks on whose advice the 
government was relying. An observer noted that a sign of the recognition of the quality of inputs 
was that the Ministry of Trade and Industry in Ghana invited a European agency to be a member of 
the technical negotiating team on EPA in Ghana. 
Being an LDC Senegal could rely on the EBA initiative to maintain its market access conditions. 
Yet, Senegal played a leading role in the region and President Wade was vocal against EPAs both 
nationally and internationally, for example, at the EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in December 2007. 
One of the key areas highlighted was that of the risks, especially in the area of agriculture (sensitive 
products) and services. A second level of influence was that governments had to be more cautious 
and ‘role back’. Campaigners claimed they made the process to stall. A representative from the 
Senegalese government acknowledged that the campaign made important and well-prepared 
contributions and reinforced their positions.
Overall it seems that campaign positions were closer to ACP positions. There were close 
collaborations between the government and advisory committees where campaign-related 
organisations played an important role. This is an example of the diffuseness of formal and non-
formal spaces of communication. An EC official acknowledged that some proposals promoted 
by the campaign had come to the negotiating table via the ACP side and that the campaign had 
strengthened the position of ACP countries. Others acknowledged that NGOs had provided technical 
advice to some governments but also supported their political message. However, there are also 
18  ‘Interim EPAs’ cover the liberalisation of goods (agricultural or manufactured products) and 
development cooperation while ‘Full EPAs’ include goods, services, and investment. Interim agreements were 
put in place in order to avoid disruption of trade between the ACP countries and the European Union. 
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reports of the uneasiness that some governments experienced when they felt that activists were 
speaking on behalf of their interests, when this was not necessarily the case. At the same time, 
strong domestic mobilisations helped ACP negotiators to use this as evidence of the high political 
costs that they would have to face if compromises in certain areas were made. This shows that 
activists and ‘Southern governments’ engage in complex relationships. All in all, the campaign’s urge 
for more flexibility and policy options supported the interests of ACP countries. 
The level of controversy also led all negotiating parties to be extra careful when determining 
the sensitive products list considering the importance of agriculture and livelihoods in West Africa. 
However, it is less evident whether activism changed predominant discourses present in official 
texts in the ways these represent the relation between trade and development. 
The comparison between assumptions implicit in activists and official texts shows that there 
is no disagreement on the assumption that trade is good for development and that ACP economies 
need to be integrated into the world economy. However, the how of this integration is a matter 
of debate. Activism contributed to challenging the liberal discourse of trade and development in 
the sense that it questioned the scope and pace of liberalisation, reinforcing ACP positions that 
demanded maximum possible flexibility and recognition of asymmetries, especially in market access 
reciprocity. While liberals acknowledge the fact that there might be losers as a result of economic 
adjustments, there is a strong assumption that overall most stand to gain. Campaign discourses 
supported the demands and concerns of West Africa, especially around the fact that there should 
be necessary conditions and support measures that are needed to deal with adjustment costs. The 
campaign pushed for limiting the trade agreement to goods, excluding so called ‘Singapore issues’. 
Officially ECOWAS negotiators did not have a mandate to negotiate services (ECOWAS, 2003), and 
asked for an extension of the WTO waiver, arguing the need for development agreements (ECOWAS, 
2007). The assumption that liberalisation of services and public procurement markets would be 
beneficial to ACP countries was put into question and ‘de-naturalised’ and the importance of the 
role of the state was highlighted. On 23 March 2009 Commissioner Ashton responded directly to the 
critics in her address to the European Parliament (Ashton, 2009) and ensured that the EC would be 
as flexible as possible and put on hold issues such as public procurement. 
The amount of texts and how these were produced and used in different events indicates 
changes in terms of ‘ways of acting’ both in Europe and in West Africa. In fact, activists claim that 
the EU failed to get the full EPAs signed before the December 2007 deadline in part due to their 
mobilisation both in Europe and in the ACP countries19 as the process slowed down giving more 
time to APC countries to negotiate and reinforce some of their positions. However, they reported 
not having influenced the positions of the EC, which basically maintained its original stance. Broadly, 
officials explained that the campaign influenced the public debate and put into question the 
‘development dimension’ of the EPAs, but how? 
Though groups of critics are directly and indirectly referred to (e.g. Open letter to anti-poverty 
19  Presentation of Gerard Karlshausen in International Encounter of Social Movements and NGOs 
facing negotiations between the EU and Latin America, organised ALOP, CIFCA, Oxfam International and others 
in ABVV/FGTB, Brussels, on 10 July 2008. 
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campaigners and open letter in response to concerns by Traidcraft), there is no deep engagement 
with the discourses related to those groups. Yet, an important shift appears in intertextuality if 
earlier texts by the European Commission (e.g. 2006c; 2006d, 2007a) in which basically the main 
message is ‘There is no alternatives to EPAs’ and newer texts of a more dialogical approach after 
the post-2007 deadline (e.g. Ashton, 2009) are compared. In newer EC texts critics are directly 
acknowledged and more flexibility is promised, though there are no changes in the underlying 
principles of a liberal approach to trade and development. 
Throughout the process EPAs as tools for development are advanced discursively in a 
number of ways. In terms of genres, one observation is an increase in the number and types of 
texts produced. Figure 8 graphically indicates this on the basis of texts available at the European 
Commission’s website. A clear increase in non-technical texts such as speeches and briefings can be 
observed, especially reaching peaks in 2007 and 2008.
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Figure 8. Genres in EPAs related documents on EU DG-Trade Website (2000-2008)
Source: own calculation based on documents available at DG-Trade Website
A second indication of the importance of communicating the advantages of EPAs was the involvement 
of media experts. According to some EC officials, the problem with the EPAs was that they had not 
been well communicated about in earlier stages of the negotiations. Thus, numerous power point 
presentations were made available on-line and the number of seminars and public events on the 
topic increased. This was acknowledged by one of the EC officials who stated in discussions about 
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EPAs with civil society, which is all the time now… [referring to 2008]. In sum, two important shifts 
can be observed in terms of discursive practices: first, a more dialogical approach in the way of 
understanding economic reality in the later stages of negotiations, and second, the EU felt the need 
to react to critics and make efforts to communicate its view of the EPAs. How do decisions relate to 
these discursive shifts? 
These discursive shifts are indications of the level of controversy and difficulties in the 
negotiations. As the deadline of 31 December 2007 approached and important issues remained 
unresolved, the EU decided to split the negotiations in two stages: Interim agreements for goods 
only to prevent a loss of market access and continuation of negotiations towards comprehensive 
EPAs. At the end of 2007, only one region initialled a full EPA (Cariforum) and a number of interim 
agreements were concluded with certain countries or regions in Africa and the Pacific.20 Table 3 
summarises the main characteristics of the EU negotiation discursive practices.
In West Africa, declarations and official Ministers’ statements were broadcasted through 
local media (TV, radio, newspapers and websites) and it was recollected that common citizens 
knew that EPAs was not the Environmental Protection Agency (interview with Action Aid Ghana). 
Genres became more diverse and came out of formal spaces. Press conferences and seminars 
were organised and hosted by parliamentarians, and officials were invited to speak at civil society 
organised events. This is illustrated in Figure 9 where events-related texts are the most numerous 
on ECOWAS website, especially within years 2006-2008. Again, the movement from economist 
technical spheres towards politicisation of the issue is observed. 
20  For a full account of negotiations state-of-play, see Bilal, Sanoussi and Christopher Stevens (eds) 
(2009) The Interim Economic Partnership Agreements: the EU and African States: Contents, challenges and 
prospects, ECDPM Policy Management Report Nr. 17 and ODI, Maastricht: ECDPM. 
Figure 9. Genres in EPAs related documents on ECOWAS website (2002-2009)
Source: own calculation based on available texts on ECOWAS website  
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3.7 Conclusions: a story of transnational activism around EPAs
This chapter examined EPAs negotiations and the actions that were undertaken to influence them. 
The evidence gathered allows me to elicit a story of the EPAs campaign aiming to capture its main 
features and conditions. 
The most salient characteristics of the negotiations were that these were asymmetric and 
between two regions with a long history of institutional relations. The EU and the ACP regions 
share a common history of colonial and cultural ties and a certain degree of dependency from EU 
member states aid. In terms of the trade relations, ACP regions enjoyed preferential treatment 
from the EU thanks to a waiver granted by other WTO members and which expired in 2007. In 
order to be consistent with the principle of non-discrimination within the multilateral trade system, 
the EU decided not to request a new waiver and re-design its trade relations with ACP guided by 
the principle of reciprocity in trade opening. The European Commission was the main proponent 
and defender of a new trade arrangement as a tool for development. The main motivation that 
guided the EU was the promotion of trade liberalisation and regionalisation as ways to integrate 
ACP economies into the world economy and, in this way, support their development by reducing 
their dependency on aid. Two elements of the EU’s identity, the EU as a global player and the EU 
as an actor committed to policy coherence and development, converged on a discourse that linked 
positively reciprocal trade, and an ambitious trade liberalisation agenda, with development. 
However, ACP and ECOWAS members in particular, held different interpretations of the 
Cotonou Agreement and of the implications of a WTO-compatible reciprocal agreement. ECOWAS 
members’ positions departed from a development-oriented agreement with maximum flexibility 
in the interpretation of GATT article XXIV (ENDA, 2009). The region did not have a common voice. 
There were different interests and needs, mainly depending on whether they were LDCs or not, 
that is, whether their goods could access the European market or not within the EBA initiative. 
Nigeria was one of the main actors within ECOWAS together with Senegal to have a highly critical 
position towards the negotiations and the aims of the EU. 
It is in this context that various organisations following the process started to raise their 
concerns and were able to mobilise to limit or stop the agreement in regards to what they considered 
possibly negative economic, social and environmental impacts. The mobilisation capacity was high 
and involved a wide range of simultaneous actions at both national and regional levels. 2007 was 
the busiest year in which hundreds of organisations joined actions and campaigns. 
Facilitated by organisations based in capitals (e.g. Brussels, Abuja, Dakar and Accra) a 
transnational bi-regional network of organisations emerged sharing information and coordinating 
actions. The network was composite in a number of ways. It involved organisations in the North 
and South, organisations of concentrated and diffuse interests, and organisations with different 
approaches to trade and development and to social change. While some organisations preferred 
direct meetings with policy makers to feed into their research to the policy process, others did 
not find incompatible with that organising demonstrations and media campaigns. But the most 
important feature of the capacity to build networks and coalitions was the relationship built 
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between activists and those ECOWAS countries which had a critical position and which were more 
open to explore alternatives to EPAs. They were able to take fullest advantage of the existing invited 
spaces such as technical committees and consultation bodies. This is supported by the research of 
Trommer (2011). Thinking counterfactually it could be argued that the negotiations would have 
stalled regardless of the reinforcing role that the critical positions of the campaign had. However, 
evidence from interviews suggests that some countries in the region considered signing the 
agreement and were alerted of possible risks later in the negotiations. 
Finally, I analysed the discursive capacity of activism. There was capacity to change the terms 
of the debate and place development concerns in the agenda. The issue became controversial and 
EU member states as well as the European parliament raised questions about the negotiation style 
of the European Commission. Activists were able to do this by engaging in ‘invited spaces’ using 
and thus reproducing ways of acting and ways of representing economic ideas. At the same time, 
activities of groups outside formal spaces, some of which contested the liberal premises all together, 
contributed to the politicisation of the issue in the broader public sphere. This shift is observable 
in the diversification of genres and a movement from technically prohibiting texts towards wider-
audience available genres. Activism managed to compel governments, parliamentarians and all 
actors to better argue the benefits and understand the full range of possible negative consequences. 
In this sense, the discursive capacity was important and provided boundaries to what was possible 
in terms of decisions, for example, not negotiating services or putting more care in the design of 
the products exclusion list. However, the scope of alternatives considered remained within known 
land and only questioned the scope and pace of liberalisation, but not their underlying liberal 
assumptions. In this sense, I interpret limitations in reflexive action, that is, in transcending existing 
frameworks and proposing new solutions.
To date, almost six years after the expiration of the WTO waiver in 2007, negotiations are still 
on-going. In this chapter, I have identified the combination of conditions and the main characteristics 
of transnational activism that contributed to shape the negotiations. Among the most important 
conditions we find the EU ambitious liberalisation agenda which conflicts with national regulations, 
critical and strong positions from ECOWAS, especially among some countries that wanted to 
protect their local industries and organisational capacities to mobilise across borders. Within these 
conditions and opportunities, activists joined forces to influence positions and the overall discursive 
atmosphere. 
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents and discusses the strategies and characteristics of transnational activism in 
relation to the negotiation of an Association Agreement (AA or AdA in Spanish) between the EU 
and Central America. A first section describes the context and background of EU-Central America 
relations, the various governmental positions in the negotiations and the invited spaces open to 
citizens´ participation. The actions analysed are those taking place in relation to the negotiations 
of the Association Agreement which started officially in 2007 and were concluded in May 2010 and 
expected to enter into force before the end of 2012 after a period of ratification. However, there 
were activities in relation to EU-Latin American relations prior to the initiation of the negotiations, 
mostly around EU-LA Summits of Heads of State and existing cooperation agreements. There has 
been resistance not to single agreements but to the whole bi-regional governance and its underlying 
neoliberal agenda (Icaza, 2004; Icaza, 2010; Zepeda, 2006; Mallo, 2011).
A second section introduces the main organisations and networks who mobilised around 
these negotiations in particular. It describes separately the approaches adopted in each region, the 
central ideas present in advocacy efforts, the main messages and types of actions. 
A third section looks at the combination of strategies and actions as a whole bi-regional 
transnational endeavour. It examines its bi-regional dynamics and its main characteristics: its 
mobilisation capacity, its network and coalition capacity building and its discursive capacity.  Finally, 
the fourth section discusses the practices of invited and created spaces and the changes in the 
negotiations which can be linked to activists´ actions: first, in discursive practices, and second, in 
terms of decisions. The chapter concludes with a story of transnational activism which captures 
the combination of circumstances and factors that led to a signed agreement. It also describes 
the characteristics of discursive practices and the marks left in the institutional setting which will 
continue to shape the implementation and monitoring of the agreement. 
  
4.2 Parties motivations and negotiations set-up
4.2.1 The Association Agreement and EU-Central America relations
EU and Latin America relations have been fluid and complex, partly due to cultural and historical ties 
and the need to counter-balance the influence of the US. The last decade has been characterised 
by diplomacy of summits and exchanges, yet of open questions and unrealised proposals. In his 
analysis of EU-Latin American Head of States Summits, Malamud (2008:2) states ‘nor the EU is clear 
about its expectations of Latin America; neither Latin America is clear about what it expects from 
the EU’. In 2005 though discursively a strategic association is pursued and trade between the two 
regions had increased, exchanges remain limited. The EU represents only 12% of total trade of Latin 
America, and inversely, 5.6%, far from trade with Asia and the US (Maihold, 2006: 4) . 
In the case of Central America, the San José Dialogue launched in 1984, can be seen as pivotal 
in European and Central American relations. In the context of a recent past of armed conflict, the 
EU supported Central America’s peace and democratisation processes. In the past decades the 
emphasis has shifted towards the support of economic development and integration processes in 
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the region. A Regional Development Cooperation Framework Agreement was signed between the 
six Central American countries and the EC in 1993, coming into effect in 1999. This was considered 
by the EC a third generation agreement as it widened the scope of cooperation sectors. In its article 
6 it included modalities for cooperation in trade areas. At the same time, in comparison to other 
emerging markets, such as Mexico, Chile and Mercosur countries, Central America did not appear 
as a priority for EU economic interests. This was shown by the 1994-1995 European Council strategy 
which outlined the pursuit of reciprocal free trade agreements with some countries and regions. 
According to the European Commission, Central American and Andean countries at that time would 
not be able to cope with a free trade agreement. This was the reason why financial assistance and 
non-reciprocal trade relations were favoured (Sanahuja, 2006:2). 
But this strategy was complemented with the signing of association agreements with Mexico 
(2000) and Chile (2002), the most advanced type of agreement that the EU can engage in with a 
country or a region. Association agreements are proposed to countries or regions with which the 
EU intends to develop stronger links, based on trust and on common values (European Commission, 
2012). Despite the assessment made in the 1990s, Central America is now the first region to have 
signed (2010) a comprehensive region-to-region Association Agreement with the EU. 
In December 2003, EU and Central American countries signed a Cooperation and Political 
Dialogue agreement which institutionalised the San José Dialogue. The aims of the agreement were 
to develop political dialogue among the two regions and to reinforce their cooperation, including 
cooperation on trade, investments and on economic relations as a way to contribute to sustainable 
development. Trade-related themes like competition policy and customs appeared respectively 
in articles 17 and 18. The idea of an AA appeared in the Guadalajara Summit of 2004 as a joint 
strategic objective. The EU is the third most important trading partner for Central America, after 
the US and the regional market. For Central America it represented an opportunity to diversify its 
trading partners.  For the EU it was a way to support Central America regional integration process. 
Negotiations were officially announced in the Vienna 2006 Summit and started in October 2007 in 
San José, Costa Rica. 
After three years of negotiations, parties reached an agreement in May 2010 in Madrid, 
Spain. The agreement gives a legal framework to all aspects of EU’s relations with Central America. 
It is organised in three chapters, namely Political Dialogue, Cooperation and Trade. The European 
Commission through its Directorate for Trade and External Relations led the negotiations on behalf 
of EU member states, while the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and External Trade sat on behalf of 
the negotiating Central American countries, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras and El 
Salvador. The Agreement was signed in Honduras in June 2012: 
including therein a provisional application of the trade part, to enter into force immediately after 
the European Parliament consent, given on 11 December 2012. Central American countries, for 
their part, have no manner of provisionally applying the trade provisions. Once signed, they will go 
for its full ratification. (European Commission, 2012b)
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The next sections explain the main motivations and drivers which led parties to have negotiated the 
first comprehensive region-to-region trade agreement, which includes various provisions which go 
beyond what has been agreed in multilateral negotiations. 
4.2.2 EU’s approach to the negotiations
The EU has implicitly and explicitly promoted its model of economic and political integration. The 
EU as a global player is interested in the formation of regional groups with which to work with 
and believes in a new regionalism as a way to address the challenges of globalisation (Sanahuja, 
2006:2). In 2006, the EC published the communication ‘A stronger partnership between Europe 
and Latin America’. One of the main purposes of the EU´s foreign policy towards Latin America 
is to establish an enhanced strategic partnership through a network of association agreements 
(including free trade agreements) involving all countries in the region and liable to contribute to 
the integration of the region as a whole (European Commission, 2006b: 6). In this frame, an AA 
and support for regional integration became the central focus of cooperation relations between 
the European Union and Central America (Díaz Silveira Santos, 2010a, 2010b; Alvarado 2003) and 
clearly evidenced in the EC Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013 (European Commission, 2007b): the 
prospect of negotiating an Association Agreement is also expected to stimulate faster convergence 
of the different visions and levels of interest regarding integration (European Commission 2007b: 
21-22). The shift in focus was also evident through the increase of funds allocated to support the 
process of regional integration. 
For the EU the negotiation of an AA seemed to pursue more political aims rather than pure 
economic interests, at least in paper. The draft negotiating mandate1 states: 
Enhance bi-regional cooperation so as to reinforce the political, social and economic stability of 
the. Central American countries, deepen the process of regional integration, help create conditions 
for reducing poverty, promote decent work and more equitable access to social services, as well 
as ensure an appropriate balance between economic, social and environmental components in a 
sustainable development context. 
While some support this view, it is clear that in its self-understanding (the EU) the trade dimension 
is the least dominant. Emphasis is on political and integrative issues (Abrahamson, 2008: 11). This 
view was contested by Central American organisations as it will be further discussed. They argued 
the EU was motivated by its economic interests:
But even if the European rhetoric in that sense (support to regional integration), it is evident that 
the EU has important economic and geostrategic interests in the area of services and investments, 
public procurement and intellectual property rights. These topics are strongly positioned in the 
negotiation table and make us question the coherence of the EU discourse in these negotiations. 
(My translation, ALOP-Iniciativa CID, 2010: 12)
1  Available at Bilaterals: http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article8336 (last accessed 16 December 
2011)
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Furthermore, according to this view, the EU sought that their companies reached the same benefits 
that the US reached for theirs in the CAFTA, taking into consideration that the Plan Puebla Panamá 
would open opportunities in infrastructure, telecommunications, energy and tourism projects in 
which European companies would be interested (Rubio Jovel, 2006). 
4.2.3 Central American countries approaches to the negotiations
Central America’s efforts towards regional integration and openness to international trade are not 
new. These efforts are due to external catalysers and the economic and political arguments of ‘new 
regionalism’ and to intra-regional dynamics and a long integrationist tradition (Sanahuja, 1998: 20). 
The main motivation of CA countries to sign an association agreement with the EU was to consolidate 
its insertion into the world economy in the context of ‘open regionalism’ ideas as prevailing since 
the 1990s (ALOP- Iniciativa CID, 2010: 11).  CA countries saw the agreement as an opportunity to 
improve the market access of its products to Europe, diversify its clients for exports and strengthen 
its relations with Europe to counter-balance the influence of other economic powers. Though these 
motivations were shared, the region did not arrive at the negotiations with a common position. 
Costa Rica was the main driver of reaching an agreement, supported by El Salvador and Guatemala. 
Honduras had a more ambiguous approach and Nicaragua, was the more doubtful and concerned 
about some aspects of the negotiation agenda. Among the issues of concern, CA included migration, 
and financial support to both carry on with the negotiations as well as to deal with adjustment costs 
which may result from the implementation of the agreement. 
Costa Rica was a driving force in the negotiations as it would be potentially the most benefited 
by an agreement, given its larger share of trade with the EU. Costa Rica’s economic development 
strategy has a strong external trade component, promoting its exports of coffee, tropical fruits and 
technological products. Ambassador Echandi explained their aim was to expand its trading partners 
and to improve market access for their products. After a highly contentious public debate in relation 
to the negotiation of a free trade agreement with the US, in a referendum on 7 October 2007, the 
voters narrowly backed the free trade agreement (51.6 percent voted Yes to the agreement).
El Salvador’s position was centred on the improvement of market access. In its public 
communications celebrated as an achievement the IV round of negotiations, the consolidation 
of virtually the totality of the SGP + as most of their products are traded within this scheme (El 
Salvador, 18 July 2008). Its main interests were to secure advantages in the area of rules of origin 
in sectors such as fisheries (aquiculture and tuna), sugar, coffee, alcohol, ethanol, drinks, shoes and 
aluminium products (El Salvador, 2009). 
Guatemala joined the negotiations in line with its Integrated External Trade Policy which 
sought Guatemala’s insertion into the world market (Guatemala, 2007). Guatemala has FTAs with 
the US (DR-CAFTA), Taiwan and Colombia. Guatemala’s officials in Brussels explained they see the 
agreement as the only and best option. Two reasons were provided. The first was that the European 
and Central American economies are complementary. Second, that SGP is a unilateral preference 
granted by the EU and renewable every two years. In their view, the main inconvenience of the SGP 
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is their legal uncertainty. For that reason, they prefer the AA which will grant legal certainty and 
create a better environment to attract investments. 
Though Honduras brought up concerns in relation to the social impacts and obstacles for 
seizing opportunities, the country centred its position on the needs for market access of products 
such as banana and sugar, historically protected by Europe. This duality was evidenced in the two 
interventions by representatives of the Ministry of Trade and Industry at the European Parliament 
on 28 January 2009. Mr. Fredy Serrato believed that the negotiations were driven exclusively from 
the perspective of companies as future users of the agreement, but not from the perspective of 
the collectivity in general, as consumers and beneficiaries. Harmony between these two had to 
be found, he stated. He was immediately followed by the Minister, Melvin Redondo who only 
emphasised the situation and needs of market access. He centred his intervention on the fact that 
the EU had already given better conditions for these products to other countries, thus, he expected 
a similar treatment out of this agreement (CIFCA, 2009). 
Nicaragua’s ambassador to the EU explained that Nicaragua’s position was guided mainly 
by five concerns or areas: the need to respect their constitution, the need to increase benefits 
for producers, and to protect biodiversity, the need for a fund of social compensation, the need 
to strengthen regional integration and finally, the situation of migrants in Europe. Overall, it was 
the country which contested the agreement most and put other issues on the negotiation table. 
Nicaragua challenged the process of regional integration as a process ‘desde arriba y para afuera’ 
(top-down and externally oriented) and rather hoped that the agreement could contribute to a 
regional integration ‘desde abajo y desde dentro’ (bottom-up and endogenous) as explained by 
Amaru Barahona in his intervention at the European Parliament on 28 January 2009 (CIFCA, 2009: 
16-17). Mr. Barahona made explicit the elements that should guide any development strategy for 
the region, and consequently, should guide the agreement. These were: emphasis on strengthening 
internal and regional markets, the need for a strong role of the state in intervening in the market 
via subsidies and state control of strategic resources such as water, energy, telecommunications 
and biodiversity and to allow flexibility for different rhythms of openness to enable endogenous 
national industries. The overall approach was rather critical of liberal postulates, with a strong 
resonance with dependency theory ideas. Nicaragua proposed the creation of a compensation 
development fund to put these ideas into action. The fund would be used to deal with the possible 
adjustment costs and to help strengthen the infrastructures and capacities to make the best use of 
the new opportunities created. The agreement mentioned the creation of a committee to study the 
feasibility of this fund.  Nicaragua was also reluctant to discuss the signature of the Rome Statute 
as part of the AA. Nicaraguan Chancellor Manuel Coronel said that although Central American 
countries were not opposed to joining international agreements on either issue, the EU demands 
were an inappropriate attempt to interfere with their autonomy to legislate on the matter.
In sum, for Central America the points of coincidence in the trade pillar were the need to 
enhance market access to Europe. In the Political Dialogue and Cooperation pillar, the issue of 
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migration was a common concern. Overall, the economic and foreign policy interests provided the 
main incentives to conclude an agreement. 
4.2.4 Opportunities and constrains for participation 
The 2003 Agreement included an article (43) on the participation of civil society in areas of 
bilateral cooperation: ‘The Parties recognise the role and potential contribution of civil society in 
the cooperation process and agree to promote effective dialogue with civil society’. Though it has 
been interpreted as political correctness (Abrahamson, 2008:7), this article opened the door for 
organisations to use and claim new spaces, for example, their legitimacy to be consulted and to 
access funds to implement projects as partners of governments. 
In the context of a general discursive support to civil society, both the EU and Central American 
countries organised consultation spaces. The EU organised meetings about the developments of the 
negotiations in the framework of the Civil Society Dialogue and participated in the second UE-CA 
Civil Society Forum held in Tegucigalpa, Honduras (March 2007). As it reads on the EC website: 
Since then, the Commission organised regular meetings in Brussels and in Central America, to keep 
civil society organisations informed of the negotiations’ progress. These encounters usually take 
place either before, during or after each round of negotiations and allow open exchanges of views 
(European Commission, 2012b)
In the case of Central America, national and regional Cuartos adjuntos2 were organised. These are 
meeting rooms in or close to the negotiations building which are open for registered non-state 
organisations to meet officials during and after the negotiations. However, there were important 
limitations in these spaces as one of its interviewed participants described. He explained ‘They 
provide very technical information and they do not know how to translate it for a wider audience, 
only economists can follow them’. This means that there were different views on the quality of 
dialogue and exchanges between states and civil society. While for the EU meetings allowed ‘an 
open exchange of views’, for some of its participants, there were limitations in the openness and 
extent of exchanges. Moreover, though there were these consultative spaces open, organisations 
considered that the main limitation was that they had no say in the definition of the negotiating 
mandates (e.g. FUNDE and CCS, 2008). The mandates and related documents are not public and 
considered confidential. The rationale is that these documents contain sensitive information about 
the positions of each party and thus, not to be disclosed in a negotiation process in which these 
may change. 
It is in this context of historical and political bi-regional relations, states motivations and 
spaces for participation where transnational activism operated. The next sections describe the 
characteristics of activism both in Central America and Europe, and the combination of efforts in a 
by-regional network. 
2  These are meeting rooms in or close to the negotiations building which are open for registered non-
state organisations to meet officials during and after the negotiations.
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4.3 Activism with hats, ties and T-shirts
Several organisations and coalitions monitored EU-Central American cooperation and trade relations 
and organised advocacy activities to influence the negotiations of an AA. An overview of the main 
actions observed appears in Table 5. Though there were activities about EU-CA relations since 2004 
with more activities in 2007, it is at the end of 2007 when organisations publish a first study (CIFCA, 
2007a). Activities were sustained over the period of negotiations between 2007 to its signature in 
2010, and with post-agreement monitoring though the level of actions decreased after 2010. 
Though there was no single and compact bi-regional campaign or a coalition under the banner 
of ‘STOP the AdA’, there were various joint activities and statements. As illustrated in Figure 12, 25% 
of documents were signed by Latin American networks, 22% by bi-regional networks, and 19% by 
European networks3. This shows that most activities were organised in a coordinated way by groupings 
of organisations rather than by single organisations. But this coordination of actions did not emerge 
spontaneously. In the past, there had been a division and distance between those who resisted FTAs 
and those who aimed to influence them as it was recalled during several interviews and has been 
analysed by Spalding (2007). It was the result of facilitation efforts as claimed by staff of private aid 
agencies based in Central America and the growing belief in the complementarities of strategies. 
I observed that various organisations took distance from each other, yet, invested time in sharing 
information, joint analysis and coordination of actions. 
This is note-worthy for two reasons. First, it supports the conceptualisation of transnational 
activism as a set of related but separated forces active in the realm of global civil society (GCS) 
rather than either a compact single-issue campaign or an atomised sum of organisations. There 
are common concerns in a context of general weakness, yet not the normative consensus assumed 
by the transnational advocacy networks approach. Second, since actions are done in some form 
of coordination, it makes difficult to separate the effects on the negotiations of each individual 
organisation member of the network or coalition. As most activities take place simultaneously – in 
the two regions and at different levels, national and regional - under the same banner of a group of 
organisation, the effects of these actions become the effects of all diffuse interventions. 
In Europe, CIFCA played an important networking and organising role. CIFCA is a platform of 
European private aid agencies and Human Rights NGOs whose mission is to monitor Central American 
and Mexico relations with the EU. They worked closely with other private aid agencies platforms 
such as Grupo Sur, APRODEV and CIDSE, as well as with other Brussels-based organisations which 
followed the negotiations, notably, Friends of the Earth Europe4. European organisations worked 
closely together and with partners and organisations in Central America, but did not formalise a 
campaign or a new coalition as such. 
In Central America, the mobilisations around and against the CAFTA-DR agreement left a 
mark in the organisational landscape. Some organisations argued that the agreement had positive 
3  Details about how the documents were collected and how the calculations were made appear in 
Appendix 1 and 4. 
4  Interviews with CIFCA officials, Brussels, 8-9 December 2008 and observations in the period 
between July 2008 to March 2010.
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effects on social citizenship rights, especially labour rights (Abrahamson, 2007). Others resisted 
the negotiations, such as Social Hemispheric Alliance (Alianza Social Continental – ASC, 2011) and 
Colectivo Centroamérica para el Diálogo (CAD). The Hemispheric Social Alliance was very active 
and led to, among other things, the creation of a bi-regional network Latin America-Europe called 
‘Enlazando Alternativas’ (Linking Alternatives). Other organisations preferred to influence the 
process by providing technical inputs about the possible negative impacts on different economic and 
social sectors and participating in consultation spaces, such as ALOP, a network of Latin American 
development NGOs, and Iniciativa CID, a Central American network of foundations, aided notably 
by some of its most active members, like FUNDE in El Salvador. 
Organisations often saw themselves as choosing incidencia or resistencia, incidencia meaning 
lobby or participation in consultation spaces, and resistencia, meaning rejecting the agreements 
and choosing social mobilisations and campaigning as the main strategy. This self-understanding 
came up often during the interviews but also it was described as such in publications (Iniciativa Cid, 
2008:38-39). But the relations and exchanges among organisations proved to be more dynamic and 
complex than a dichotomic understanding of activism as it will be further discussed.  
In the next section, the approaches, ideas and actions of these organisations is examined. This 
helps to understand their strategic choices and inter-organisational dynamics. 
4.3.1 Approaches to activism in Central America
Various types of organisations were concerned and actively followed the negotiations5. These were 
a mix of research and advocacy NGOs, membership-based associations of agricultural producers, 
local and regional trade unions platforms, local and international development NGOs. My 
observations and network mapping showed that the organisations perceived as most active were 
regional organisations: a) Iniciativa CID, a network of 40 organisations including, HR organisations, 
trade unions and research organisations, and one of its members, FUNDE, a research and advocacy 
organisation based in El Salvador; b) ALOP, the association of Latin American NGOs; c) Colectivo 
Centroamérica para el Diálogo (CAD); d) the Hemispheric Social Alliance (Alianza Social Continental) 
and one of its members in Nicaragua, Movimiento Social Otro Mundo es Posible; e) the Campaign 
Water outside the AA (In Spanish, Agua fuera del Ada), composed by group of organisations; 
f) the Central American Platform of Trade Unions (In Spanish, Plataforma Sindical Común 
Centroamericana), and g) associations of agricultural producers and farmers, la Via Campesina. 
There also active national coalitions and platforms such as CHAAC in Honduras. 
They were all involved in different ways; some preferred the t-shirt, while some preferred the 
tie. But they adopted different mixes of political strategies. Organisations acknowledged each other, 
met, exchanged information periodically and converged in some common concerns. They created 
a new and special regional and bi-regional dynamic of transnational activism, different from the 
dynamics present during the CAFTA negotiations.  
Four main networks (ALOP, ASC, CAD and Iniciativa CID) came together to exchange information 
5  See organisational glossary in Appendix 6 for details about the organisations mentioned. 
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and views. Despite the diversity in views, after some meetings, there was convergence towards 
some common points of concern. Out of this process of exchanges two main joint documents 
were produced: Basic conditions for the negotiations (Dec. 2006) and the Tegucigalpa Declaration. 
Though this process did not lead to a full-fledged campaign of joint actions, it was important for the 
networks involved. It is also worth of analysis as it is in these discussions and interactions where 
the various underlying assumptions, views and theories about the link between development and 
free trade emerged. These interactions and ideas are analysed below. It is necessary first, to locate 
organisations and describe the main efforts made to influence the negotiations. 
Among those who preferred the tie or least the shirt we can find some members of Iniciativa 
CID and ALOP. Iniciativa CID played an active role in monitoring and analysing the negotiations from 
a more technical point of view. They sustained their participation in Cuartos adjuntos, in seminars 
and other dialogue spaces. One of its most active members, FUNDE, edited several publications and 
organised seminars and workshops in the region. They collaborated with European networks such 
as APRODEV or CIFCA participating in activities organised in Brussels. Their research, publication 
and dissemination activities were in various occasions funded by European private aid agencies. 
Their publications examined the impacts of different aspects of the agreements from a Central 
America’s point of view. They analysed prospects in the areas of investments, funded by Diakonia 
Sweeden in 2006, Intellectual Property Rights in 2006, fisheries funded by Oxfam International in 
2007, together with Iniciativa CID on workers rights and the views of civil society in 2008, impacts on 
the agricultural sector funded by Centro Cooperativo Sueco in 2010. They also co-wrote publications 
with ALOP. 
 ALOP is the only Latin American association of NGOs which has been able to sustain an 
office in Brussels since 1997. The aim of this office is to follow European development-related 
policy-making in relation to Latin America. Their main activities were to represent their members´ 
opinions, to disseminate their studies and reports, to engage in dialogue and advocacy activities 
before European institutions and the representations of Latin American governments based 
in Brussels, and to articulate their actions to other networks. They sustained their participation 
in invited spaces both on the Central American as well as the European sides: cuartos adjuntos, 
consultation fora and DG-Trade Civil Society Dialogue to name a few. In this line, one important 
contribution can be highlighted: they were one of the few organisations that followed closely 
and pro-actively the process of the Sustainability Impact Assessment. They analysed the terms of 
reference, draft and final reports. But they were also pro-active in creating new spaces. Together 
with Iniciativa CID and ICCO they organised multiple thematic exchange workshops parallel to the 
negotiations in Tegucigalpa in March 2009. Their aim was to open discussion spaces among and 
with governments, with the support and engagement of the South Centre, an intergovernmental 
initiative of Southern governments with expertise in trade negotiations. Additionally, the aim was 
to provide extra arguments, tools of analysis and information to empower the negotiating capacity 
of Central American negotiation teams. To facilitate the participation of government officials and 
negotiators, the workshops took place in the same hotel where the negotiations were being held. 
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Another important contribution of ALOP worth highlighting was that they were able to play an 
important nexus role among Central American and European networks, being based in Brussels, and 
in the building of Belgian Flemish NGOs 11.11.11., where also CIFCA is located. 
CAD and ASC members preferred the t-shirt. They labeled their activities as resistance activities 
(ASC, 2011). They rejected the agreements and considered that resistance to the negotiations was 
the best strategy. They favoured the creation of new spaces with the aim to mobilise citizens and 
especially those who would be potentially most negatively affected. They organised discussion fora, 
made campaign materials such as pamphlets and videos and mobilised in the streets in the capitals 
where negotiations took place. On 16 April 2008 coinciding with the 3rd round of negotiations in 
San Salvador, a march was organised by ASC Centroamérica and the local student organisation, 
Fuerza Estudiantil Salvadoreña (FES) Jorge Arias Gómez. The organisers state that the march of 5.000 
people belonging to women, student, environmental organisations, trade unions and community-
based organisations. They walked from the centre of town until the entrance of Radisson Hotel 
where the negotiations were taking place. They read their declarations. In these declarations, they 
rejected participating in cuartos adjuntos depicted as places where the interests of workers were 
betrayed. Similar marches were organised in other negotiation rounds.
I participated in the march organised in Tegucigalpa on 31 March 2009. The march was 
preceded by sessions of the International People’s Tribunal and informative sessions in which 
presentations by different organisations were made. Wearing a T-shirt did not mean that activists 
were prevented from meeting with government officials. Leaders of these social movements had 
communication channels with officials of some governments, mostly Honduras (before the coup-
d’état in July 2009) and Nicaragua. The point of convergence is the search for development paths 
which escape the neoliberal models. For example, officials from the Nicaraguan negotiating team 
came to discuss and share views to the hotel where organisations were gathering in Tegucigalpa. 
According to activists, in general, there was no real dialogue with governments, with the exception 
of Nicaragua and Honduras, where social movements participated in dialogue tables6.  In this same 
location, there were also workshops especially organised to involve concerned Central American 
parliamentarians, both from national parliaments as well as from the Parlacen (Central American 
Parliament). This activity aimed to mirror similar dialogue spaces organised at the European 
Parliament.
Wearing a T-shirt to participate at the people’s forum did not prevent an advocacy officer 
of a European private aid agency to take a taxi, put on a shirt and a tie and join a workshop about 
services and investments and give an interview to a local TV channel. Wearing a tie did not prevent 
those who had been organising technical workshops at the hotel to join some of the people’s forum 
activities later in the day.  
Though some organisations believed that the agreement would bring more risks than 
benefits, and that it would be good to stop it, their involvement in consultations was motivated by 
6  Telephone interview with Plataforma Sindical Centroamericana/ Asociación Nacional de Empleados 
Publicos y Privados de Costa Rica, September 2009) 
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the need to make it the least harmful, as explained by a trade unions leader from Nicaragua7: ‛the 
circumstances are not favourable to stop the agreement’. This process of influence and resistance, 
of acceptance and rejection, of encounters and tensions was influenced by the pace and outcomes 
of the negotiation rounds. As the negotiations went on without reflecting much openness to their 
demands, organisations joined forces. At least, they met regularly and shared information. In April 
2010, and previous to the Madrid Summit in which the agreement would be signed all organisations 
met at an event in Managua and subscribed to a single statement (CLOC-Via Campesina, 2010) 
which was handed in to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua and to the European Union 
Representation.
Organisations created new spaces. These were awareness-raising spaces as public fora and 
dialogue spaces with parliamentarians and officials as in the seminars organised in Tegucigalpa in 
March 2009. These are note-worthy spaces for mainly three reasons. First, it was the initiative of 
organisations to involve their representatives in debates, rather than representatives themselves 
being pro-active in gathering inputs from different concerned groups. Second, these were the only 
spaces where most parties from different countries could meet and exchange ideas, in less formal 
and constrained formats. Third, in most cases, these activities – from publications to public fora 
- were made possible by the financial support of European private aid agencies and partners in 
Europe. 
In sum, organised used invited spaces and most importantly, created new spaces. Strategies 
used a mix of actions ranging from a close monitoring of policy-process and participation in invited 
spaces with policy briefs and alternative analysis, and at the same time, putting pressure on the 
negotiating countries via direct meetings, street mobilisations, campaigns and public statements in 
the media.  The organisational preferences in the use of invited and created spaces are graphically 
depicted in Figure 138.  But which were the underlying ideas which motivated these actions? 
 
Diversity and convergence in ideas
Some organisations believed the agreement could be an opportunity for development of Central 
America and thus, they aimed to enhance that window of opportunity. It could be so if risks were 
mitigated, asymmetries recognised, and the right approaches and policies were put in place. They 
explained: ‘If free trade is effectively geared towards contributing to development; this implies 
recognising the existence of big difference among transnational companies and local ones’ (my 
translation, FUNDE, 2011). Free trade and foreign investments are seen as tools for the region’s 
economic development: Iniciativa Cid and ALOP consider that trade, especially in a scenario which 
tends to its liberalisation, must be a tool for development, not an end in itself (ALOP- Iniciativa CID, 
2010: 53). But free trade should be subordinated to human rights and environmental legislation: 
7  Interview with trade unions leader from Nicaragua, member of Iniciativa Cid, January 2009.
8  I first constructed this figure based on my observations and interviews, but I discussed it with 
member organisations of CIFCA at a session in March 2010. It is important to note that these positions are 
not static, rather they represent the most preferred and used strategy but some organisations used various 
strategies and were more mobile than the picture suggests. 
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Table 5. Story-line of key actions
2004
29 January 2004. Brussels. I Dialogue with Civil Society Forum EU Central America about regional integration. 
2007
5 March 2007. Tegucigalpa. International Popular Forum: Central America – EU: trade with justice and equity 
is possible
5-6 March 2007. Tegucigalpa. II Dialogue with Civil Society Forum EU Central America. 
October 2007. Launch of the negotiations
December 2007. Publication of the study commissioned by CIFCA and executed by CEPA (Comisión de Estudios 
Políticos Alternativos) Possible affected sectors in Central America and Panama of the negotiations of an 
Association Agreement with the European Union. (CIFCA, 2007a)
2008
26 February 2008. Brussels. Dialogue at the European Parliament in the context of the II Round of negotiations. 
La sociedad civil toma la palabra 
July 2008. Brussels. International Gathering of Social Movements and Non-Governmental Organisations 
in relation to the Negotiation of Association Agreements between the EU and Latin America ALOP – 
APRODEV – CIDSE – CIFCA – Grupo Sur – FIDH - Friends of the Earth Europe – Red UE-CAN – OXFAM 
International
8 October 2008. Managua. Americas Social Forum. ASC event to analyse possible effects of signing the 
agreement. ASC 
November 2008. Participation at Civil Society Dialogue organised by the EC.
2009
January 2009. Week of events in Brussels parallel to Round X. Seminar at European Parliament, public events, 
internal meetings and informal discussions with policy makers.
27 March – 1 April 2009. Tegucigalpa. Week of events parallel to Round VII International People’s Tribunal 
Meeting, open forum and demonstration to negotiations venue, Tegucigalpa, Honduras. 
30 March – 1 April.  Tegucigalpa. Hotel Clarion. Exchange of experiences in trade negotiations in the frame of 
the VII Round organised by ALOP, Iniciativa CID and ICCO. 
April 2009. Briefing paper for European parliamentarians prepared by APRODEV and ALOP.
October 2009. Stockholm. Seminar at the Swedish Parliament. 
2010
15-16 April. Managua. Forum about Central American integration and AA with the EU. 
May 2010. Madrid. Signature of the Agreement at the EU-Latin America Head of States Summit. 
2011
March 2011. Brussels. Dialogue at the European Parliament Facing the upcoming ratification of the trade 
agreements between the EU and Central America, Colombia and Perú 
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when there is a dispute related to recognised human rights, labour and environmental internationally 
recognised laws, these should prevail above the rights of investors (my translation, FUNDE, 2011). 
Organisations question the development potentials of free trade but do not challenge the basic 
development model per se (understood as market liberalism): the model can be improved. 
ALOP makes explicit in its documentation its understandings of development and regional 
integration (ALOP, 2011). Governments-led integration processes alone cannot ‘establish the 
mechanisms to avoid the destructing effects of globalisation’; civil society organisations need to adopt 
an active role in controlling both governments and markets. This is why ALOP aims to contribute 
to processes of regional integration from the perspective of citizens´ rights and to build a ‘regional 
citizenship’. Regional integration appears as a potential factor of development and development 
as more than economic growth. It is the ‘expansion of people’s capacities and freedoms to access 
opportunities’. Development would be achieved through a ‘virtuous articulation among governability, 
competitiveness and social integration’. This approach materialises in ALOP´s analysis and statements. 
In its analysis of the SIA reports, ALOP emphasises the need to assess in-depth social and environmental 
impacts. The methodology used in the study appears too focused on macro-economic growth and 
limited in various ways. Among its limitations, ALOP´s paper points out to lack of social impact 
indicators such as poverty, access to basic services and social equity– the only social indicator used is 
employment -; no consideration of adjustment costs when labour mobility among sectors is likely to 
happen; no clear analysis on the effects in intra-regional trade; and no specific analysis on the impact 
on key agricultural products markets per country; and its consequent effects on livelihoods of small 
agricultural producers. The paper also highlights the importance of impacts on the agricultural sector 
in relation to issues like food sovereignty, social cohesion and climate change. 
On another level, the report indicates that public procurement and competition policy are 
not considered and should be because these are tools of national economic policy important to 
promote endogenous development. The analysis made by ALOP is detailed and it includes a critical 
assessment of process-related issues and of economic policy and methodology-related topics. The 
report indicates that it aims to realise the ideas of sustainable development beyond economic 
growth only. Thought the SIA report states that the AA would be beneficial for both regions in terms 
of increase in Gross National Product, ALOP is concerned with social and environmental impacts 
as well as possible limits to the policy capacity of governments in the long term. The mentioning 
of food sovereignty is puzzling as the adopting this concept as a guiding principle in policy would 
imply important limitations to international trade and a deep redefinition of food production and 
land use. ALOP has subscribed to several civil society statements, both with Central American and 
European networks. 
For the ASC, the AA and the Central American Trade Unions Platform the AA is simply an 
FTA, equivalent to CAFTA. The aim of FTAs is to deepen global markets integration in favour of 
multinational corporations’ interests. The AA is defined as:  
a political instrument ruled by the EU interest to expand its hegemonic influence in Central 
America, which is a region disputed by economic blocs over the control of its markets and 
productive resources, coherent with the Global Europe vision (original highlighting, ASC, 2009) 
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These organisations connotate the agreements with images and ideas of invasion, neo-colonialism 
and imperialism. Figures 10 and 11 have been extracted from materials produced by ASC. In Figure 
10, Europeans are shown as unfriendly soldiers who use the AA to force its way through the door 
and walls which protect Central America. European soldiers also engage in competition with CAFTA 
soldiers who also want to conquer the region. They project an idea of the agreement as a weapon 
in a battle field. The aim is to show how economic powers dispute the access to countries and their 
resources. A person or soldier inside the Central America’s fortress appears as scared and helpless, 
without weapons and only watching the situation. In Figure 11 the asymmetry of power in the 
negotiations is represented. Europe is presented as a big and tall person wearing boots in front of 
a small, fearful and bare-feet Central American peasant. The tall person inviting the short person 
to negotiate as equals. The picture aims to stress the unfairness and impossibility of a reciprocal 
trade agreement between two very unequal regions. Even if competition is accepted as positive 
for economic development, under such structural differences in economic capacities, competition 
becomes unfair. 
These representations of asymmetries bring in the morality of allowing a considerable degree 
of openness and competition. The vision of the AA by these organisations cannot be more negative. 
It is equated to a war, threat, with the use of violence and force as tools, rather than dialogue and 
cooperation. If the AA is perceived as a threat, then there is a need to resist these agreements and 
protect national and regional interests. Indirectly, these representations in the population reinforce 
and legitimatise the demands of Central America as a region which deserves special and differential 
treatment in trade negotiations. These representations also contribute to build the identity of the EU 
as a competitor and whose main interests are economic rather than cooperative and of CA as weak 
and in need of protection against invaders. In a way, this representation of CA governments as fearful 
and weak could be counterproductive for the perceptions of their negotiation capacity. 
 
Figure 10. FTAs as invaders (Source: Alianza Social Continental)  
134
Chapter 4
These organisations thus reject the agreements and do not aim to influence them. They see them 
as a continuation of previous policies of liberalisation and de-regulation which they assess as having 
been disastrous for their countries. Furthermore, they see liberal policies as eroding functions and 
competences of governments, which in their view, should be strengthened to guarantee access to 
basic social and economic rights. 
Via Campesina shares these critical views and frames its rejection within their overall global 
struggle against neoliberalism and to promote the idea of agrarian reform and food sovereignty. For 
ASC and Via Campesina it is the right to food that is put at risk by these agreements: 
The human right to food is closely linked to food sovereignty. With the AA, the principle of food 
sovereignty and the guarantee of safe food for the population is jeopardised, because it allows 
transnationals to monopolise food production and that they profit through patents and property 
rights.  (ASC, 2009: 6) 
Concerns of all active networks increased in more advanced stages of the negotiations and their 
assessment was that the agreement would not contribute to development of Central America. 
In April 2010, a joint common statement was published and signed by the main movements and 
networks as they refer to themselves, ASC, ALOP, Campaign Water out of AA, Iniciativa CID, UNAM 
and Via Campesina Centroamerica (CLOC – Via Campesina, 2010).  After a seminar in Managua of 
15-16 April, their conclusion is that economic and geopolitical were prevailing in the trade pillar 
against the political dialogue and cooperation pillars. They saw this result as the lack of coherence 
 
Figure 11. Asymmetries, Let’s negotiate as equals. (Source: Alianza Social Continental)
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and political responsibility of Central American governments who were unable to come to the 
negotiations with a regional development strategy. This weakness allowed the EU to impose its 
topics, times and priorities in the agenda. Their analysis of negotiations at this stage led them 
to come to a common position: they demanded the immediate suspension of negotiations for 
considering the AA as harmful for economic, political and social rights. The document makes several 
references to the rights of workers, the need for agrarian reform and food sovereignty. 
During the five years of monitoring and mobilisation around the agreements a movement from 
diversity of actions and ideas towards convergence to common positions could be observed in Central 
America. This movement was neither linear nor easy. Several and conscious efforts were made to 
discuss and analyse the implications of the agreement and to coordinate joint responses, according 
to those interviewed. In the context of history of distrust and coexistence of different analysis and 
consequent strategic actions inherited from the mobilisations around CAFTA, new dynamics of 
coordination and cooperation emerged. These new dynamics could be observed in the increasing 
amount of meetings to discuss developments before, during and after each round, the exchange of 
information and finally, coming together to ask a suspension of the negotiations in 2010. But these 
dynamics did not evolve in isolation. Evidence from interviews indicates that European organisations 
attempted to play a facilitating role. A staff of a European Private Aid Agency said ‘we were the chewing 
gum’. This facilitating role was appreciated by Central American organisations; yet, it also led to some 
uneasiness about leadership. The dynamics of the bi-regional network which emerged to channel civil 
society concerns deserve a separate analysis. But before, it is necessary to understand what were the 
main actions and ideas of European organisations. 
4.3.2 Approaches to activism in Europe
The main European organisations who followed the negotiations in a systematic way were CIFCA, 
Grupo Sur, APRODEV, CIDSE, Friends of the Earth Europe and CAWN. Most European organisations 
concerned with the negotiations were private aid agencies with a long cooperation tradition in 
Central America. They had supported peace processes and the transitions to democracy (Biekart, 
1999). From a rights-based approach, they were concerned about rights which could be put at risk 
by the possible negative impacts of economic adjustment (e.g. TROCAIRE, 2008).  There was also 
CAWN a network of Central American women based in the UK, who looked at the possible impacts 
of the agreement on women (CAWN, 2007). 
Most organisations considered the agreement as an opportunity for Central America in 
the beginning: ‘We gave them [the EU[ the benefit of the doubt’ they explained9.  They did so 
as the EU argued the agreement’s main aim was to contribute to sustainable development. More 
specifically, there was the opportunity of a chapter linking trade and development under which 
labour, environmental and social issues could be dealt with. As negotiations progressed without 
echoing the concerns of European organisations, some proposed a stronger position, a ‘No to 
the AA’ campaign, while others preferred to maintain a more dialogic approach. However, they 
9  Explained in an interview and mentioned in meetings of the CIFCA CAMEX group. 
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all worked together and most activities were organised jointly. Most notably these were letters to 
European authorities, position papers, contacts with media, informative sessions and the exchange 
sessions at the European Parliament. But each organisation made a special contribution according 
to its special expertise, human and material resources.  
CIFCA created a working group of interested member organisations to follow the negotiations. 
These were mainly Oxfam Solidarité/Oxfam International, CNCD/Concord, Centro Cooperativo 
Sueco, Progressio and Forum Syd. Their office in Brussels invested in preparing their engagement: 
they commissioned a study (CIFCA, 2007a), and developed exhaustive analytical and informative 
material and activities to equip their members to advocate at European member states levels. Their 
materials explored the relationship between human rights and international trade with the purpose 
of identifying European states obligations in the negotiations (CIFCA, 2007b: 7). Their advocacy 
approach was largely based on trying to hold European governments accountable by reminding 
them of their past commitments, either in previous agreements or statements. 
Ideas in Europe: Rights, development and regional integration
European private aid agencies and solidarity organisations used prominently a rights-based 
approach to analyse and engage in the negotiations, which was not the case in the EPAs campaign, 
at least not so explicitly. This is partly due to the tradition of work of European agencies in Central 
America in support of the democratisation and peace processes. There is continuity in personnel, 
approaches and there is expertise developed in this area. Agencies starting point is to defend and 
promote an integral vision of human rights to realise the right to development as a human right 
(e.g. CIFCA, 2007b:2). 
A Human Rights lens is used to analyse any public policy intervention: Human development 
must be the criteria through which to look at trade in the framework of the agreement, and not 
the other way around (my translation, CIFCA, 2007b:48). They refer to the same UNDP definition 
used by ALOP, understanding development as more than economic growth; and trade as a possible 
tool for development. There is no explicit questioning of economic liberal theory and assumptions. 
It is up to governments and their societies to decide their best path to development as long as 
rights are realised. They should have the necessary policy space to decide which policies work best, 
which combination of state and market and which type of integration into the world economy is 
more suitable. Regional integration is also understood as a positive phenomenon, as long as it is 
endogenously driven and not only the result of intergovernmental relations (CIFCA, 2007b:60). 
Governments’ role is fundamental as guarantors of rights. In this line any trade liberalisation is 
positive as long as human rights are advanced or not jeopardised: 
From a human rights approach it is necessary that any progressive liberalisation of trade and 
investments is focused on the progressive realisation of human rights. If these two processes are 
developed in opposing or conflicting directions, the adoption of any trade liberalisation measure 
which may reduce the protection of human rights constitutes a violation of them (My translation, 
CIFCA, 2007b: 24) 
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In this direction, APRODEV developed the concept of ‘bench-marking’, that is, linking development 
indicators to progress in the implementation of the agreement. 
Friends of the Earth – Europe is one of the few organisations in Europe which moves beyond 
the generally agreed-upon definition of development. They put forward more explicitly the idea of 
development alternatives: 
These movements have been talking about ‘alternatives’ to the ultra-liberal agenda from 
the beginning. However, for many years talking about it publicly was simply impossible; it was 
a daunting prospect for many people, and nobody in the institutions was there to listen to us. 
Besides, resisting to the ultraliberal bulldozer was already a full-time job for the few campaigners 
that were out there, and it didn’t leave much time to work on a positive agenda. (…)  Our work on 
alternatives to ultra-liberalism and ‘free trade’ has been articulated for a few years now in terms of 
paradigm shift (the need for our societies to move away from the paradigm of short-term economic 
growth) and lifestyle changes (the need to put an end to overconsumption in Europe) (FOE-E, 2008) 
This shift is important as it questions the paradigm of economic growth - based in the need of 
increasing demand and consumption -. Tough it does not spell out an alternative; it refers to a need 
to change life-styles. 
4.4 Bi-regional activism characteristics and its dynamics
Though all above mentioned organisations acknowledged each other’s work and exchanged 
information on a periodic basis, there were mainly two bi-regional networks and related dynamics10 
which corresponded to my categorisation as functional networks or open coalitions. This meant 
more than acknowledgement. Yet, collaboration among organisations could not be categorised as 
a formalised and compact coalition or platform. The first group was composed by ALOP, on the 
Central America/Latin American side, and Friends of Earth, CIFCA, Grupo Sur and Oxfam on the 
European or International organisations side. Facilitated by the fact that ALOP has an office in 
Brussels, these organisations signed several statements and letters together. They agreed on the 
basic analysis and adopted an explicit rights-based approach and on common concerns about social 
and environmental impacts. 
The second bi-regional initiative which emerged in 2004 is Enlazando Alternativas. The 
network was formalised during the forum organised on the occasion of the EU-Latin American 
Summit in Guadalajara. The origin was the concern of organisations in both regions for the 
neoliberal orientation of EU policies and its ambitious trade agenda. In their website they explain: 
the creation of the bi-regional network reflected the need to increase resistance by civil society 
in Latin America and in Europe to the European project, to transnational companies based in the 
EU and to international policies of free trade (Enlazando Alternativas, 2011, my translation). Their 
10  There were also bi-regional exchanges among trade union leaders and related foundations such 
as the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Though there were exchanges, according to a Central American trade union 
leader, European trade unions did not do enough. They needed more dialogue and deeper understandings of 
each other’s positions and the reasons for opposing association agreements. Thus there was not a strong joint 
bi-regional trade unions campaign.
138
Chapter 4
approach and understanding of the negotiations was similar to those of some of its members, for 
example, the ASC, and Friends of the Earth: 
We energetically reject Free Trade Agreements, Association Agreements and bilateral investment 
treaties – or Treaties of Investments Promotion and Protection – agreed among some Latin 
American and European countries, which have been negotiated on the backs of and against the 
interests of our peoples. (…) 17. We make the struggles and demands of indigenous peoples ours, 
and for the ‘buen vivir’ (good living), the creation of pluri-national states and the recognition 
and defence of the rights of our mother earth, which contribute to the necessity of developing 
consumption and production models that are more sustainable, responsible and fair. (My emphasis 
and translation from Spanish, Enlazando Alternativas, 2010)
A new narrative appears in the texts of Enlazando Alternativas and of Friends of the Earth: that of 
looking for alternative life-styles and ‘good living’. However, what this means is not fully spelled out, as 
was also acknowledged during a meeting of activists in Madrid11. 
 Three important aspects of transnational activism can be analysed based on the above 
description of actions and ideas: first, the mobilisation capacity, second, the network and coalition 
capacity, and third, the discourse capacity in relation to diffuse and instrumental action. 
4.5.1 Mobilisation capacity
The actions described above make evident that there was a basic mobilisation capacity. There were 
a handful of organisations which were able to sustain their involvement in consultation spaces 
and their monitoring work over a long period of time. There were several public awareness and 
discussion events as well as publications. These actions were organised by a relatively small group 
of people, mostly based in capitals, with high degrees of qualifications (e.g. staff were economists, 
lawyers specialised in HR law and in European institutions). 
The mobilisations were much more limited than those around the CAFTA negotiations12. A 
Central American ambassador’s13 perception was that the pressure and mobilisation around the 
negotiations at regional level in general had been weak: 
Mobilisation about this topic in Central America, there is none; rather, there is an intellectual 
concern of concrete organisations from civil society and NGOS that denounce this agreement as 
negative. This has to do with other preoccupations in the daily life of citizens.
Explanations for this limited mobilisation were related to two reasons. First, the existence of other 
more pressing issues both in Europe and in Central America was mentioned as an important factor. 
Citizens need to mobilise around issues like power cuts in Nicaragua or employment in Europe. 
Second, activists considered that resources for campaigning were more limited in comparison to 
other campaigns. Organisations from Central America compared the funds available to mobilise 
11  Observations in Madrid, March 2010.
12  Interview with activist, Brussels, January 2009.
13  Interview in Brussels, 2009. 
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around CAFTA with those to mobilise around the AA. Their assessment was that there were fewer 
funds for advocacy work on the AA. They believed that European NGOs were somehow reluctant 
to get involved. They believed they were fearful of losing funds from their governments if they 
supported resistance or critical views about the AA. One of them explained: ‘Some gave us an 
explanation, others simply evasive answers’ 14 
Despite the fact that citizens in CA did not mobilise massively, there were demonstrations 
during the negotiations, mostly of small producers and social movements critical of FTAs as observed 
in Tegucigalpa in March 2009 and recounted by activists15. 
4.5.2 Network and coalition building capacity
There was a web of relations organised through local, national, regional and bi-regional levels. They 
included formal federations and associations as well as de facto relations. Though there was no 
formalised bi-regional ‘No to the AA’ coalition, there were joint projects and relations between 
agricultural producers and European private aid agencies, trade unions and foundations, etc. The 
two bi-regional dynamics identified above included a diversity of organisations in terms of size, 
geographical coverage, approaches and type of organisations. The level of collaboration can be 
illustrated by the number of joint actions and publications. Figure 12 shows that almost half of the 
documents were issued as a network or coalition (48%), and a considerable amount signed as a bi-
regional initiative (20%). Yet, there were limited links to Central American associations of agricultural 
producers and small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Associations of small-scale producers and 
farmers, such as those linked to fair trade schemes and Via Campesina where active and mobilised 
in numbers. However, other important economic sectors were not equally represented. Only in one 
of the events observed in Tegucigalpa there was a representative of SME. He explained that there 
has been a traditional distance between those organisations with a more contentious approach 
to activism against FTAs, and their organisations which seek for better market conditions for their 
members. Though he hoped there would be more links with those organisations that conduct 
studies and are concerned with the possible negative consequences of such agreements. Despite 
the fact that this link between SME and the coalition of citizen organisations in Honduras (CHAAC), 
these groups did not join actions in a sustained manner nor there were indications that the presence 
of groups of concentrated interests were strong. In sum, the evidence gathered shows a limited 
coalition in terms of the presence of important groups of concentrated interests in both Central 
America and Europe. Considering that the most important private sectors actors were sugar, beef, 
coffee, fruits and agricultural producers, their limited involvement in the bi-regional networks left 
the latter only backed-up by sectors of trade unionism and small-scale farmers and peasants.  
The links and relations with states existed but differed in terms of fluidity of dialogue and 
access depending on the state and the type of invited spaces.  In the case of Europe, European 
14  Brussels, interviews with trade unions leader from Nicaragua, January 2009 and activists, January 
2009. 
15  Interview with Central American activist, Brussels, January 2009.
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networks cultivated relations with the European Commission, the European Parliament and 
member states. They also held meetings with Central American ambassadors in Brussels. There 
were also formal exchanges in debriefing meetings and Civil Society Dialogue meetings. All actors 
acknowledged each other, yet there was distance in the positions and the information provided was 
scarce. 
In Central America, officials met with CC-SICA (Comité Consultivo Sistema de la Integración 
Centroamericana)16 representatives and held meetings at national level. Costa Rica maintained 
a general information website and all countries reported having had meetings with several 
organisations both in the region and in Brussels.  However, some believe the CC-SICA is not 
representative enough and that the exchange of information was limited as officials replied they 
could not disclose much information to the nature of negotiations as explained by an activist from 
Honduras17. Officials receive proposals but ‛those [officials] who are linked to enterprises do not 
read them’ he explained.
Nicaragua’s ambassador explained that in his country there was a commission composed of private 
sector representatives and other social forces which advised the President and the negotiators. In 
his view, this was the case in which they were most involved and in general, there were coincidences 
16   It is the consultative body of the Central American Integration System open to civil society actors 
17  Interviews with activist from Honduras, Brussels: January 2009 and Tegucigalpa, March 2009.
Figure 12. Documents per type of network (2007-2010) 
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in positions, for example, on the emphasis on the recognitions of asymmetries. It is to the 
governments of Honduras (before the coup) and Nicaragua that representatives of the bi-regional 
networks delivered a political proposal which included the major points of concern. 
In brief, there were contacts among all actors, and two functional networks could be observed. 
These two networks converged more as the negotiations advanced and formed an open and 
functional network. Yet, these networks had limited links and channels of communication with state 
actors and important economic sectors. Only there were more open contacts with Central American 
countries with whom social movements and networks found most resonance and openness to their 
concerns. 
4.5.3 Mix of ideas and approaches to action
The diversity in organisational composition of transnational activist networks is reflected in the 
wide range of strategies used and in the ideas underlying positions and statements. The diversity 
in strategies and ideas as illustrated in Figure 13. Though it appears as static, positioning was much 
more fluid. But in general, two dynamics can be observed. First, there is an active bi-regional network 
composed by ALOP-Iniciativa-CIFCA-APRODEV-FOE-E mainly. They can be categorised as adopting a 
reformist rights-based approach18. Their statements do not challenge markets integration per se, 
rather the way countries integrate. It is the scope and pace of liberalisation that has to be limited 
if there are any risks of affecting social, economic and environmental rights. Within platforms of 
private aid agencies like CIFCA there are discrepancies about the desired extent of liberalisation 
and its possible negative consequences. There are some member organisations that considered 
the agreement as having positive aspects for it would enhance the market access opportunities 
for associations of producers with whom they work19. Some organisations adopted more or less 
reformist language depending on the context and moment. Overall, they agreed on their main 
concern: respect for HR and the most enabling conditions for development. They also agreed on the 
need to reinforce the EU´s identity as a responsible and coherent donor and as defender of HR and 
of sustainable development. Yet, in internal meetings there was an underlying undefined tension 
among various visions of development. 
A second bi-regional network, Enlazando Alternativas together with ASC, TNI and sub-regional 
networks questioned more the growth-oriented and exports-led development model implicit in 
the AA. Their representations of economic reality brought to the fore concepts of environmental 
sustainability, food sovereignty and ‘buen vivir’ or ‘good living’. Reformist and isolationist approaches 
coexisted, conflicted with each other and, at moments, entered into dialogue, especially towards 
the end of the negotiations. But in all cases, reference to human rights frameworks, especially 
to economic and social rights was central. A rights-based approach was much more explicit and 
fundamental than in other mobilisations around FTAs.
18  This positioning was confirmed by CIFCA members in a presentation which showed this graph in 
March 2010.
19  Interview with a representative from a private aid agency, Brussels: September 2009.
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In terms of ways of acting, all organisations used invited spaces in most cases. ALOP, CIFCA, 
Grupo Sur, APRODEV, FOE-E sustained their participation in Civil Society Dialogue and informative 
meetings. They also followed closely the SIA and provided their input. But they also created 
new spaces such as the seminars organised at the European and Swedish parliaments and the 
organisation of local, regional and international informative fora. These events aimed to inform the 
public, and especially, reinforce the role of parliamentarians. The events at the parliaments were 
unique in the sense that all perspectives were expressed. There were also informative seminars and 
events often called ‘forum’, a format in which there are presentations combined with mobilisation 
(rallies, banners, and songs).  
At the same time some organisations which see themselves as social movements and criticise 
invited spaces for its legitimatising role of the status quo, also participated in them. Some had 
close relations with some governments whose rhetoric and structural analysis they shared. So 
organisations positioned in the figure as preferring the use of created spaces such as ASC members, 
do also use invited spaces when they see opportunities for influence and when there is less distance 
between their demands and governments´ ideological orientations. 
This fluidity is reflected also in the genres used. There were important attempts to open 
technical documents to wider audiences. Examples of these efforts are: FUNDE and CCS, Cuadernos 
de Trabajo (2008) and CIFCA´s guidelines for advocacy (CIFCA, 2007b). There were also attempts 
to back up political documents with technical inputs as was the case of the informative forum 
organised by the Campaign Agua fuera del Ada in Tegucigalpa in March 2009.  
Figure 13.  Actions and ideas in transnational activism (AA) based on Gaventa (2006)
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4.5 Contributions to changes in discursive practices and decisions
This section discusses the effects of transnational activism on the negotiations discursive practices. 
It examines the power dynamics in practices of invited and created spaces, and through these 
practices, the discursive capacity of transnational activism is observed. Of the total amount of 
documents identified about the AA20(447), most were produced by governments (210). Even tough 
most documents were produced by national governments and regional institutions, a considerable 
amount (187) were produced by non-state actors with different educational, informative and 
advocacy purposes, including those produced by the CC-SICA (20). This with the exception of those 
documents produced by consultancy firms hired to produce the SIA (40). It is noteworthy that a 
small amount of the documents found were produced by parliamentarians (10), including both 
the European Parliament, national parliaments in Central America and the Inter-parliamentarian 
Assembly. 
Three sets of practices are analysed: a) experiences of invited spaces managed by 
governments, b) experiences of created spaces but taking place in the context of formal spaces, 
parliaments and, c) an experience as a created and claimed space in the form of a public forum and 
street mobilisation. Following the analytical approach detailed in chapter 2, discursive practices are 
analysed in terms of their productivity of subjects authorised to speak (who is allowed and who 
manages to participate), subject identities (perceptions of roles and consequent proper conduct), 
and reflexive action to be perceived as common sense (normative contents). 
4.5.1 Practices of invited spaces
There were three main practices of invited spaces involving civil society organisations. On the 
European side, the EC organised the Civil Society Dialogue and informative sessions organised 
before and after each negotiation round. On the Central American side, there was a regional 
cuarto adjunto. Third, there was a process of consultation in the frame of the Sustainability Impact 
Assessment Study which was managed by ECORYS, a research and consultancy company based in 
the Netherlands. 
In the case of the Civil Society Dialogue sessions these were open prior registration with the 
EC as a Europe-based organisation. They were held in Brussels and the list of registered and present 
participants was published on the EC website. The format was in general a brief presentation by 
officials followed by questions and answers from the audience. Presentations were made by both 
representatives of DG-trade and DG-Relex for the trade chapter and dialogue and cooperation 
pillars respectively. In the case of informative sessions, registration was via email and also took 
place in Brussels. Only a few organisations based in Brussels could sustain their participation. The 
spaces were in principle open but quite restricted in the sense that a handful of organisations could 
in practice attend the meetings. 
Organisations used these spaces with the aim of accessing information and of expressing 
their concerns and views. Some of these spaces were created at the demand of organisations, like 
20  Excluding media coverage.
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the informative sessions. The fact that they were sustained shows that governments accept that 
they must inform the public and channel concerns and demands. However, there were doubts 
about how meaningful these sessions were for both the governments and participants.  It seemed 
as it was an exercise to go through. First, it would show openness by responding to the demand of 
organisations. Second, from the list of meetings that took place it could be concluded that there 
was an open and real dialogue between the EC and civil society. Again, these exercises fit into a 
predominant discourse that it is good to involve civil society, reinforcing the identity of the EU as 
open and transparent in its policy-making. 
Dialogue was limited in a number of ways. Time management was quite strict and in the 
hands of an EC official. One hour in the case of informative sessions and longer depending on the 
amounts of topics in the case of civil society dialogues. In both cases the format was similar. First, 
there was a general briefing by EC officials, usually one representative of DG-trade for the trade 
pillar and one representative of DG-RELEX for the other two pillars. This was followed by a questions 
and answers period. Organisations found that the information given was very limited. The answers 
were concise and in some cases, vague. In my own observations of an informative session, I was 
struck by the vagueness of the information provided. Only the topics discussed were listed and 
even, in one occasion21 it was so vague that the official said ‘We discussed only one of the sensitive 
products’, without giving any other detail about which product he was referring to, or the status of 
the discussions. In the same session, I asked a question myself. I asked which kind of programmes 
and actions were being discussed as part of the cooperation pillar to deal with possible adjustment 
costs and measures to overcome capacity problems. The answer was short and elusive, that it was 
being discussed. I sensed a lack of willingness to explain and an arrogant attitude. The tone of voice 
and non-verbal language did not reflect an open and listening attitude. I started to wonder whether 
my question had been inappropriate or unclearly formulated. I observed that it was the same for 
other questions and a similar attitude in other officials as well.  In another informative session, there 
was a last question and time had run up, the official stood up, left the room with a smile, and did 
not answer the question. I understand that officials are busy but the kind of handling of questions 
led to frustration. Participants shared that it was always like that and confirmed what had been 
explained in interviews about the lack of open exchange. There was an exchange of words, but 
not an exchange of arguments. There were different worldviews in the room which could not be 
bridged. The control of topics and time, the access to some organisations, the language involved led 
to some knowledgeable practices to remain commonsensical and protected from being challenged. 
In these invited practices the discursive capacity of organisations seems limited to making 
their demands known and gathering information. Governments also gather information about 
concerns and demands which help them anticipate similar demands in the future. These spaces 
make civil society – government relations appear as an arena rather than a forum. What seems 
to matter is who is asking the question and the kind of question asked, rather than representing 
a dialogue in search for understanding. The idea of actions being reflexive on the part of civil 
21  Observation of debriefing meeting at the European Commission, Brussels, 30 January 2009. 
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society as discussed by Dryzek seems difficult to grasp in this context. Concerns over HR, social and 
environmental impacts are made appear as misplaced by the answers of technocrats who consider 
they should be dealt in other instances and policies, but not within the context of trade agreements. 
Though the EU expresses its efforts in linking trade and development, in practice these two areas 
appear as compartmentalised. 
4.5.2 Practices of created spaces
There were two types of new created spaces of information and deliberation. The first were 
seminars hosted by parliaments and the second, were public fora/informative activities followed by 
mobilisations to the doors of the hotels were negotiations were being conducted. 
European networks led by CIFCA and Grupo Sur (2011) organised three sessions at the 
European parliament in collaboration with the European Parliament’s Commission for Central 
America (27 February 2008, 28 January 2009 and 16 March 2011). The uniqueness of these 
spaces was that they were the only spaces in which all concerned actors met and spoke, including 
representatives of all negotiating Central American governments, the EC and parliamentarians from 
all groupings in the European Parliament and a few from Central American parliaments. 
I observed and taped the sessions of January 2009. The speaking order reflected the most 
important actors in order of importance, balancing European and Central American speakers. Their 
interventions reinforced and shaped identities of the main subjects, the EU, Central America as a 
region, Central American countries and civil society, referred to as a single entity. As the session 
was hosted by the European Parliament, the session was open by an intervention of two members 
of the European Parliament, the President of the EUROLAT and member of the PPE group at that 
time, Mr. Salafranca, followed by the chair for of the Commission for Central America, of the 
PSOE group. Mr. Salafranca stressed the idea that for the EU integration had worked to face the 
challenges of globalisation, justifying the need to deepen regionalisation processes. ‘Today, we 
think that without integration, development is more difficult, or even, impossible’ (My translation, 
CIFCA, 2009). The AA would be a tool in that respect and that for the EU it would be a way to 
consolidate commonly shared values, rather than a market to capture.  They were followed by an 
intervention by the Ambassador of Costa Rica to the EU, Mr. Echandi, and the EC DG-RELEX official, 
responsible for relations with Latin America, Mr. Sannino. Mr. Echandi emphasised the need of CA 
to diversify its experts and recollected that Costa Rica had already FTAs with other regions, so the 
AA was reinforcing their already existing path and choice for openness and integration into global 
markets. His intervention can be interpreted as a reinforcement of open regionalism.  Mr. Sannino 
shared that both parties were committed to finish the negotiations and indicated that it would be 
an example for other regions, reinforcing the identity of the EU as a model of regional integration, 
implicitly saying, a model to be followed. 
I heard how governments praised civil society for having organised it and used it as a space to 
explain their positions, indirectly send messages to the other negotiating parties and demand civil 
society to contribute to the process in various ways. For example, Mr. Echandi asked civil society to 
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help put topics on the agenda and in their right dimension. He asked that priorities for cooperation 
reflected the needs of the region.
A similar experience was attempted to coincide with the VII round in Tegucigalpa. The idea 
was to host an event at the Honduras parliament, but this was not possible. The reasons given were 
that parliamentarians were busy with other pressing issues, a national security bill proposed by the 
President those days.  The event was then organised at the hotel down-town where some other 
civil society seminars took place. Only the president of the commission of International Relations of 
the Honduras Parliament attended the event, and left early. Her input was rather general and short. 
The other Central American parliamentarians who participated in the event had been especially 
invited for the occasion. But the limited participation of parliamentarians shows that other issues 
were more pressing in their agendas, and that the awareness about the possible implications of 
negotiating such an agreement was scarce. This lack of involvement of parliamentarian brings to 
the surface the debate on the democratisation of trade politics, especially when they are being 
informed by activists and even, their participation and spaces to meet are being possible by them. 
A second type of created space was that of the open fora and informative events. I participated 
and observed the public forum and walk to Clarion hotel in Tegucigalpa on 31 March 2009.  The 
event took place in Plaza Colprosumah, a big auditorium surrounded by an open space. The place 
was full. Mostly small-scale producers, women and students took part in the event. Hats were 
distributed among participants and food was served. The room was decorated with several both 
simple hand-painted cloth banners but in the centre there was a more professionally printed banner 
with the title of the event and the logos of the donors which made it possible. The atmosphere, set-
up, faces and clothes contrasted with those of invited spaces, and even more, with the negotiations 
venue, a five-star hotel down-town. 
The content of the event consisted in several presentations which mixed technical inputs, 
analysis, declarations and popular songs and stories. The first presenter, a former negotiator 
and presently, consultant to associations of agricultural producers, gave a state-of-play of the 
negotiations. The explanations were quite technical in nature, but he tried to make difficult issues 
understandable to the large audience, which paid attention in silence. He wondered later in private 
whether he had been understood. My questions to participants proved that to some extent, they 
had, but there was language they were not able to follow. It is hard to conclude whether participants 
in this forum deepened their understanding of the AA, or rather, they had been already convinced. 
They trusted their leaders, their analysis and directives. They agreed on the need to mobilise and 
make their voices heard. Again, these were not spaces where deliberation took place, but it was 
an important space where different groups and movements recognised each other. Being part of a 
larger movement and being recognised as an important actor which deserves to be heard, was in 
itself important for many of the participants present in Plaza Colprosumah. We walked to the Hotel 
Clarion, whose name seems a coincidence with those that stood outside of it: to call, to make noise. 
The crowd waited until some officials came out of the hotel to receive the proposals and declaration 
of the forum after which the event concluded. 
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In brief, these created spaces contributed to the politicisation of the AA in important ways. 
First, it created deliberation spaces within overall apathic and uninformed parliaments. It brought 
to the front new perspectives and demands that would have remained in the margins. It is sure they 
made their voices heard, but not clear they were listened to by officials. This is the issue of analysis 
of the next section. 
4.5.3 Official discursive practices
The preceding sections have analysed invited and created spaces practices. But, it is necessary to 
examine to what extent any influence can be traced on the general way states approach negotiations 
in their official discursive practices, that is, the way they communicate publicly and the ideas 
promoted in their communications. 
An analysis of official public documents about the AA shows a general stability in terms of 
genres used and ideas since the pre-negotiation texts (texts referred to previous agreements and 
events in EU-CA relations since the Cooperation agreement signed in 1993) to the post-agreement 
texts which are documents explaining the content of the agreement during the process of 
ratification (2010-2012). Roughly in a period of 20 years (1993- 2012) there is an overall continuity 
in terms of predominant policy paradigms and discourses in all parties with some nuances and 
exceptions. The strongest and principal idea guiding EU-CA relations is the need to enlarge the 
scope of cooperation, of which trade relations becomes a central aspect since 1993. Both regions 
see themselves as economically complementary and the driving common interest is enlargement 
of market access and diversification of trade partners. Regional integration is seen in both regions 
as the way to face the challenges of globalisation. Integration into the world economy is perceived 
as a must. Enlarged regional markets and legal and political stability are then necessary conditions 
to attract investments, and thus, to promote growth. Increase in trade flows and growth are then 
related in texts to sustainable development. The AA agreement is again and again explained and 
referred to as a tool to support regional integration, to develop trade and attract investments which 
will then be beneficial to both regions. Some topics gain relevance and are commonly mentioned 
such as the importance of protecting the environment and in later texts (2011-2012), the sentence 
benefits for citizens appear. 
This overall continuity in ideas is only interrupted by ideas of alternative models of regional 
integration which favour local and regional markets, as explained in the interventions of Nicaraguan 
officials at the event at the European Parliament in January 2009. Most official texts examined (texts 
of agreements, press releases, communications, reports of meetings) show a low intertextuality and 
reference to other groups, that is, a limited dialogicality. It is limited in the sense that texts tend to 
be centre in the enumeration of facts and decisions of negotiating parties. For example, negotiating 
parties issued press releases announcing the negotiations, each of its rounds and their conclusions 
mentioning the place, dates and the main issues of discussion. The idea of involving civil society is 
established and remains present over the years. 
Limited changes in perceptions and policy paradigms can be observed in statements, public 
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documents or interviews which could be attributed to their engagement with organisations. One of 
the changes observed was in the EU draft negotiating mandate which explicit acknowledges that 
the inclusion was a suggestion of representatives of civil society. The draft included a suggestion to 
discuss the ratification and implementation of International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 
169 on the rights of indigenous peoples given the importance of indigenous populations in Central 
America. However, this was not taken up in the final agreement. 
Table 6. Official Discursive Practices in the AA
EU CA
Genres Press Releases followed by reports of 
Civil Society Dialogue meetings
ECORYS impact assessment related 
documents
Press Releases
Discourses Regional integration and trade as a tool 
to foster investments, growth and jobs 
creation. 
Diversification of trade partners and 
access to EU market. 
Predominant policy 
paradigm
Neo-liberal, rules-based multilateral Neo-liberal, rules-based multilateral 
trade + recognition of asymmetries 
Only Nicaragua referred to alternative 
forms of regionalism 
Dialogicality in texts Limited Limited 
Positions Market Access
Support for regional integration
Market Access
Key decisions Agreement signed in May 2010
Development fund to be studied. 
International Criminal Court to be 
supported but remains decision of 
states. 
4.5.4 Perceived influence and changes in decisions
Both the EU and Central American governments expressed in a joint press release that the parties 
acknowledged the importance of the dialogue with civil society which was present in large numbers 
in the margins of the negotiations (European Union, 2008). However, little was said in the interviews 
about concrete ways in which this dialogue had been important in terms of changes in decisions. 
One CA ambassador explained that what they said [that activists put pressure and emphasis on 
the recognition of asymmetry] we do not see it in concrete results in the negotiation. Another CA 
ambassador answered that they did have influence but could not link it to specific decisions. They 
do take into account inputs and sensitivities of civil society, yet they cannot content everyone. When 
asked for an example of influence, one of the state representatives explained that they promote the 
ILO Convention 169 on the rights of indigenous peoples yet other states had reservations.  
Government officials had a mixed perception of organisations. On the one hand, they 
highlighted their contributions to dialogue and setting the terms of debate. On the other, some 
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officials had a very negative view of them: ‘They [NGOs] speak in the name of developing countries, 
and yet, what they tend to do is to weaken the negotiating position of developing countries’. The 
official explained that organisations´ views were often driven by Northern-centric conceptions of 
development and ideological considerations without taking into account the real interests and 
needs of the countries. In their descriptions some officials divided organisations in two, those 
driven by ideology and whose leadership was from the 1960s and those that had real interests. In a 
way, they implied that they took seriously the latter. They questioned the legitimacy and credibility 
of organisations. In their view, this legitimacy should be based on representativeness (numbers 
of persons represented or/and importance of sector for the economy) and/or expert knowledge. 
These were the sources of legitimacy they considered as worth-paying attention to. Even if officials 
were honest in their answers, they nuanced their comments with appreciation of their contribution 
to pluralism of ideas. There is a general atmosphere of political correctness towards civil society. 
Consequently, they were inclined to give positive but vague impressions. Some of them were 
reluctant to mention organisations and preferred to refer to redes (networks). 
Representatives of Central American governments interviewed acknowledged the work 
of some of the organisations, like CIFCA and ALOP. They have a positive perception of them, and 
appreciated the improvements in quality of the analysis and proposals over the last four years. 
One ambassador to the EU acknowledged having used information provided by the networks 
in their briefings to the negotiators that come to Brussels from their National Ministries. Even 
tough, most of the government officials interviewed believed that advocacy does influence the 
negotiations, they could not specify how. This answer can be analysed as a political correctness 
answer. Otherwise, it would represent a contradiction with the discourse that civil society matters. 
Only one interviewee, a former governmental negotiator, and now technical advisor to associations 
of agricultural producers estimated that the influence of transnational activists on the trade aspects 
was none, in Spanish he stated: ‘nula’. It cannot be proved that there has been any special change 
in decisions attributable to the mobilisation activities. I did find indicators of possible contributions 
to changes in the process. For example, those organisations participating in the Nicaragua Mesa de 
Diálogo hosted by President Ortega, supported the Nicaraguan proposal for a special compensation 
fund. 
Transnational activism in Central America takes place in a context of contradictions and 
changes. On the one hand, there is general political correctness and acceptance of civil society. On 
the other, there is a political polarisation which tends to divide organisations and their proposals 
into those that are acceptable, legitimate, credible and representative and those that are not. But 
this depends on the political orientations of the government in question. 
4.6 Conclusions: a story of bi-regional activism
This chapter analysed the strategies and characteristics of transnational activism in relation to the 
negotiation of an Association Agreement between the EU and Central America. 
To understand transnational activism it is important to consider the context in which it 
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operates. The first sections of this chapter provide a basic background and contextualisation of 
the negotiations. The main structural features of the negotiations were that it was a region-to-
region negotiation in the context of pre-existing cooperation and political dialogue agreements. 
The agreement is comprehensive in the sense that it includes provisions in the areas of services 
and public procurement which are areas not agreed at the WTO level. The negotiations were 
conducted in the period of three years, a fast negotiation considering that rounds were suspended 
twice. First, a suspension was due to the temporary withdrawal of Nicaragua as a negotiating party 
in March 2009, and second, due to the coup d´etat in Honduras in June 2009. The negotiations 
were concluded as planned in terms of schedule and content. Both regions saw incentives in the 
possibilities of enlarging their market access and of giving predictability to their trade relations, 
moving beyond GSP unilateral preferences. It is these national economic and foreign policy interests 
which prevailed. The AA confirmed the continuation of EU-CA relations within understandings of 
‛open regionalism’. The only critical stances among negotiating parties emerged from alternative 
conceptualisations of regional integration and of ideas of national sovereignty. 
Several actions such as seminars, publications and demonstrations were organised and a 
fluid open bi-regional network was activated. In terms of mobilisation capacity, there was sustained 
monitoring of the negotiations and partial mobilisations, but in general, mobilisation capacity was 
weak due to limitations in resources and that issues were not perceived by both Central American 
and European citizens as worth-mobilising about. The mobilisation efforts were stronger in Central 
America, yet less massive in comparison to mobilisations around CAFTA. These street mobilisations 
were limited to Central American capitals parallel to the negotiation rounds. 
In terms of the network and coalition building capacity, there were fluid contacts and 
coordination of actions across countries and regions. But the main limitation was the weak alliance 
with associations of producers and small and medium size enterprises. Though there were regular 
contacts with all negotiating parties, there were more distances than coincidences in positions. 
Most parties were pro the AA and thus, the alignment with critical states and the reinforcement of 
these critical positions led only to some changes in the negotiations content, such as the study of a 
compensation fund. 
Efforts to affect the discursive aspects of negotiations were diverse in terms of the ways 
of representing economic reality and in terms of acting. Reformist and isolationist/alternative 
approaches coexisted. Two main approaches could be identified. One centred in the provision of 
analysis which raised concerns about the possible negative impacts, with a strong emphasis on HR 
frameworks and technical studies (for example, the inputs provided in the process of the SIA). A 
second approach challenged the need for an FTA with Europe. 
Important contributions to changes in discursive practices were the establishment of invited 
practices and the creation of new spaces. New invited practices such as pre-negotiations informative 
meetings and post-debriefing meetings appeared on the demand of organisations. New spaces 
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were also created such as the open fora in the European Parliament and informative sessions. 
The main common denominator of all groups was the use of human rights frameworks, mostly 
economic and social rights. Though, some ideas can be considered as reflexive in Dryzek´s terms, 
that is, transcending short-term interests, they did not manage to achieve a level of acceptance to 
influence decisions visibly. 
Though policy makers acknowledged most organisations, they could not explain or gave 
indications of direct or specific influence on their decisions. If they acknowledged a demand, this was 
included in a national position but did not manage to be adopted in the bi-regional agreement. They 
rather stated that they had taken all concerns into consideration and that they were reflected in the 
agreement. States have adopted a rhetoric which includes concepts like sustainable development, 
human rights and recognition of asymmetries. Yet, their way of translating these concepts into 
the agreement did not satisfy the organisations and networks in this study. The only countries 
negotiating teams which resounded the rhetoric and demands of networks and movements were 
Nicaragua, and to some extent, Honduras (before the coup d´etat). However, there were other 
prevailing drivers which led to the signature of the agreement with none of demands made being 
integrated, as organisations themselves assessed (ALOP and Iniciativa CID, 2010). They continued 
mobilising against the ratification of the agreement to date (2013). 
The most significant implication of this process was the dynamics created among organisations 
which in the past conflicted over positions and approaches. Towards the end of the negotiations, 
organisations tended to converge more and more in their analysis. 
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5.1 Introduction
This chapter explains the power of transnational activism based on a comparative analysis and 
building on the analysis of the two case studies presented in chapters 3 and 4: activism around 
the negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAS) between the EU and West African 
countries and the negotiations of an Association Agreement (AA) between the EU and Central 
American countries. In these previous chapters, two stories and explanations recounting the role 
of transnational activism emerged out of the various interpretations of interviewees, document 
analysis and my interpretations as an observer. In brief, while the strategies of activism were 
similar in the two cases, the outcomes and process varied considerably. In the case of the EPAs, 
most interviewees agreed on the fact that transnational activism contributed to affect the process 
and content of the negotiations. The negotiations were not concluded as planned by December 
2007 and several issues like services and other ‘behind the border’ issues remained contentious. 
In the case of the Association Agreement, though there were important contributions made by 
transnational activists, the agreement was signed in 2010 with the process and content of the 
negotiations going largely according to the plans made by the negotiating parties. Following Mill’s 
Method of Difference, given two similar sets of negotiations and cases of activism, finding the 
differences may help account for the consequential contributions to changes in the negotiations. 
This chapter aims to explain the special role of transnational activism in affecting negotiations by 
examining the similarites and differences in the strategies adopted and in the negotiations contexts. 
The chapter compares the negotiations in terms of the negotiations’ set-ups, their main 
drivers and outcomes, as well as in terms of the characteristics of transnational activism. In the 
preceding two chapters, I gave a provisional explanation for the activisms’ contributions and 
influences on each negotiation based on the analysis of interviewees’ perceptions, documents and 
my observations. Comparing the two cases and taking distance from single-case study analysis aims 
to strengthen the provisional explanations provided thus far. 
This chapter does not only explain the role and power of transnational activism but in a 
way, it provides an explanation of how power works in international negotiations in the context of 
changes in global governance described in Chapter 1. This means explaining power in a context in 
which there are contending discourses in a global public sphere where multiple non-state actors 
play an increased role. This is why it can be said that power can be explained through the lens of 
transnational activism. 
This explanation draws on the theoretical insights presented in chapter 1. In a few words, the 
changing nature of power were international rules are created and re-discussed through deliberation 
(Hajer, 2003), the various contending discourses that affect policy-making (Dryzek, 2006) and the 
different roles played by non-state actors depending on their material or non-material capabilities 
(Holzscheiter, 2005). 
The comparative analysis continues to use the assessment framework proposed in chapter 2 
and used in chapters 3 and 4.  Basically, it included the analysis of the context and of the mobilisation 
capacity of transnational activism (capacity to assemble resources and implement actions), its 
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network and coalition building capacity (capacity to link to different actors across sectors and 
boundaries) and its discursive capacity (capacity of communicating with different audiences and 
finding common ground with different positions).  
Based on this analysis, the main difference which appears to explain the way transnational 
activism played a significant role is its discursive capacity. In the case of the EPAs, activists managed 
to use existing opportunities and build a discursive bridge between already critical positions of 
ECOWAS members (Economic Community of West African States) and their concerns. They knew 
how to promote their aims by using spaces of consultation, creating new spaces and managing the 
distances between diverse positions to highlight the need for certain decisions or non-decisions. 
This chapter is structured as follows. The first sections compare the two negotiations contexts 
in terms of the history and institutional framework in which they took place as well as the general 
drivers and orientations of involved states. It is important to understand the kinds of opportunities 
used and created by transnational activists, that is, their strategies. The second section compares 
the three main factors proposed to assess the power of transnational activism: mobilisation 
capacity, network and coalition building capacity and discursive capacity. A special emphasis is put 
on the analysis of links built with negotiating states and the kind of discursive interactions with 
them. Thereafter, based on the evidence gathered, the kinds of contributions that can be claimed 
as an effect of transnational activism to official discursive practices and decisions are examined. The 
final section discusses these findings through the theoretical insights presented in chapter 1 and 
explains these kinds of contributions. It does so by examining the ways in which this study confirms 
and/or challenges theoretical assumptions about power and the role of transnational activism in 
global politics.
5.2 Similarities between the two negotiations
This section examines similarities between the two negotiations. It is important to note that the 
cases were chosen for sharing important similarities at the outset of the negotiations, yet over the 
course of them, the process and outcomes of negotiations varied considerably. It is necessary to re-
examine the assumed similarities at the beginning of the study to strengthen the explanation of the 
variations found between the two cases. 
The negotiations had mainly five similar characteristics: a) economic and political power 
asymmetry between the negotiating parties, b) they were both region to region negotiations, c) 
both West Africa and Central America undergo a complex regionalisation process, they are somehow 
regions in construction, d) they are both diverse regions, with some countries being more stable, 
developed and already open to international trade than others, e) both Central America and West 
Africa negotiated with the EU which proposed an ambitious trade liberalisation agenda. The next 
paragraphs review these similarities in more detail. 
First, they were both negotiations between the EU and regions composed of developing 
countries, thus, asymmetric negotiations. The importance of the fact that the negotiations were 
among unequal negotiating parties lies in the kinds of rules and exceptions that apply in the context 
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of the multilateral trade system. Developing countries are entitled to be granted preferential 
treatment by developed countries, thus bridging the general principle of non-discrimination. This 
has to do with the construction of fair rules and proper conduct in relation to the treatment and 
support given by developed countries to developing ones. The asymmetric aspect makes them 
somehow an atypical free trade agreement (FTA) given the development cooperation and political 
dialogue emphasised by the EU. 
Second, they were both region-to-region negotiations. This implied a process of definition of a 
common regional agenda and overcoming differences and discrepancies emerging from conflicting 
national interests. Not only national governments but also regional institutions (e.g. European 
Commission, ECOWAS) are involved, and consequently, new opportunities for engagement appear 
in the interface between national and regional decision-making processes. 
Third, the two regions with which the EU negotiated were regions in construction, that is, 
with difficulties in levels of market and political integration. These difficulties added a complicating 
factor to the negotiations. If intra-regional agreements did not exist first, a certain level of clarity 
needed to be achieved in order to finish a negotiation with another region. These voids also created 
opportunities for debates and proposals. 
Fourth, both West Africa and Central America are diverse regions, with some countries being 
more stable and developed than others. They are both composed of smaller and medium economies 
and with important exports of agricultural products (e.g. fruits). They are also two regions in which 
several countries have recently emerged from civil wars. In both cases, processes of peacebuilding, 
reconciliation and democratisation were supported by European countries and are still marking 
the present political life in these countries. Likewise, since the 80s, these countries have been 
influenced by Washington consensus recipes advised by the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank. They implemented Structural Adjustment Programmes. They were advised to focus 
on resource extraction and exports, in order to liberalise their trade and to follow the principle of 
austerity in budget spending, thus, limiting the role of the state and enlarging the role of the market. 
Thus, in both cases, markets were already to some degree open and the goal of integration into 
the world market appeared prominently in official documents in both regions prior the start of the 
negotiations under examination. 
Last, in both cases, the EU, as a powerful block, put forward an ambitious trade agenda, 
which included not only trade in goods, but also the so called Singapore issues, namely liberalisation 
of services, public procurement and intellectual property rights. The EU ambitious trade agenda 
involved also other parallel negotiations with other regions in Latin America, most notably, the 
negotiation of an Association Agreement with the Andean Community, which led to organisations 
dedicating resources and efforts to follow EU-Latin America relations more broadly. In that sense, 
there is a similarity between the two cases; both are inserted in larger regional dynamics: West 
Africa within Africa and Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP) as a group, and Central 
America in Latin America.
These similarities in the negotiations’ set-up created analogous reactions. There was a general 
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concern over the benefits for developing countries when competing with a large economy such as 
the EU. The concern is greater in a context in which there are critical voices over the effects of trade 
liberalisation have had in the past. There were also doubts about the impact of these negotiations 
in the delicate process of regional integration whose contents and aspirations are still subject of 
debate. And, finally, since the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún, developing countries showed 
some resistance to enlarging the scope of areas to be negotiated about beyond trade in goods. 
5.3 Differences between the two negotiations
As examining similarities, examining differences between the negotiations is necessary to 
understand what possible factors could have enabled or constrained transnational activism and 
thus, help account for its role in affecting the process and outcomes of negotiations. 
Although negotiations shared these important characteristics and thus triggered similar 
concerns and reactions, they were also somehow different in terms of their historical pasts, the 
scale of negotiations – ECOWAS only of the six ACP regions, and the drivers and motivations guiding 
the negotiating parties’ trade policies and ultimately, their positions. In more detail, the two regions 
had different colonial pasts and processes of nation-state building and several attempts of regional 
integration. There are also some differences in the scale of negotiations. While one negotiation 
involved more organisations, resources and countries (75+EU, in West Africa 15+EU), mobilisations 
around the AA were more limited, but still relatively important considering the number of countries 
involved (5+EU). 
But the most significant difference between the negotiations was the drivers and motivations 
in the countries involved. These drivers, explained in detail in the first sections of the previous 
chapters, can be summarised as follows. In the case of the EPAs, ECOWAS and its members, given 
their various situations (LDCs/non-LDCs/ UEMOA members or not), did not share a common 
negotiation position. However, they did share some elements in their underlying policy paradigms. 
Although a belief in trade as a tool for development is maintained, in their view, trade relations must 
receive preferential and differential treatment and maximum flexibility from developed countries. 
Cote D’Ivoire and Ghana decided to initial Interim Agreements while Nigeria decided to apply for 
the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP+)1. To date (2013) a comprehensive agreement has not 
been signed. 
In the case of the AA, the main aim was to consolidate its insertion into the world economy 
in the context of open regionalism ideas as prevailing since the 1990s. Costa Rica was the main 
engine to take forward the negotiations, followed by Guatemala and El Salvador. The Costa Rican 
Ambassador to the EU, and head of the negotiations, explained that the AA was to a great extent 
the result of their efforts to improve market access and insertion of their products into other 
economies. They aimed to secure more partners so as to limit their dependence on a few markets 
(e.g. US). Nicaragua and Honduras were the two countries that expressed more concerns over the 
1  The EC has rejected its request on the grounds that Nigeria does not satisfy the necessary 
conditions, in particular concerning the ratification of certain international agreements.
158
Chapter 5
model of regional integration. In brief, there was an overall interest in improving the opportunities 
for Central American products and for strengthening the relations with the EU, also as a way to 
counter-balance the influence of the US. These two reasons prevailed over other concerns and the 
Agreement was signed in May 2010. 
Understanding these original state positions is key for comprehending the role of 
transnational activism in affecting the negotiations. Specifically, one must acknowledge the 
distance to be bridged discursively in terms of ways of representing the ideal links between 
trade and development. Activists aimed to influence policy makers at national and regional levels 
simultaneously and if one powerful state’s position was tilted in one or other direction, the overall 
negotiations would be affected. In the case of the EPAs, Nigeria kept a strong and influential position 
within ECOWAS, described by Commissioner Mandelson as ‘the elephant on the road’. Perceptions 
among both Nigerian policy makers and activists were that the campaign played an important role 
in reinforcing this originally critical position towards the EPAs. In the case of Central America, the 
positive positions towards the agreement among most countries, most importantly, Costa Rica, do 
not appear affected at the core by the concerns and criticisms. Commercial and strategic relations 
prevailed in state positions. It thus becomes necessary to compare the activism in the two cases: 
how and why was a strong critical position reinforced in the case of the EPAs? Why was this not 
the case in Central America where there were also critical positions among negotiating states? The 
aim of this thesis has been to argue that the answers to these questions can be found in the role 
transnational activism played. In the next sections, the similarities and differences in the two cases 
are analysed. Out of this analysis a main central difference emerges: the crucial role played by 
activists of reinforcing a critical negotiating position to affect the negotiations as a whole. 
5.4 Similarities and differences in transnational activism
Transnational activism in the two cases shared three basic and important features. First, they 
were characterised by North-South collaborations of regionally organised platforms and networks. 
Second, these collaborations included a mix of organisations, mainly private aid agencies, HR 
and development-oriented organisations and trade unions in Europe and farmers and traders 
associations, advocacy organisations and trade unions in Central America and West Africa. This 
list includes groups of concentrated and diffuse interests.  Third, different approaches to trade and 
development and to activism coexisted. Within the ambiguity of the Stop EPAs slogan, roughly two 
groups coexisted: those that rejected free trade all together with those that aimed to stop what 
they considered negative aspects of the agreements. This was also the case in Central America 
though there was no Stop the AA joint statement.  The reasons for concerns were in both cases 
rooted in reformist and rights-based approaches and the reasons for resistance also shared the 
same basic premises: alternative development models centred in national and regional markets 
first, and respect for economic, social and cultural rights as well as environmental and indigenous 
peoples rights. 
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However, the two main differences I found between the two sets of coordinated actions 
were the scale in the mobilisation capacities and in the discursive capacity, most importantly, 
the ability to align demands with openings in the positions of negotiating states. The following 
sub-sections explain in more detail similarities and differences in the three primary constituting 
features of transnational activism: mobilisation capacity, network and coalition building capacity, 
and discursive capacity. 
5.4.1 Mobilisation capacity
Both cases showed that transnational activism managed to engage fully and sustain activism during 
the negotiations. This is not a minor achievement given the amount of negotiations and range of 
issues that citizens mobilise around. In the case of EPAs, this meant that some organisations started 
to follow the negotiations of the Cotonou Agreement and continue to monitor EPAs negotiations 
more than 10 years later. In the case of CIFCA, that the association exists and monitors EU external 
policies uninterruptedly since 1991 is a sign of coordination and capacity at European level. It 
shows that trade and development issues have managed to stay on the agenda and have motivated 
continued support in terms of human and financial resources. They have been able to do so largely 
by the financial support of development cooperation programmes. Organisations involved have 
increased their analytical and advocacy capacities. Their involvement in policy processes has 
contributed to learning and increased expertise among organisations in both cases. Indicators of 
this have been the amount and quality of documents of analysis produced and the appreciation of 
these inputs acknowledged by policy makers. 
Due to the number of countries involved – especially least developed countries – and how 
contentious the issues were, the EPAs campaign attracted far more attention and funds than 
mobilisations around the AA. Additionally, Africa is a priority region for many private aid agencies, 
while attention to Latin America has to some extent decreased (Tezanos and Martinez, 2010).  
In both cases, the combination of organisations involved brought together different and 
complementary resources as summarised in Table 7. This is one aspect of composite activism. 
Different resources and parts come together: knowledge, finances, legitimacy, and numbers. 
Research NGOs provided analytical capacity and could offer ready-to-use information to both 
activists and policy makers. Private sector organisations provided their own studies and estimations 
but most importantly were perceived differently by policy makers given their role in securing 
livelihoods, jobs and income, especially in vulnerable economies. This was also the case of trade 
unions. Private aid agencies had crucial liaison and organising roles. They supported the mobilisation 
of their Southern partners financially and logistically. But they also engaged in activism in their own 
political jurisdictions in Europe. They aimed to influence member states and European institutions 
by the provision of analysis, largely based on their development work expertise and on rights-based 
frameworks. Last but not least, various citizens’ associations, mostly working on special themes, 
joined the petitions and activities. 
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This combination became a strength as there was a functional network. Organisations 
worked in more or less coordinated ways in an open coalition as is further explained in the following 
sections. This process of joining forces had its advantages but working with a diversity of actors was 
a challenge in both cases. 
Table 7. Coalition Resources
Type of organisations Resources 
Research NGOs - Research and analysis capacity on trade technical issues 
- Located in or close to capitals
Private sector 
organisations
- Representation of ‘concentrated interests’ vital for economic reproduction 
and livelihoods of large amounts of the population
- Recognition by authorities as social partners
Private aid agencies - Financial resources that could be allocated to projects in different countries
- Multi-lingual human resources located in multiple capitals both in Europe 
and ACP/CA countries as well as rural areas
- Knowledge of human rights framework and development
Trade unions - Representativeness in terms of numerous membership
- Capacity to mobilise numbers in the streets
- Recognition by authorities as social partners
- National, regional and international federations
Citizens Associations - Expertise on a particular issue: environment, gender
- Voice of citizens concerns emerging from local groups of activists 
5.4.2 Network and coalition building capacity: composite activism in conflictive symbiosis
In both cases, activists found incentives to collaborate transnationally. They needed allies in the 
‘other’ negotiating region. Partners could facilitate access to strategic information and analysis from 
all of the countries and regions involved, help address the challenge of scarce human and financial 
resources and enhance the overall legitimacy and credibility of the campaigns. Considerable 
resources were allocated for the EPAs campaign, although this was not the case for actions in Central 
America which is not a priority region for many funders and private aid agencies. Furthermore, 
financial constraints hindered the organisation of strategic meetings and activities in Central 
America, while the availability of funds may have encouraged organisations to work together more 
in the case of EPAs. Given that the EPAs negotiations were taking place simultaneously in the six ACP 
regions, resources were pooled together and more benefited from the commissioning of studies or 
the creation of web-based information services. 
In both cases, generally different points of view were exchanged and respected. According 
to an activist from Ghana: ‘One of the great achievements of the EPA campaign was the respectful 
cooperation that was generated between and amongst participants in the campaign, all over Africa’. 
Positive views such as this indicate that the process of coalition building and joint action has respected 
plurality, and therefore the attributed positive values of GCS in practice. Others indicated that there 
were conflicts and that they needed to reach compromises. ‘When you are clear about your positions, 
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it is easier to be flexible about the tactics’ explained an activist who coordinated a regional African 
network. 
The need for negotiation and compromise is a positive indication of respect for plurality and 
diversity. However, others had a different view and explained that this denoted a lack of trust and less 
cooperative relations. There was one illustrative example from the negotiations with Central America: 
an activist explained: 
We had a clear ‘no’ position. They [referring to European groups] lack this [clear positions], 
sometimes they say yes, sometimes they say no. (…) In some cases this is counter-productive as 
they influence social organisations with watered-down thinking. We do not believe what they say. 
If the discourse was in order, the strategies would be easier to accept. 
Although groups needed each other, it seems as if groups worked together in a sort of conflictive 
symbiosis to manage diversity. Different groups state the importance of working with others. This is 
not only expressed out of politeness. In my observations I noted the need for and the use of strategic 
information and resources. Some groups needed the legitimacy and operational capacities of partners 
from the South, while others needed to be included in information sharing networks that swap strategic 
information from other regions. Still others simply needed access to financial resources. Interviewees 
working for national organisations explained that, by participating in regional and international 
networks, they had access to resources and information that would otherwise have been difficult to 
obtain. For example, a leader of an association of enterprises from West Africa explained that they 
‘accessed research that they would otherwise not have been able to produce’ and that ‘International 
organisations have been very dynamic and, at the same time, they have supported and challenged 
the negotiation process. They have been very vocal. They brought credibility to our positions’. The 
interviewee also mentioned how important it was to get strong statements from members of the 
European parliament. 
Bi-regional negotiations created the need for a bi-regional collaboration and coordination. As a 
leader of a regional network explained: 
Having this relationship with European groups reinforced our positions and also reinforced our 
legitimacy. Because they are in Europe, they can speak to their governments to put pressure on 
European and African governments and come up with common positions. (…) We have analytical 
capacity, we all share these things in pursue of agreed political …But when the actual intervention 
comes, particularly in the South, we should take the lead. They take the lead in the North. We 
should create platforms in both places where we can (…). The way the work is organised starting 
from the assumption that the weight of the power in the EPAs is of course in the North and 
therefore they [Northern partners] have a very important role.
The coalition members benefit from diversity but several challenges had to be overcome. First, 
there were various understandings of the negotiations within each region. Second, there were 
tensions relating to roles and representation, still latent from the history of relations and nature of 
partnerships, especially between Northern private aid agencies and their counterparts in the South 
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(Elbers and Schulpen, 2010). For some, the lack of common agendas was counterproductive. For 
others, coexisting with the conflicts was in itself emancipatory, as it led to more reflection. 
A staff member of a European private aid agency explained that they had observed distances 
and conflicts among organisations which had been present since the mobilisations against CAFTA 
(Central America Free Trade Agreement). This supports the findings of the study by Spalding (2007). 
They believed they (private aid agencies) had a facilitative role and were trying to achieve a common 
agenda. As he explained, ‘we tried to bring the different positions together. We played the role of a 
‘chewing gum’ because before, those sitting around the table now could not even meet’. This shows 
the level of polarisation in terms of positions in Central America. The points of departure were more 
distant than in the case of EPAs, thus, the bridging efforts more straining. This partly explains why the 
level of coordination and collaboration was a success in relation to previous attempts in the region, but 
was not reached in a one-message campaign as it was in the case of EPAs (though with the unresolved 
ambiguities explained earlier). 
The general perception among interviewees was that despite the conflicts, one of the main 
outcomes of their efforts was that they improved dialogue about and respect for different perspectives 
among organisations. In sum, it can be concluded that rather than using compact coalitions, there 
were synergies among organisations, an exchange of information and attempts to avoid overlaps in 
the timing of events. There were more channels of dialogue, yet, pre-existing conflicts remained. There 
was an on-going discursive struggle that was managed on an on-going basis. Ideological differences 
could not be easily overcome; however, the need to cooperate sustained interactions. These distances 
are illustrated in Figures 6 and 13. Actors worked in conflictive symbioses and managed the distances 
between their positions. 
The capacity to build networks with negotiating parties was partially different. Though in both 
cases there were channels of communication built with all negotiating states, those built with critical 
states appeared to be more decisive. The evidence in chapter 3 showed the close links built between 
some organisations like NANTS and MAN with the Nigerian trade team and the role of the West 
African Civil Society Platform in consultative spaces of ECOWAS (e.g. inputs like those like ENDA-
TWN, 2005). In the case of CA, there is evidence of meetings with all negotiation parties in a variety 
of settings, yet, the distance in positions was larger and the receptivity by policy makers was limited. 
The advisory committee in Nicaragua or the meetings with former President Zelaya of Honduras 
are examples of the dialogue efforts facilitated by social movement organisations. But the parallel 
events to the negotiations organised by ALOP, Iniciativa CID in cooperation with the South Centre 
or the events in the European Parliament are noteworthy as important spaces for dialogue and 
exchanges of ideas. These activities were co-organised with various state institutions at the initiative 
of the networks, thus they were created spaces but not of a contentious nature. These types of 
activities were aimed at creating a conducive framework for deliberation, a forum of ideas. The 
critical discursive dynamics are analysed in the next section. 
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1.4.3 Discursive capacity: managing distances between positions
In both cases important indicators of the quality of discursive capacity could be observed. The 
combination of organisations with their different approaches and resources led to the production 
of a wide range of materials and activities. Texts produced ranged from detailed analysis of policies 
and a great variety of materials to reach out to different audiences. There was a movement towards 
genre diversification, that is, different types of texts used according to the audience or the space to 
maximise its outreach and receptivity. There was a creative and extensive use of invited spaces in 
both cases. However, the strength of the EPAs campaign managed to stimulate a greater number of 
activities and seminars. The activities and strategies used were similar in both cases, mostly, they 
differed in quantitative terms. 
The main differences can be observed in the capacity to make ideas be discussed, become 
known, contentious and thus, reach out to more and different audiences. In both cases, the discussions 
over agreeing on one main message clearly showed that there were different understandings and 
approaches to free trade. Though there were different positions, there were also common concerns 
and needs and therefore incentives for cooperation. In the case of EPAs, the slogan ‘Stop EPAs in their 
current form’ was the result of a compromise. In practice, however, some used the short version while 
others emphasised that they wanted reforms rather than stopping the negotiations. Again it seems 
as if the coalition worked in a conflictive symbiosis, together but apart. Yet the message was strong. 
In the case of negotiations with Central America, the bi-regional networks could not agree 
on a common message as previously mentioned. In almost every planning/evaluation meeting that 
I observed, some groups proposed launching a more determined ‘No to the AA’ slogan. In every 
meeting, however, other groups – especially some private aid agencies – believed that such a slogan 
would halt dialogue with governments. They argued that they preferred to have fluid communication 
with policy makers as they were their partners and funders. Organisations adopted more or less 
reformist/isolationist strategies depending on the occasion, partners and changing political context. 
Discussions within coalitions had to deal with time limits and other constraints, such as the pressure 
to decide timely actions. This left almost no room to explore coalition members’ underlying theories 
of change. As a result, what was really meant by fairer trade and underpinnings of trade theories was 
not made explicit nor discussed. 
It is worth noting that the level of polarisation in terms of ideological positions was higher in the 
case of Central America. In this region, there was a recent history of social mobilisation in the context 
of the CAFTA and ALCA negotiations. Positions for or against free trade had been further pushed to 
the extremes as evidenced by the Referendum of October 2007 in Costa Rica: 51.6% of the voters said 
‘yes’ to Costa Rica joining CAFTA. This popular mobilisation had a strong impact not only among Costa 
Ricans but also in the whole region. Additionally, the anti-colonialism rhetoric had a different effect in 
the two regions analysed. In Central America, the US is perceived as the neo-coloniser, while Europe 
is perceived mostly in terms of cooperation and solidarity, given its role during the peace-building and 
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democratisation process of the 1980s and 1990s. Though Europeans were represented as colonisers in 
both cases (see figures 3, 10 and 11), this tendency was much stronger in West Africa. 
In the case of EPAs, the determinant factor was that activists showed the ability to align their 
demands with existing openings in the positions of negotiating states. At the same time, reflection 
and the search for alternatives reinforced the critical position of some states and tilted them to a 
doubt position. Understanding how activists attempted to simultaneously influence positions at 
national and regional levels is crucial to realising their relative successes. 
In the case of Central America, the positive positions towards the agreement among most 
countries do not appear affected at the core by the concerns and criticisms, and commercial and 
strategic relations prevailed. The agreement was negotiated and signed in a relatively short period 
of time and it is the first comprehensive region-to-region agreement. 
One of the crucial differences between the two cases is the kind of access, relations and levels 
of coincidence in positions with the Southern negotiating parties. In both cases, the EU seemed 
to maintain its position and goals, but it is only in the EPAs case where the most controversial 
issues remained subject of negotiation and delayed the process. The comparison and the evidence 
emerging from different perceptions of the process make this as the key factor for success of 
transnational activism: the ability to establish a bridge of communication and cooperation with at 
least one of the strong negotiating parties. This supports Nelson and Dorsey’s observations (2007) 
of a reversed boomerang in which Southern governments can play the cards of making Northern 
countries responsible for supporting their development.  
5.5 Comparing contributions to changes in discursive practices
The analysis of the two case studies shows evidence of contributions of transnational activism to the 
stability and changes in discursive practices. The analysis of texts and genres, the ideas discussed 
and the spaces in which communication takes place shows clearly that the main contribution 
was the politicisation of trade negotiations in both cases. There were movements from technical 
genres, ideas and spaces towards genres diversification, more open debates about other technically 
possible real alternatives and enlivened and diverse spaces for exchange. Discursive practices of 
trade negotiations have over the years moved outside the closed-doors of negotiation rooms and 
the corridors to which only a few had access. However, it was only the case of EPAs in which there 
is evidence of a strong reaction by the European Commission to better explain the development 
contents of the agreements. The were so many doubts raised about them, that they felt the need 
to mitigate them by deliberately improving their public relations work. Their main argumentation 
had been destabilised by the ‘noise’. The two conflicting identities of the EU had been made more 
evident, the identity of a trade player and the identity as an example of policy coherence. These 
public relations efforts show the need to control social discursive spaces as a way to sustain the 
productivity of a certain discourse, the EPAs as a tool for development. 
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Table 8. Comparing transnational activism capacities
Indicators EPAs AA
M
ob
ili
sa
ti
on
 c
ap
ac
it
y
Human resources 
Non-material resources 
material resources 
financial resources
considerable – trade and 
development analysts
Technical and Briefing Papers
considerable – major private 
aid agencies involved, offices 
and capacity to work in various 
political arenas. 
limited – emphasis on HR 
expertise
Technical and Briefing Papers
limited – project-based funding 
and on-going monitoring of EU 
policies in Brussels. 
N
et
w
or
k 
an
d 
co
al
iti
on
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
ca
pa
ci
ty
geographical scope
network diversification
networks with states
National, regional and bi-
regional network
Strong links between 
concentrated and diffuse 
interests
Strong links and alliances with a 
few critical states
National, regional and bi-
regional network
Limited links between 
concentrated and diffuse 
interests
Limited links with critical states, 
though fluid communication 
with states, limited coincidence 
in positions
Di
sc
ur
siv
e 
Ca
pa
ci
ty
genres diversification considerable limited/ stable 
use of formal spaces and 
creation of non-formal 
spaces
Protagonism in invited spaces 
but complains over their quality
Positioning of ENDA/West Africa 
Civil Society Platform and NANTs 
in consultative spaces
New spaces created
Protagonism in invited spaces 
but complains over their quality
Proposal handed to Honduras 
government
New spaces created 
economic ideas 
diversification
re-signification of development
and WTO compatible options
coherence between trade and 
respect for human rights
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5.6 Comparing contributions to changes in decisions
In the case of the EPAs, politicisation was important and evidence shows that this contributed to 
making the negotiation process slower despite the interests of the EU in concluding negotiations by 
2007. There were many more mobilisations in West Africa, even supported and led by governments 
as in the case of Senegal. In the case of the AA, politicisation was much more limited and transnational 
activism remained trapped in the polarisation of opinions and ideological positions over trade and 
development which has marked the region historically and more evidently in the negotiations of 
the CAFTA agreement. 
It is in the EPAs case where I found more confirmed perceived influence by policy makers. 
In general policy makers felt their positions were reinforced by pressure in the streets about 
the risks of signing an EPA, the concerns of important associations of agricultural producers and 
local industries, and by extra studies and reports. On the contrary, in CA, policy makers were less 
conclusive about the levels and kinds of influence. Their perceptions were that campaigns had 
limited or no influence. One of them explained that it was due to the limited mass mobilisation 
and that without this pressure, there were no incentives for governments to take critical demands 
seriously. Another CA negotiator explained that the organisations that expressed their concerns 
were not representative. The governments knew what was best for the region as they knew the 
reality well. They believed that Northern organisations often played against the interests of the 
region, even if with good intentions. The governments therefore were negotiating to advance the 
interests of their countries and of the region as a whole. 
The key difference between the cases is that in the case of EPAs there was a coincidence 
in positions between a large part of the campaign members and some strong and critical states 
positions in the negotiations. The campaign could see the opportunities and developed strategies 
to make maximum use of these. Transnational activism formed a functioning South-North coalition 
which combined its resources, network capacity building and its discursive capacity. Alternative 
proposals enjoyed the legitimacy and credibility among some ECOWAS members, for example, 
to demand maximum flexibility in the application of WTO article XXIV. This interpretation of the 
article ‘substantially all trade in a reasonable amount of time’ paved the way to allow accounting 
for asymmetries and back the offer of ECOWAS to limit liberalisation of its market to 60-70%. This 
was the complex pattern of conjunctural causation (Ragin, 1994) or combination of factors which 
resulted in the continuation of negotiations to address the several pending controversial issues, 
despite the original idea and plans to end negotiations in 2007.  
This was not the case in CA. Policy makers tended to view transnational activists as 
ideologically driven and Northern-interests-driven. Thus, policy makers regarded activists as having 
little representativeness, proposing unfeasible alternatives and if feasible, not adequate for the best 
interests of the region. Trade and foreign policy objects prevailed though some topics continued 
to be incorporated in the discourse such as human rights, sustainable development and the 
environment.
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Examining these similarities and differences in efforts and effects helps to offer a more solid 
explanation grounded in the empirical analysis and enhanced by theoretical insights. The following 
sections re-analyse the evidence and discusses it in terms of its theoretical explanatory implications. 
Table 9. Comparing negotiations, activism and contributions to change
Similarities Differences
Negotiations - Asymmetric negotiations
- Drivers: EU´s trade agenda and 
support for regional integration
- Region to region negotiations
- WA and CA: Regions in construction 
and difficulties to speak with one 
voice. 
- WA and CA experienced liberalisation 
policies, opening of markets and 
civil wars and peacebuilding and 
democratisation processes. 
- Drivers: EPAs: end of preferential 
treatment and WTO-compatibility 
AA: Strengthening of existing inter-
regionalism, interest of some CA 
countries to expand their market 
access and integration into the world 
economy. 
Activism - Composite activism
- Mix of approaches to social change
- scale 
- discursive capacity
- relations with negotiating states
Discursive 
practices
- Genres diversification 
- Changes in the use of invited and 
created spaces
- Economic ideas diversification
- Polarisation in ideas and political 
context in CA
Decisions - Inclusion of topics in anticipation 
strategies
- Delay in the EPAs negotiations in WA 
vs. a signed agreement as scheduled 
in CA
5.7 Explaining the role of transnational activism
This thesis departed from theoretical insights which show the changing nature of power in a context 
of globalisation. Power becomes dispersed and elusive due to processes of regionalisation and global 
governance. Important decisions are taken beyond the boundaries of the national state. At the same 
time, international organisations have become sites of norms production in the attempt to regulate 
flows of persons, information and goods often in a patchy and contradictory manner. An example of 
this is the contradiction between intellectual property law and human rights international law. This 
creates voids that, according to authors such as Hajer and Dryzek, are filled through deliberation. 
The role of transnational activism contributes by shaping the normative contents of global politics. 
But how can it influence the normative aspects in the area of economic policies in which the politics 
of economism prevail? How can transnational activism open spaces for change when those that 
benefit from the status quo make efforts to reproduce it? 
Activists look for and create opportunities and strategies to advance their goals. They are 
aware of the importance of seeking the best arrangements to secure livelihoods and jobs. Those 
organisations of diffuse interests, concerned with the overall well-being of society and adopting 
rights-based approaches aim to ensure the sustainability of livelihoods through a responsible use 
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of natural and material resources. They know that the quality of their proposals will be judged 
according to how responsible they appear in terms of being the best feasible and fairer option for 
most. It is the distance between state positions and their own policy proposals what they need to 
overcome. 
In brief, transnational activism power can be explained through their mobilisation and 
discursive capacity in relation to the negotiations context. First, they gained credibility if they were 
able mobilise and link diverse and important concentrated interests in the eyes of policy makers. 
They worked to strengthen the expression of allegedly disadvantaged interests: those that would 
be possibly negatively affected by a FTA. The level and quality of their mobilisation and network 
building capacity has been proved as necessary, but insufficient. It is their discursive capacity, the 
management of discursive spaces and the management of distances between different ideas, 
which allowed them to influence and reinforce the position of some of the negotiating states. 
What does this imply for IR theory about power and the role of non-state actors? I argue that 
transnational activism plays an important role in the interplay between decisional and discursive 
power. This thesis shows how this happens through the analysis of discursive practices and the 
relations between these and changes in decisions.  Power is exercised through the use and creation 
of spaces in which these discursive practices take place and through the rhetoric management of 
the distances between ideas. Examining the use of spaces and rhetoric interactions helps to assess 
the discourse productivity of activism. 
5.7.1 Power through the use and creation of spaces
This study departed from the theoretical assumption that there is some degree of transmission 
between the public space and those decisions taken in closed spaces or empowered space in 
Dryzek’s terms. The examination of the case studies shows how transnational activism made efforts 
to use and shape invited spaces and to create new ones, across borders and across organisational 
differences. 
Networks were knit across borders and open coalitions formed to link the efforts of farmers, 
small enterprises, workers, women and concerned citizens. Together they worked in conflictive 
symbiosis as there were various understandings of the ideal link between trade and development. 
A special type of transnational activism emerged which I have named composite activism. The 
association of groups and their coordination led to the emergence of a phenomenon that could not 
be described as a transnational campaign or as un-organised shapeless network. Rather than shared 
values and a common discourse as assumed by literature on transnational advocacy networks (e.g. 
Keck and Sikkink, 1998), there were common concerns and incentives for transnational and trans-
sectoral collaboration. Groups needed partners in other regions and many saw the complementarity 
of approaches (contentious/dialogic) as necessary. 
In coordination, activists made a special use of spaces. They used existing spaces and created 
new ones where discursive interactions took place. They did not only use existing invited spaces, 
they occupied them by managing to sustain their involvement, and shaped them by contributing 
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to agenda-setting. Interestingly, the assumed division between insiders and outsiders was blurred. 
There were information flows between those that preferred to use invited spaces and those that 
preferred not to do so as to delegitimise them. The relations between more dialogic and contentious 
approaches to activism were fluid and dynamic, and significantly, functional to each other. Pressure 
in the streets with slogans on the T-shirts and struggles over technical impact assessment studies 
led by men in suits formed two aspects of negotiations which became much more than one more 
routine procedure.  
In both contentious and dialogic approaches, activists considered that existing spaces were 
not enough for their voices to be adequately taken into consideration. They also created spaces 
in which they had more control over the topics and rules of engagement. They facilitated public 
spaces in which all negotiating parties met outside closed spaces as was the case of sessions at the 
European and Swedish parliaments described in chapters 3 and 4. 
These spaces were mostly arenas in which actors met, acknowledged each other and 
exchanged utterances to promote their aims. The ideal of a respectful exchange of reasoned 
arguments was the exception rather than the norm. Activists deployed their resources to make their 
discourses as productive as possible: they aimed to define acceptable practices and common sense 
through the management of spaces. Though the occupation and creation of spaces views were 
expressed, and interests promoted, encoded in general principles of proper international conduct 
such as maximum flexibility in reciprocal trade agreements in a FTA with a developing country within 
WTO rules. Spaces were arenas in which actors formed a sort of discursive coalition, that is, where a 
joint discourse tied a group of actors with similar concerns. In the case of the EPAs, the signification 
of a pro-development agreement as the most possibly flexible one led to a high resonance between 
transnational activists and ECOWAS, and notably with some of its most prominent members such 
as Nigeria.
Through the participation in these spaces, activism contributed to pluralism as it improved 
the expression of different interests and provided inputs such as alternative studies and analysis. 
Notable was the participation in spaces such as cuartos adjuntos and Civil Society Dialogues in the 
case of Central America, and the participation in national and regional technical and consultative 
committees and meetings in West Africa. In the latter there were more evident effects in decisions. 
The kind of decisions affected reflected that it was mostly reformist views which found a perceived 
politically feasible course of action. This meant limitation of mandates to negotiate only goods, or 
the idea to study an investment/compensation fund. The kinds of effects observed did not imply any 
deep destabilisation of the market-oriented policy paradigm. Either an agreement was in fact signed 
or continued in negotiation. What explains these findings?
These findings support the liberal/pluralist account in relation to the power of non-state actors 
in trade politics. Influence in decisions is explained through the prominence of organised groups 
that promoted their interests by using and improving access to decision-makers, to the quality of 
their knowledge inputs and the importance of these groups for the reproduction of the economic 
base, including those of whom many livelihoods depend. At the same time, they also support a 
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critical IR account – the politics of economism prevailed. The hegemony was not challenged by 
a counter-hegemonic movement. But this does not mean that the strongest economic actors 
determined the content and course of negotiations completely. These elements offer only a partial 
explanation of the kinds of contributions of the transnational activism in these cases: the interests 
of those possibly negatively affected sectors gained visibility and weight in relation to activists’ 
discursive capacity to appeal to ideas of state proper conduct. So the explanation of these findings 
needs a social constructivist angle to be complete. Without the strengthening of the identity of 
the EU as a responsible and coherent donor, who truly seeks partnership and the promotion of 
development, the demands for flexibility by its negotiating partners would have been weaker. The 
discursive construction of identities of proper conduct took place in arenas and forums through the 
management of distances among different representations of the ideal economic reality elaborated 
as follows. 
5.7.2 Power through the management of distances
This thesis argued that the role of transnational activism can be best explained through a 
combination of theoretical lenses. It is not only interests that matter; it is also ideas that shape 
identities, and indirectly interests and the scope of negotiable options. The shaping of identities and 
ideas of proper state conduct happens largely in discursive spaces where policy makers and societal 
forces meet. Rhetoric aims to persuade decision-makers. In a context of discursive contestation, it 
is the capacity of agents to manage the distance between their views and those of their opponents 
that matters. In short, power lies in the capacity to build bridges with as many as possible, or at 
least, with key negotiating parties. 
I have shown that in the case of EPAs a discursive bridge was built between the activists 
and ECOWAS, who consequently saw their critical negotiating position reinforced. The campaign 
clustered critical concerns, made noise, and built channels of access through consultation spaces. 
Although there were various positions within the campaign coalition, isolationist and reformist 
positions and their messages were often contradictory and ambiguous (STOP EPAs and STOP EPAs 
in their current form), activism contributed to highlight the need for further negotiations to address 
ACPs concerns. On the contrary, in the case of Central America, the existing polarisation in the 
political landscape, already evident in the context of CAFTA negotiations and in the affiliation  or not 
to the ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América, the Bolivarian Alliance for the 
Americas), made the bridges more difficult. The distances to bridge were larger without a stronger 
and unifying concept that could transcend such opposing views of desirable visions of development. 
In both cases, discursive spaces appear as arenas, rather than forums. Most efforts by 
transnational activism were concentrated on giving voice to those groups which would be 
possibly most negatively affected by the negotiations. These various groups, though with different 
perspectives and needs, shared common concerns – the development content of the agreements – 
and collaborated transnationally and searched for a common message. This common concern was 
the bridge among them, and the bridge to developing countries’ positions and to the EU. Given 
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the EU commitments to support development, to forge partnerships and regional integration, the 
significance of the idea of development gained central stage. Through the various ways in which 
discourse is productive, the EPAs campaign managed to produce a sort of common sense. Flexibility 
within existing rules became then the frame of possible decisions. The campaign echoed and 
reinforced the positions of ECOWAS members. There was a bridge built confirming the reversed 
boomerang dynamic explained by Nelson and Dorsey (2007). Rather than Northern countries being 
those that put pressure on Southern countries to respect human rights, it is now developed countries 
that should be made responsible for the possible negative implications of their agreements and 
decisions on developing countries, especially, in the realisation of economic and social rights. 
The same basic strategy did not work in the same way in Central America. The region is 
much more polarised politically in terms of the positions towards the kinds of integration to the 
world economy. A bridge could be built but only to one of the negotiating parties. In a context of 
dependence of external aid and of market access opportunities for CA products in other markets, 
these interests prevailed. The idea of development remained tied to an exports-oriented model 
in which the diversification of trade partners becomes essential. The efforts to bring together 
those possibly negatively affected – small industries, small farmers, workers – were not enough to 
overcome the distances in positions with most of the negotiators. 
Outcomes can be explained then by the different contexts (drivers and positions in the 
negotiations) and the various kinds of discursive capacity. While in both cases, transnational activists 
engaged in spaces as arenas and forums, limited reflexive action could be observed.  Reflexive action, 
in the sense of constitute and future-oriented thinking, was present in the attempts to re-signify the 
idea of development, presented as a process which would result of a paced integration into the 
world economy from a rights-based approach. However, it was limited in terms of the problem-
solving and transcending nature of the proposals as the underlying conflicts among worldviews 
remains untransformed.  
5.8 Conclusions
The comparative analysis shows that the main difference between the two case studies was the 
strength of the discursive bridge built between activists and key negotiating parties. To put it 
simply, in both cases activists aimed to reinforce critical positions and build alliances with some 
of the negotiating states whom they felt were more open to their concerns and demands. They 
provided alternative research studies, mobilised in the streets and organised seminars to persuade 
government officials to take into account their ideas and proposals. Yet, it was only in the case of 
EPAs where some states, notably Nigeria and Senegal, were more receptive to these inputs and 
used them in the negotiations. Additionally, given the relative importance of Nigeria within the 
region, this critical position played an important role in the course of the negotiations. In the case of 
Central America, there were channels of communication between activists and states. Some were 
receptive to activists’ demands and coincided with their analysis. However, other factors prevailed 
in the negotiations.  
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Despite the differences in the kinds of positions adopted by states, and the more or less 
distance between these positions and those of activities, the capacity to use and build on existing 
opportunities appears as crucial. Activists knew how to promote their aims by using spaces of 
consultation, creating new spaces and managing the distances between diverse positions to 
highlight the need for certain decisions or non-decisions. But it cannot be concluded that it was 
only the discursive capacity in one case which accounts for all the differences in the negotiations. It 
is one important factor within a configuration of factors and special conditions which – in the case 
of the EPAs negotiations - tilted in one direction the always delicate balance of decision-making in 
which various states are involved.  
Rather than a direct influence on decisions due to one cause, the effects of transnational 
activism can be found in the setting of discourse boundaries and the shaping of identities. By setting 
boundaries and shaping identities, they reinforce and mould existing positions visibly in the strategy 
of anticipation and agenda setting. They are able to help set boundaries through their discursive 
capacity, basically, their capacity to manage discursive spaces and the distances between ideas. 
Discursive effects are most pervasive in the long term through the slow process of forming and de-
constructing economic ideas and paradigms. This process happens through the often imperceptible 
variations that happen in the play of practice. This study aimed to trace these variations in the 
discursive practices observed in the medium term, and their potential for changes in decisions and 
for opening leads for the appearance of reflexive thinking in the future. 
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6.1 Introduction
This thesis intended to improve understanding of the power of transnational activism aiming 
at affecting political and economic decision-making processes. Transnational activism was 
conceptualised as a set of related forces, a functional network of organisations that coordinated 
actions across borders. This thesis examined transnational activism related to two sets of 
international negotiations: the negotiation of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between 
the European Union (EU) and West Africa and the negotiations of an Association Agreement (AA) 
between the EU and Central America. These are special trade negotiations: they are negotiations 
between two regions and did not only include trade issues but also important development and 
political dialogue components. Despite the fact that the two negotiations and activism around 
them shared important similarities, the two cases were chosen because negotiations processes 
and outcomes were substantially different. While the EPA negotiations became contentious and 
continued over a much longer period of time than originally planned, on the contrary, the AA 
negotiations developed largely as planned by states. In the perception of both activists and involved 
parties, transnational activism played a role in accounting for these differences. 
By investigating the context and characteristics of activism, its strategies and its effects on the 
negotiations process and outcomes, this thesis provided an explanation of transnational activism 
power. Chapters 3 and 4 looked at the two selected cases studies respectively and explained how 
transnational activism contributed to change the negotiations. Activists enlarged the voice of some 
sectors who considered their interests would be jeopardised by the future agreements. At the same 
time, they challenged accepted norms and the underlying ideas which framed state positions and, 
ultimately, decision-making. 
Theoretical insights discussed in chapters 1 and 2 made evident how both interests and ideas 
matter in trade politics. To look at the interplay between changes in ideas, interests and changes in 
decisions, I used the central concept of discursive practice. Discursive practices are social practices, 
that is, accepted forms of acting and speaking in a social situation, in which points of views are 
expressed through the use of different texts and oral formats, articulation of systems of ideas and 
styles. Agents are constrained by expected norms of behaviour and at the same time, they draw 
from abstract but socially shared systems of ideas (ideologies), craft and re-signify ideas according 
to their aims in specific socio-cultural-political contexts. 
The concept of discursive practice was introduced to capture how the ideas were interlinked 
with the ways of behaving in more or less stable social practices in which civil society and officials 
interacted in the context of trade negotiations. There were key events noted in the flow of the 
process in each of the cases as well as the contextualisation of these events and practices in longer 
term historical processes and discourses. The discursive practices examined in this study were those 
related to the negotiations both organised by the negotiating states as well as other non-state actors. 
For example, the public periodic informative meetings organised by the European Commission, 
called Civil Society Dialogues, the practice of cuartos adjuntos in the case of Central America and 
those seminars and events organised by activists to sensitise and mobilise their constituencies.  It is 
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argued that through changing the content and form of discursive practices, transnational activism 
contributed to define what was possible and acceptable in terms of decisions to be adopted by the 
negotiating parties. 
In this chapter, the study’s key findings are summarised and its theoretical and methodological 
contributions are presented. Lastly, the limitations of this study are discussed and areas for future 
research and experimentation are proposed. I conclude with some final remarks about the definition 
of ‘success’ and a short personal comment.
6.2 Transnational activism in trade politics: key findings
Transnational activism as observed in these case studies was not a sum of engaged individuals 
and organisations that shared common values as often assumed in earlier literature. Rather, 
organisations with similar concerns worked together in a conflictive symbiosis. This meant working 
together in coalition and networks but at the same time, allowing room for separate actions. There 
were agreements on some common actions, for example, some statements or days of action, or 
only information sharing and some level of coordination.  If transnational activists’ actions did not 
translate into a single-issue and tidy campaign, a broader conceptualisation of effects was needed. 
Transnational activism was conceptualised as a set of related forces, a functional network of 
organisations that coordinated actions across borders. 
This conceptualisation implies that there was not a single strategy, but rather, several 
coexisting strategies with some degree of overlap. Observations confirmed a combination of often 
contradictory actions and goals. Some groups exerted pressure to change specific decisions in the 
negotiations in the short-term, notably representing concrete economic sectors and/or having 
technical and legal knowledge. Others preferred actions towards affecting wider approaches to trade 
and development. The puzzle was to find how these two levels intersected or affected each other. 
There were assumptions in literature about the links between ideational dimensions and material/
decisional ones: our ideas shape our behaviour. But empirically, most studies and organisational 
analyses had tended to focus only on one of them. Giving a more comprehensive answer necessarily 
required adopting different theoretical and methodological lenses. 
  
6.2.1 Efforts and strategies of transnational activism
Efforts of transnational activism were assessed by examining its mobilisation capacity, its network 
and coalition building capacity and its discursive capacity. Mobilisation capacity refers basically to 
the capacity to assemble human, financial and other resources, implement planned actions and 
sustain the involvement in the negotiations process. Network and coalition building capacity refers 
to the capacity to build relations at different levels: at local, regional and international levels, to bring 
together or connect different types of organisations (knowledge-based, constituency-based) and to 
build relations with the negotiating states. Finally, discursive capacity is succinctly the capacity to 
build a discursive bridge to shorten the distance between different ways of thinking. Discursive 
capacity was assessed through the capacity to use and mix different types of communicative means 
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or genres as appropriate vis-à-vis the intended audience and context, the capacity to make use and 
shape existing spaces and create new ones and the capacity of persuasion.  
Taking into account these capacities an overall strategy could be observed and summarised 
as ‘composite transnational activism’. Activists aimed to maximise the chance of achieving their 
goals pulling together resources and forging collaborations at various levels. First, groups acted 
in the North and in the South and coordinated actions across national borders and regions. Being 
bi-regional negotiations, if one country or region changed its positions the whole process would be 
altered. Second, groups adopted different advocacy approaches in terms of ways of acting and ways 
of representing economic reality. They made use of invited spaces and created new spaces, with 
more or less contentious modes. Dialogue and contentious activism are not two mutually excluding 
choices; rather, they are used in combination depending on the moment, place and interlocutor. And 
third, open networks and coalitions included groups of both concentrated and diffuse interests. The 
fact that these two types of groups coordinated their actions defied theoretical frameworks which 
either explained power through the weight of concentrated interests or explained power through the 
capacity to forge new normative contents through appealing to moral principles. 
6.2.2 Effects of transnational activism
The first exploratory interviews and observations indicated that transnational activism was having 
effects on the process. It was only through the triangulation of views, analysis of documents and 
observations that a story emerged more clearly. But arguing that transnational activism played a 
role in the negotiations becomes meaningless without understanding the conceptualisations of 
transnational activism and of changes in the negotiations that were developed along the research. 
The definition of success varies depending on the policy goals of each of the actors involved and 
this study did not equate power to these multiple and particular possible definitions of success. By 
stating that transnational activism contributed to affect negotiations, I aim to emphasise that the 
dynamics in the public sphere – of which activism is an important part – and the general context 
within which negotiations take place matter for their outcomes. It becomes more important to 
analyse how changes in the debates in the public sphere affect negotiations. 
In terms of effects, transnational activism contributed to shape discursive practices and 
through them, helped to set the boundaries of what was considered possible and desirable in terms 
of decisions. The main example analysed was though an ambitious agenda was proposed by the EU, 
negotiations concentrated on trade of goods and negotiations on services and other ‘behind the 
border issues’ remained quite contentious. 
Transnational activism contributed to changes in discursive practices in a number of ways: 
certain aspects of them continued to be reproduced and maintained, notably not destabilising the 
underlying assumptions of trade liberalisation (though some groups aimed at this). At the same 
time, transnational activism introduced changes, such as diversification in genres towards inclusion 
of more voices and issues in debates, such as the meanings of development given that these were 
South-North negotiations. Activists appealed to the identity of the EU as a responsible donor and 
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fair competitor, through engaging in the debate over what pro-development FTAs would entail. 
Immersed in a more politicised issue than expected, negotiating parties attempted to reconcile 
regional/ national economic interests and compliance to policy coherence between trade and 
development. It was in the ‘play of practice’ that activism opened spaces for change as observed in 
the discussion on EPAs and WTO compatibility. Activism did so helped by and in relation to debates 
on what ‘proper conduct’ means in trade and development policies. Negotiating parties were 
encouraged to search for alternatives and it was non-state actors who led important search exercises 
of WTO-compatible alternatives. In both cases, the role of civil society was further institutionalised 
and, in the case of the AA, a bi-regional periodic civil society forum became part of the text of the 
agreement as a consultative space. 
6.2.3 Explaining power through interpretation and comparison
The third research question aimed to seek an explanation of the phenomena observed: ‘what explains 
the contributions of transnational activism to the process and outcomes of the negotiations?’. To 
answer this question an interpretative and comparative approach was adopted. Some activists 
believed that strong state positions, economic interests and prevailing policy paradigms were 
their main limitations to achieve their goals. Many explained that though they may have access to 
officials, this does not mean there is real dialogue. These interpretations resound with established 
International Relations theories: it is national states’ interests, the pressure of domestic groups 
and the relevance of unquestioned policy paradigms which matter. In this scenario, transnational 
activism may appear as irrelevant. However, I aimed to show that through a composite strategy, 
transnational activism manages to play a role in affecting each of these factors. 
The comparison of cases shows that one of the main differences is the kinds of relations 
established with negotiating states and the distance between original positions and activists’ 
demands. In the case of EPAs, the distance between ECOWAS positions and West African civil 
society was shorter than the distance between positions and activists in the case of the AA. But even 
if there would be a total coincidence of positions, it is uncertain whether some states would have 
maintained its strong original position without the politicisation created around the negotiations 
and the additional studies and materials provided. It is then a combination of causes which explains 
the contributions described above. Bi-regional functional networks were organised in time and 
scale and these had the discursive capacity to encode demands so that they would resound as 
feasible and proper conduct for some of the negotiating states. Messages were centered on the 
suitability of trade liberalisation to promote sustainable development, thus, safeguarding the 
national interests of developing countries to integrate into the world economy. Involving relevant 
economic domestic groups helped to increase the legitimacy of the demands before policy makers. 
This was especially the case of West Africa where small-scale famers had a key role and upon whom 
millions of livelihoods depend. The proposals were framed within an overall pro-development policy 
paradigm, supported by commitments of policy coherence and protection of human rights. The 
terms of the debate were shaped and the boundaries of what could be negotiated were expanded 
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through appealing to already existing principles of flexibility within the multilateral trade system. At 
the same time, the general discourse of civil society as an important actor created opportunities for 
access to information and consultation spaces that facilitated communication.  
In brief, the role transnational activism played can be explained through the ways that 
networks profit from opportunities in the context of negotiations. Using opportunities means 
aggregating interests and mobilising groups by shortening distances among different ideas and 
arguments for or against proposed decisions. In this way, transnational activism contributes to 
shape the boundaries of what is possible and perceived as proper conduct in terms of decisions. 
The role of transnational activism cannot be explained by actions observed in a short period 
only. Activists draw upon ideas established as proper in the past such as the idea that the involvement 
of civil society is positive and a discourse of development and human rights. Advocacy in the past 
helped to create opportunities for participation and to place certain topics in the agenda. Taking 
this into consideration, governments develop strategies to anticipate possible criticisms to their 
proposals.  This is why the role of transnational activism must be explained in the context of longer 
term changes in the political economy and discursive context of trade and development politics. 
6.3 Theoretical contributions
6.3.1 Composite transnational activism
The conceptualisation of transnational activism as a set of related forces which do not share values 
in a neatly single-issue campaign, but rather common concerns, and work in conflict symbiosis 
takes distance from the conceptualisation of transnational advocacy networks offered by Keck and 
Sikkink (1998). They assumed normative consensus within the network and they explained their 
emergence in the context of campaigns mostly related to civil and political rights. This consensus 
cannot be assumed in the area of economic policies. The distances between various interpretations 
of what is considered right and wrong is wider and one of the main challenges for activists. This 
study shows there is a different and more functional form of trans-border collaboration that departs 
and builds on this diversity to make the best use of opportunities in bi-regional trade negotiations. 
While Keck and Sikkink studied networks of HR NGOs, the organisational composition observed in 
this study is much more diverse and, most interestingly, creating collaboration among groups of 
concentrated and diffuse interests. 
6.3.2 Locating power in the interplay between interests and ideas
This thesis contributes to a better understanding of transnational activism’s power in trade 
negotiations through a discursive lens. The main implication of these findings for IR theory is that 
the effects of this type of transnational activism can be best seen through an analytical framework 
which captures both changes in decisions and in the small – and often imperceptible – changes in 
the discursive context making some decisions possible, and others not. The power of transnational 
activism in trade politics is thus only observable in the interplay between changes in discourses 
and changes in behaviour. Discursive practices shape what is possible in terms of decisions. Both 
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interests and norms matter and are inextricably linked supporting what other researchers have 
concluded for other policy areas (Doty, 1993 and 1997, Epstein, 2005 and 2006, Fierke and Wiener, 
1999). 
I argued that these discursive shifts had an effect in decisions by playing with the projected 
and perceived identities of actors and interests. In this way, they contributed to some topics not 
being negotiated or negotiated later, opening room for new debates. If activism is analysed only in 
terms of effects on outcomes, it is difficult to prove attribution of specific changes to activism. On 
the other hand, if only changes in discourses are examined over a long period of time, the interplay 
between discursive frames and concrete actions and decisions would be missed. To account for 
the effects on these two levels and the interplay between the two is the strength of the analytical 
framework adopted. Transnational activists contributed to reproducing and legitimising power 
structures, yet carving spaces for re-definition of the ‘right’ policy paradigms. Discursive power 
shifts the scope of options, thus, constraining or facilitating some decisions against others. 
This analysis reinforces the complementarity of liberal/pluralist and social constructivist 
IR approaches. It also shows how hegemonic some discourses are and how difficult it is to de-
construct them and build bridges to new alternative ones. In this sense, it appears as if a neo-
Gramscian reading of the findings would make sense: the market-led liberal paradigm was not 
destabilised. Yet, I have also shown the challenges to this paradigm: challenges based on concerns 
over environmental sustainability and principles of respect for human rights. In short, there are 
cracks on the rock through which change happens.
6.3.3 Democratising politics through the representation of discourses in global civil 
society
Understanding power as affecting change in this way shows how GCS understood here as an arena 
and a forum is the space where forms of discursive democracy1 can emerge. The implications 
for democratising trade politics is not then only limited to improving access, accountability and 
representativeness through involvement of civil society. Activists both help reproduce ways of acting 
and representing by playing in this realm. They open spaces for alternatives and increase overall 
dialogicality2. Though these alternatives may be seen as limited, they contribute to emancipatory 
strategies as they provide tools for reflexivity and politicisation. If all political parties and groups 
think alike, representative democracy and elections become less relevant. Democratising effects are 
needed at the level of reflexive action, that is, of multiple alternatives. 
I explored the alleged emancipatory potential of GCS. This potential is realised through the 
expression of different ideas of fair trade and the process of managing a diversity of opinions while 
searching for common messages and an enhanced voice. Transnational activists’ actions led to more 
reflection and debate on negotiations, often outside the scrutiny of citizens due to their highly 
1 Discursive democracy (also known as deliberative democracy) is a form of democracy in which the 
quality of deliberation is central to decision making and legitimacy.
2 Dialogicality is the extent to which one document makes references to other documents, actors and 
ideas as an indicator of dialogue (Fairclough, 2003 and 2009).
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technical nature. This can, in itself, be emancipatory, especially for what it means for groups whose 
voices are often neglected.
These findings contribute to problematising the idea of GCS as a realm of taken-for-granted 
emancipatory and democratising potentials. The emancipatory contents and meanings are being 
forged through conflicts and interactions among different groups. Some ideas become predominant, 
while others remain marginalised. Though it is true that activists overcome their differences and find 
points of convergence, this is not always easy and does not always mean that conflicts are solved. 
GCS is a realm where discursive struggles continue to take place over the meanings of a ‘good’ global 
society. It is a space where different agendas meet and interact, rather than being a channel where 
a single agenda is wished. It is through the process of negotiations and the creation of spaces for 
participation however, that the emancipatory potentials of GCS are partly, and promisingly, being 
realised. 
6.4 Methodological contributions
This study allowed experimentation with different methods of data gathering and analysis. Two 
aspects of this experience can be highlighted. First, the concept of discursive practice was introduced 
with the aim to capture the crossroad between history – the weight of established rules, institutions 
and ideas – and events and decisions taking place in punctual moments of time. Discursive practices 
are rather stable configurations in the medium term and serve as a bridge between long term 
changes in discourses and short-term changes in decisions. Observations of some of these events 
in a period of three years allowed me to note what characteristics remained stable and which 
ones were altered with time. For practical reasons, limited historical research and follow-up of the 
negotiations processes could be sustained beyond the period of data gathering. 
The second aspect is related to the challenge of assessing a reality that does not only happen 
in many locations simultaneously, but in closed spaces. It is widely known that anticipation and 
political correctness are commonly used strategies by politicians in interviews. Thus a combination 
of observations, interviews and document analysis was needed. This type of triangulation is not 
new in the social sciences. What I attempted to do differently was to get closer to observe and 
remain distant to analyse. Originally, I considered doing an internship with one of the negotiating 
parties. This may have allowed me to observe the process of decision-making within closed spaces. 
But it may have also closed the opportunities to join advocacy organisations. I decided to work 
in collaboration with the organisations, experimenting with some forms of action research. This 
helped me to gain insights into the ways organisations worked together, prepared their actions 
and evaluated their own work. Without these insights I may have overlooked the complexities and 
richness of diverse organisations trying to find a common message and strategy. 
6.5 Limitations and implications for future research
Though I claim that this study has contributed to a better understanding of transnational activism 
and of power in global politics, it is limited in a number of ways.  First, given that it is based on two 
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case studies of a particular type of negotiation, the validity of its findings beyond similar types of 
transnational activism remains a question. The configuration of a functional composite activism 
needs to be further studied in other contexts and policy areas, for example, in relation to activism 
about climate change. In these cases, groups needed each other for different reasons. It is to be seen 
whether the characteristic of being composite remains the case for activism about the environment, 
financial regulations or debt in which there are important North-South and economic components 
or not. Previous studies of activism already indicate how activists of ‘multiple identities’ (Tarrow, 
2005; Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005) work together and converge on common positions to mitigate 
their weaknesses (Magis, 2010). Considering the level of interconnectedness among citizens and 
issues in a more increasingly integrating world, it could be expected that similar dynamics of 
composite activism become recurrent in multiple types of campaigns. 
Second, this study shows how material and ideational dimensions are inextricably linked, 
assuming that changes in the identities of actors and their guiding paradigms and policy orientations 
take place in a long term historical process. This study did not conduct an in-depth historical 
examination linking changes in identities, discourses and policy orientations. A historical approach 
and long-term monitoring of on-going negotiations could help verify the conclusions of this study.  
Third, the conceptualisation of ideas such as reflexive action and transnational discursive 
democracy deserve further elaboration in dialogue with more empirical studies, especially in the 
context of international negotiations. Dryzek proposes that civil society actors are less constrained 
to move beyond instrumental action and engage in reflexive action, which would allegedly be 
needed to solve global problems more profoundly. In theory, civil society actors are less constrained 
than markets and governments to act reflexively. Yet, the empirical evidence has not fully supported 
this proposition. Organisations are also constrained by short-term goals, limitations in information 
and funding dependency and the need to maintain relations with governments and markets. It 
remains a question whether organisations can develop capacities for reflexive action, or conflict 
solving capacities as Galtung proposes (2000). This is related to the capacity to engage in dialogue 
in a forum, where reasons and ideas are exchanged and considered, against exchanges taking place 
in a less constructive arena. It remains a question to what extent global civil society becomes more 
a space for deliberation or a space for discourse contestation.
Fourth, this thesis examined how activists challenge the official discourses and the links made 
between trade and development. They did so at the policy levels. However, their analysis was often 
limited by their own interests and motivations. Only a few could take a critical stance towards their 
own ideological frameworks and be able to look at issues from a variety of perspectives. Only a few 
could question their own implicit theoretical assumptions and organisational theories of change. 
As seen in chapters 3 and 4, most proposals were of a confrontational or reformist nature. In the 
case studies examined, the need for convergence in coalitions leads to some common messages on 
the lowest common denominators reflecting similar concerns, rather than transcending proposals 
for future-oriented solutions.  Is it too much to ask civil society to act reflexively? That is, to move 
beyond confrontation or compromise attitudes towards a problem-solving and future-oriented 
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thinking? The danger could be to expect too much of civil society, not only to be the ‘conscience 
of the world’ (Willets, 1996) but also humanity’s saviour. Further research should look into the 
reflection and conflict transformation capacities of organisations and the effects of their attempts to 
act in a reflexive manner. Is it possible that real reflexive dialogue could take place within the existing 
negotiation and international policy making practices? A Civil Society Forum has been agreed as part 
of the AA. The institutionalisation of the consultative role of civil society should be monitored in 
terms of the access and dialogue quality of these spaces. How meaningful will these spaces be as 
channels of societal demands and dialogue? This area requires further examination together with a 
better conceptualisation of the idea of reflexive action. 
Fifth, conflict theories could possibly help enhance the theoretical frameworks to look at 
discursive struggles. Conflict workers and mediators are trained to expose underlying interests and 
needs of different parties in conflict. They work to move communication from the arena to the 
forum, from the ‘who shouts louder’ mode to the ‘listening and exchange of arguments’ mode. 
Conflict transformation toolboxes applied in peace international negotiations could be applied to 
other types of international negotiations. Are international negotiations as known in the present 
and the public sphere only an arena where ideas exist in juxtaposition and competition? Could 
there be spaces deliberately created with attention to the quality of dialogue and deliberation 
to provide room for problem-solving? Could transcend scenarios be imagined collaboratively? 
This would imply interventions with an explicit normative starting point: the ways international 
negotiations are conducted now are insufficient to solve complex conflicts. Further research and 
experimentation should be done about the role of discourse in international negotiations in both 
the present and in possibly innovative settings. The concept of discursive practice could be a tool 
for analysis to monitor future negotiations. Discursive practices could help identify the aspects of 
forum and arena, which always coexist. However, much more attention could be given to the quality 
of deliberation and exchange of arguments and to the reality of resistance and blocking strategies 
in which there is no real dialogue. 
Finally, Dryzek also assumes that there is a transmission belt between empowered spaces 
and the public sphere. More conceptualisation is needed about the way this belt works and the 
links between these spaces. Social network analysis could be a tool to experiment with to assess 
to what extent there is exchange and circulation in elites or intellectuals who work alternatively for 
governments, think tanks, the private sector, or other organisations. 
6.6 Final remarks: a note about success
This study explained the role of transnational activism and how it attempted and – to some extent 
– achieved to affect negotiations. It did not aim to attribute a particular kind of ‘success’ to any 
specific campaign or action. Evaluation is a loaded activity in terms of the values that guide it, and 
it is the task of each organisation to conclude the extent to which it achieved its goals. Evaluation 
should also be done in a historical perspective as change is the result of multiple cumulative actions. 
The efforts of today may yield results in the future, even if it may not seem likely. The promotion of 
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human rights and social justice has moved policies forward, in non-linear and zigzag paths. In the 
case of trade and development policies much more collaborative thinking and dialogue should help 
find new answers. This in itself would be a success. 
Based on the experience of conducting this study, I include practical considerations about 
evaluation of transnational campaigns in Appendix 5. I do not aim to offer the ‘right’ way of 
evaluating, rather, with this thesis, I hoped to have provided insights that help both policy makers 
and organisations to reflect on their own roles and ideas. 
Personally, I watch citizens’ protests on TV differently now. I ask myself many questions 
about their motivations, their strategies and ideas. Most importantly I cannot stop wondering what 
comes next. How will our political systems channel the demands and uneasiness felt by those who 
feel marginalised from enjoying the fruits globalisation has yielded? I wonder if we will learn to 
transform our conflicts, moving beyond the dispute over material resources and our unsustainable 
models of production and consumption. I wonder if we could be able to do so by appealing to our 
reservoirs of creativity and principles of justice.  
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Data on activists’ actions was collected via Internet search of documentation, meetings with 
organisations, interviews and observations of internal and public meetings and activities. A list of 
interviewees and events observed can be found in Appendices 2 and 3. 
In the case of the EPAs campaign, data was gathered through collection of documentation 
made public in official websites (European Commission DG-Trade and ECOWAS), campaign and 
related organisations’ websites, observations of some events and interviews within the period 
of February 2008 and December 2009.  In an early stage of the study, a meeting was held with 
Oxfam Novib, in which I was informed of their plans to evaluate their contributions to the EPAs 
campaign. In this context, I collaborated with the external evaluator hired by Oxfam International. 
We collaborated in data collection and I participated in two internal presentations of the evaluation 
results, one at the headquarters of Oxfam Novib in The Hague, and one in the office of Oxfam 
International in Brussels.  
A total of 59 semi-structured interviews were conducted. These included the main negotiating 
parties, that is, regional organisations and member states, and most active non-state actors. 
European Commission and EU member states (16); ECOWAS, Senegal and Nigeria officials (5), EU 
parliamentarians assistants (2); European private aid agencies (16); West African NGOs (6); Trade 
unions in West Africa (4), farmers association in West Africa (1); private sector organisations in West 
Africa (2); media and researchers in Europe (4), media and researchers in West Africa (3). The list 
was composed using a snow-ball sampling technique. It started with two interviews with experts/ 
observers based in the Netherlands but with an overview of both state and non-state actors at the 
beginning of February 2008 in which a preliminary list was composed. Participation as an observer 
in the UNCTAD Conference and previous and parallel civil society activities allowed me to have 
an overview of transnational activism on trade. Through preliminary interviews and observations 
I could identity the most active organisations and networks. The list of interviewees was thus 
completed and after this event the choice for case studies was made.  
In the case of activism around the Association Agreement, CIFCA was approached for 
collaboration. Access to materials and observations of meetings was agreed. As negotiations of 
the AA started in 2007, I could observe most advocacy activities between the end of 2008 until the 
beginning of 2010. A total of 48 interviews were conducted. 
Texts were collected and classified per author, general genre (formal or produced by 
governmental institutions or non-formal produced by non-state actors) and specific genre (press 
release, briefing paper, power point presentation, etc.). They were collected and classified based on 
Internet search and on analysis of the information gathered during interviews and observations. I 
noted the documents that were mostly used and referred to as important.   Based on the comments 
of interviewees and observations some documents seemed to have performed important functions 
in the history of the negotiations and of the activism.  These documents were chosen to be analysed 
in more depth. 
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Reflections on methodological limitations
My original research design included interviews, observations and elements of action research. I 
had anticipated challenges in access to information and reliability of the information shared.  These 
challenges are related to the nature of trade negotiations in which policy makers and activists are 
careful about losing face and the perceptions other actors could have about them.  However, as I 
started to conduct interviews and do observations I noted that the willingness to speak differed per 
interviewee. 
In general, policy makers agreed to grant interviews. I conducted interviews with about 2/3 
of officials identified through Internet search and documentation. I had expected a lower response. 
I deliberately mentioned in my letters that my research was part of the IS-Academy, a cooperation 
scheme between the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Dutch universities. I used the formal 
letter head of the university, phone, post and fax in some cases and not only email to make the first 
contact. I explained the aims of my research and promised not to include direct quotes. My intention 
was to project an image of objectivity and trustworthiness. Most officials showed a strong political 
correctness: the involvement of civil society is valuable. This complicated my first ideas of drawing 
a social network analysis diagram to depict perceived influence: I did not trust the data gathered, 
thus, any picture, would be a picture of perceived acknowledgement. My assessment was that only 
a few shared their perceptions honestly and more nuanced insights. I learned that silences could be 
interpreted. There were certain issues that they would rather not discuss in depth or about which they 
did not know much. These limitations led me to strengthen my research design with more analysis of 
documentation and observations of what evidence of actual responses and decisions I could trace. 
For example, I observed some officials received periodic information from some organisations – they 
had piles of their publications on their desks – but would not mention them as important actors. At 
the same time, I noted others would mention more organisations, but may not have read much about 
their research or positions. 
My first observations at the UNCTAD conference made me realise that there were many 
organisations involved, linked in various ways, and at the same time, that a few key organisations and 
individuals seemed to be the main facilitators and spokespersons. I realised that to get good insights 
into their views, strategies and internal decision-making processes, the only way was to observe it 
closely. Having been a busy network coordinator myself, my main concern was to gain trust and be 
able to give them something in exchange of their valuable time. Or rather, be able to observe what 
was happening and understand issues by myself, rather than taking their time to explain them to me. 
This is why I decided to explore cooperation with organisations. In a first contact with Oxfam Novib, 
I was informed they were planning to conduct an internal evaluation of their role and contribution 
to the EPAs campaign. We remained in touch and we agreed on collaboration, setting boundaries 
and roles. I would get access to their documentation, be able to observe evaluation meetings and 
I would share my interview findings. For Oxfam it was difficult to interview their targets as this may 
have biased their results. We assumed that as an independent researcher, I would elicit more honest 
answers. At the same time, I had to inform interviewees about this cooperation and that I would 
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share my findings with Oxfam. I shared the transcript of the interviews with officials and they had 
a chance to check them before I would analyse or share them. This may have increased the level of 
political correctness in answers, but it was the only ethical way in which I could both do the interviews 
and access information which would have been impossible for me to collect on my own.  For me it 
was a rich experience. I navigated it with fears of being trustworthy and following the principle of 
doing no harm, that is, collecting information without interfering or creating wrong perceptions and 
judgements about the roles of different organisations. For example, one of my fears was - and is – 
not to imply that by doing research on the campaigns, I meant that they were successful or on the 
contrary, unsuccessful. 
My collaboration with CIFCA was different in the sense that I joined activities for a few months. 
My first aim was to experiment with an action research approach. But soon I realised that doing more 
activities with them may lead to being perceived by interviewees as a staff of CIFCA. I also realised it 
would be too time-consuming to be able to learn daily tasks so as to execute them with accuracy as 
I was learning about the topics myself. In reality it became a limited action research collaboration. 
I helped in the preparations of activities around the VI round in Brussels, doing small tasks such as 
compiling a data-base and helping with reporting. These allowed me make observations and at the 
same time, contribute a little to the work of the organisation without being a disturbance or extra 
burden to their already overloaded work agendas. What was most fruitful was that I could observe 
events and meetings, rather than reading or hearing about them. The fact that the activities were 
in Spanish was an advantage for me as a native speaker. There were nuances and implicit cultural 
meanings which I easily could recognise. I had the feeling that organisations and officials were more 
open to share, but it may be that I felt more open and secure as well while conducting the interviews, 
knowing when to pause, when to probe, and how to empathise with interviewees. In both cases, being 
able to participate in evaluation meetings represented excellent opportunities for me. I could share my 
preliminary views, hear their comments and discuss their assessments and reflections about their own 
roles and limitations. I hope that my participation in these meetings – and my numerous questions - 
may have contributed to their reflection. 
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In alphabetical order by last name
1. Adegbenro, Rasheed, Manufacturers Association of Nigeria - MAN (Head, Corporate Affairs 
Department). Abuja: 11 May 2009.   
2. Akalbila, Ibrahim. Ghana Trade and Livelihood Coalition (Coordinator). Accra: 4 May 2009.
3. Alegría, Rafael, Via Campesina Honduras. Tegucigalpa: 2 April 2009. 
4. Andersson, Annika. Diakonia (Head of Latin American Department) Telephone interview: 10 
December 2009.
5. Antwi, Anna. Action Aid Ghana (Food Rights Policy advisor) Accra: 5 May 2009. 
6. Arce, Rodrigo. Forum Syd (position) Brussels: 16 September 2009. 
7. Ardito, Nicola. European Commission - DG-Trade (Coordinator EU-Central America Association 
Agreement) Telephone interview: 3 December 2009. 
8. Ba, Amadou, Ministry of Commerce of Senegal (Head of International Trade Negotiations), Dakar: 
15 May 2009. 
9. Barrantes, Roger. Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores José Benito Escobar (CST-JBE) Iniciativa 
CID Nicaragua. Brussels: 27 January 2009. 
10. Ben Abdalah, Taoufik. ENDA Tiers Monde (Programme Director) Dakar: 15 May 2009. 
11. Berden, Koen. ECORYS (Senior consultant) and Erasmus University (Senior lecturer). Rotterdam: 20 
January 2010
12. Blanch, David and Okokon Odiongenyi, Embassy of France in Nigeria (Economics Department). 
Abuja: 11 May 2009. 
13. Brongers, Thessa. Netherlands Embassy in Nigeria (Economic and Trade Affairs Advisor). Abuja: 11 
May 2009.  
14. Castro, Lourdes. Grupo Sur (Executive Secretary). Brussels: 4 March 2009 
15. Cann, Vicky. World Development Movement (Policy Officer). Accra: 19 April 2008.
16. Céspedes, Renzo, expert on international trade. Tegucigalpa: 30 March 2009. 
17. Ciss, Bathie ENDA Tiers Monde Dakar: 15 May 2009. 
18. Cisse, Al Hassan, Action Aid Senegal (Food Rights Advisor). Antwerpen: 11 June 2009.   
19. Chambille, Karel. Hivos (Hivos Evaluation Manager). The Hague: 20 October 2008. 
20. Chicas, Marco. Embassy of Guatemala to the European Union (Minister Counsellor). Brussels: 1 July 
2009.  
21. Coronado, Jorge. Alianza Social Continental - Costa Rica (Comisión Nacional de Enlace ASC) 
Tegucigalpa: 1 April 2009. 
22. Cronin, David. Inter Press Service (IPS). Brussels, 22 April 2009. 
23. de Miguel, Imma. Oxfam International, s/c Intermòn Oxfam based in Benin (Head of Economic 
Justice for West Africa) Abuja: 10 May 2009. 
24. De Morree, Dicky. Cordaid (Advocacy officer). Utrecht: 12 September 2008. 
25. Deraedt, Filip.  European Commission – DG Trade (Policy Co-ordinator Trade and Development). 
Brussels: 19 March 2009. 
26. De Schrijver, Guido. Red Europea de Comites O.Romero (Coordinator) Brussels: 20 January 2009. 
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27. Diouf, Mignane, Senegal Social Forum (Coordinator) Dakar: 13 May 2009. 
28. Doussa, Simeon. Trade Union Benin. Accra: 18 april 2008.
29. Durand, Guillaume. European Commission - DG Development (Relations with African, Caribbean 
and Pacific States, Unit B/1: Economic Development: Infrastructure Networks, Trade and Regional 
Integration). Brussels, 6 July 2009. 
30. Echandi, Roberto. Ambassador of Costa Rica to the European Union (Chief negotiator) Brussels: 8 
July 2009. 
31. Es, Yvonne. Oxfam Novib (Head of Evaluation) The Hague: 8 September 2008. 
32. Exterkate, Marja. Partos (Evaluation Manager). Amsterdam: 10 September 2008. 
33. Fabbi, Fabio. European Commission - DGTrade (Information and Communication Officer EPA 2). 
Brussels, 25 February 2009.
34. Fautrel, Vincent CTA (Programme coordinator. Technical Centre for Agricultural and Rural 
Cooperation. Wageningen: 26 February 2008.
35. Fokker, Rian. Oxfam Novib (Spokesperson and head of Advocacy) The Hague: 8 September 2008
36. Garcia, Carmelo. IEPALA (Director), Madrid: 20 March 2009. 
37. Garcia Lobo, Nelson. Comisión de Acción Social Menonita (Director) Brussels: January 2009.  
38. Garza, Jesus. CHAAC Honduras (Coordinator) Brussels: 28 January 2009 and Tegucigalpa: 28 March 
2009.
39. Gehrels, Annemarie. ICCO (Learning Facilitator for Lobby) Utrehct: 15 September 2008. 
40. Genee, Otto. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (Head of Coherence Unit) The Hague: 
13 February 2008. 
41. Gningue, Sékène. Confederation Nationale des Travailleurs du Senegal (CNTS), Dakar: 13 May 2009. 
42. Gornés, Quique. Ingenieros sin Fronteras Catalunya (Spokesperson water group) Tegucigalpa: 27 
March 2009.
43. Graham, Yao.Third World Network Africa (Director) Accra: 25 April 2008. 
44. Gueye, Mohamed. Le Quotidien (Journalist and chief of Economy and Finances Desk) Dakar : 14 
May 2009.
45. Hazard, Eric. Oxfam GB (Economic Justice Campaign Manager West Africa) Telephone interview: 16 
June 2009.  
46. Heemskerk, Anne-Marie. Partos (Coordinator Kwaliteithuis). Amsterdam: 16 December 2009.  
47. Hospes, Otto. Wageningen University (Lecturer) Wageningen: 9 September 2008. 
48. Ibero, Marta. CIFCA (Deputy General Secretary) Brussels: 8 December 2008. 
49. Idzenga, Arianne. Intermon Oxfam/ Oxfam International (EPA Campaign Officer West Africa based in 
Burkina Faso) Abuja: 11 May 2009.  
50. Inye, Briggs. Federal Ministry of Commerce of Nigeria (Principle Commercial Officer). Contribution 
by email sent on 24 April 2009.  
51. Iorio, Mariarosario. IGTN Geneva Office. Accra: april 2008. 
52. Kalilou, Sylla. ECOWAS (Department of Macro Economic Policy) Abuja: 8 May 2009. 
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53. Kareweh, Edward T., General Agricultural Workers’ Union of Ghana (Deputy General Secretary) 
Accra: 6 May 2009. 
54. Karlshausen, Gerard. CNCD-CONCORD. Brussels: 12 February 2009. 
55. Kasse, Tidiane, Flamme d’Afrique (Editor) and Pambakuza News. Bonn: 4 December 2009
56. Kersjes, Ingrid. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands (Policy Officer Sustainable Economic 
Development Department) The Hague: 8 April 2009. 
57. Kjellberg, Lars, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark - Danida (Humanitarian Assistance and NGO 
Cooperation) Written contribution sent 3 November 2008.
58. Koch, Dirk-Jan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (Policy Office NGO Division). Written 
submission: April 2009. 
59. Kofi Mude, George. Ghana Trade Union Congress (GTUC) Accra: 6 May 2009.  
60. Lambregts, Ruud. Oxfam Novib. The Hague: 5 February 2008. 
61. Levamo, Tiina-Maria. Plan International Finland. Written contribution sent 21 November 2008.
62. Løvstø Severinsen, Helle. MS-Action Aid Denmark Stockholm: 15 October 2009 and telephone 
interview: 10 December 2009. 
63. Magha, Mohamadou–ROPPA (Coordinator). Telephone interview: 18 November 2009. 
64. Maes, Marc. Coalition of Flemish North-South Movement (11.11.11) (Trade Policy Officer Brussels: 
11 March 2009 and 23 April 2009.  
65. Mavromichalis, Petros. European Commission, DG-Relex, (Head of Central America and Mexico 
Unit) Brussels: 19 November 2009. 
66. Menseh, Ivens. Joy FM and United Nations Information Service (journalist) Accra : 5 May 2009.  
67. Minero, Yadira. Centro de Derechos de Mujeres Honduras. Brussels: January 2009.  
68. Morales, Edgar. Plataforma Sindical Centroamericana Costa Rica. Telephone interview: May 2009. 
69. Moreno, Juan. Comité Económico y Social Europeo/Confederación Europea de Sindicatos. Brussels: 
12 February 2009.  
70. Morgan, Justin Oxfam GB (Country Director) Accra: 4 May 2009. 
71. Nikolay, Renate. European Commission – DG-Trade (Cabinet of Commissioner Ashton, DG-Trade), 
Brussels: 9 March 2009. 
72. Obiols, Raimon.  European Parliament (MEP) Brussels: 29 January 2009.  
73. Odemwingie, Osaro. Oxfam GB (Media Coordinator, Oxfam GB Country Office Nigeria).  Nigeria. 
Abuja: 9 May 2009. 
74. Oghayei, Sunday. Federal Ministry of Commerce of Nigeria (Assistant to Chief Administrative Officer) 
Abuja: 8 May 2009. 
75. Olsson, Joakim. Swedish Cooperative Centre (Regional Director). Brussels: 16 September 2009. 
76. Olympio, John. ECOWAS (Technical Advisor to ECOWAS Team Leader EPA Support Unit. Abuja: 8 
May 2009. 
77. Osei, George. SEND Foundation (Trade Programme Officer). Written submittion: 8 June 2009.
78. Palacios, Lourdes, Member of El Salvador Parliament for FMLN. Brussels: 30 january 2009. 
79. Perez Casas, Luis Guillermo. CIFCA (General Secretary). Brussels: 9 December 2008. 
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80. Poppe, Charly. Friends of the Earth Europe (Trade Campaigner). Brussels: 13 February 2009.  
81. Poulsen, Peter. DFID, British High Commission (Regional Economics Advisor for ECOWAS and Growth 
Team DFID Nigeria), Abuja: 9 May 2009. 
82. Roberto, José. CALDH (Coordinador Programa Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas) Brussels, 28 
January 2009. 
83. Robletto, Lizette. Progressio (Advocacy Coordinator for Latin America and CAMEX group chair until 
April 2009 and President of CIFCA since October 2009) Brussels: 12 February 2009. 
84. Ruiz Gimenez Aguilar, Mercedes. AIETI. Madrid: 20 March 2009. 
85. Samson, Ramona. European Commission – DG Trade (Coordinator of the Civil Society Dialogue). 
Brussels: 19 March 2009. 
86. Sandino, Lautaro. Ambassador of Nicaragua to the European Union. Brussels: 26 July 2009. 
87. Sayabou, Laoual. REPAOC Platform of Civil Society of Niger (Coordinator). Accra: 22 April 2008
88. Schaumans, Greet. Broederlijk Delen (Programme Officer) Brussels: 11 March 2009. 
89. Sharkey, Cliona. CIDSE (Policy and Advocacy Officer). Written submission: 16 March 2009. 
90. Sloot, Huub. BBO. The Hague: 14 October 2008.  
91. Tanoh, Gyekye. Third World Network-Africa (ATN contact Pan-Africa) Accra: 5 May 2009. 
92. Tinoco, Victor Hugo, Member of Nicaraguan Parliament for MRS Brussels: 26 January 2009. 
93. Tolentino, José Ángel. Iniciativa CID El Salvador (Coordinador de Proyectos Area Macroeconomía y 
Desarrollo) Brussels: 30 January 2009. 
94. Tounkara, Ndeye Marianne, Oxfam GB -OI (Regional Trade Campaign Assistant) Written submission: 
22 June 2009.    
95. Tovar, Camilo. ALOP (Head of Brussels Office) Brussels: 30 January 2009. 
96. Tuahiru, Muhammed. Oxfam GB (former National advocacy officer in Ghana) Accra: 4 May 2009. 
97. Ukaoha, Ken. National Association of Nigerian Traders (NANTS) (President). Accra: april 2008 and 
Abuja: 9 May 2010. 
98. Vahl, Remco. European Commission DG-Trade (Deputy Head of Unit EPA 1). Brussels: 25 February 
2009. 
99. van Mele, Erik. Oxfam Solidarite – Oxfam International (Policy officer) Brussels: 12 February 2009. 
100. van Ommeren, Piet. ICCO (Head of Policy and Advocacy Unit). Utrecht: 15 September 2008. 
101. van Reisen, Mirjam. EEPA (Director) Brussels: May 2008. 
102. van Wijk, Paul. Oxfam Novib (Pan-Africa Programme) The Hague: 9 April 2009. 
103. Weller, Christina. Christian Aid. Written submission: 3 July 2009. 
104. Williams, Neeley. European Parliament (advisor to Robert Sturdy, MEP). Brussels: 21 April 2009. 
105. Wunenburger, Jacques. European Commission – DG Trade (Sub-head for three EPAs (ESA, SADC, 
Pacific). Brussels: 4 March 2009.  
106. Zagema, Bertram. Oxfam Novib (EPAs policy lead for Oxfam International). Accra: 18 April 2008 and 
The Hague: 8 April 2009.
107. Zepeda, Carlos Salvador. Oxfam Solidarite/Oxfam International (Political Advocacy Officer based in 
El Salvador). Tegucigalpa: 1 April 2009. 
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General events observed
Type Event Place and date
Public 1. UNCTAD - Civil Society Forum Accra, 17-25 April 2008
Public 2. CIVICUS General Assembly Glasgow, 19-21 June 2008
Public 3. Public Hearing in the European Parliament on EU Free Trade 
Agreements 
Brussels, 9 April 2008
Public 4. Ad hoc meeting, Bilateral Trade Negotiations, State of Play Brussels, 11 March 2009
Public 5. TNI Debating Europe Series. The global crisis, solutions, and 
implications for EU Trade Policy with Susan George, Myriam vander 
Stichele, Ignasi Guardans MEP, Gaspar Frontini, Chief Economist 
European Commission.
Brussels, 25 February 2009
Events related to the negotiation of EPAs
Type Event Place and date
Public 6. How Europe should bring development into its trade deals with 
ACP countries
Accra, 21 April 2008
Public 7. Presentation of Oxfam Policy Paper Accra, 23 April 2008
Oxfam 8. Feedback workshop on draft evaluation report The Hague, 24 August 2009
Oxfam 9. Feedback workshop on draft evaluation report Brussels, 25 August 2009
EvEnts obsErvEd
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Events related to the Association Agreement with Central America
Type Event Place and date
Network 10. Meeting of networks working on FTAs Brussels, 10 July 2008
CIFCA 11. Meeting CAMEX group and General Assembly Brussels, 23-24 October 
2008
CIFCA 12. Meeting CAMEX group Brussels, 10 December 
2008
Public 13. Event at the European Commission about the EU- Mexico 
Agreement 
Brussels, European 
Commission, 12-13 
November 2008
Public 14. Public debate about the AA with Central America organised by 
ICCO
Utrecht, 23 January 2009
Public 15. Event at the European Parliament Brussels, European 
Parliament, 28 January 
2009
CIFCA 16. Meeting to analyse activity at the European Parliament 29 January 2009
Public 17. Public event organised by FIAN Brussels, 29 January 2009
Public 18. Debriefing meeting at the European Comission Brussels, 30 January 2009
CIFCA 19. Meeting CAMEX group Brussels, 12 February 2009
Network 20. Meeting of European networks Brussels, 19 February 2009
Public 21. Event El Agua fuera del Ada, organised by CDC, Alianza Social 
Continental, Internacional de Servicios Públicos, Alforja, Foro del 
Agua, with the financial support of Heinrich Boll Foundation and 
Oxfam Novib
Tegucigalpa, 27 March 2009
Public 22. Peoples Tribunal Sessions
23. Public Forum and walk towards the hotel where the VII round of 
negotiations were taking place 
Tegucigalpa, 30-31 March 
2009
Public 24. Event with Central American parliamentarians organised by 
CHAAC, supported by CIFCA/AECI.  
Tegucigalpa, 1 April 2009
CIFCA 25. CIFCA members meeting Tegucigalpa, 2 April 2009
CIFCA 26. Grupo CAMEX General Assembly Brussels, 23 April 2009
CIFCA 27. Meeting CAMEX Group Brussels, 10 June 2009
CIFCA 28. Meeting CAMEX Group Brussels, 16 September 
2009
Public 29. Sweedish Parliament Stockholm, 16 October 
2009
CIFCA 30. General Assembly Stockholm, October 2009
CIFCA 31. General Assembly Madrid, 17-19 March 2010
Public 32. Seminar Madrid, 15-16 March 2010
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In alphabetical order
11.11.11. It is the coalition of 70 NGOs, unions, movements and 300 committees of volunteers and 
solidarity groups in Flanders (Dutch speaking part of Belgium) and it works in close cooperation with 
the CNCD, the coalition of organisations of Wallonia (French speaking part of Belgium). Its main goal 
is to achieve a ‘fairer world with no poverty’. The coalition engages in campaigns and they choose 
one main thematic focus per period and per year. Source: http://www.11.be/
Action Aid. It is an international anti-poverty federation of agencies with headquarters in 
Johannesburg, South Africa. Formed in 1972 and active in 42 countries, it works with local partners. 
Their aim is to help poor people ‘fight for and gain their rights to food, shelter, work, education, 
healthcare and a voice in the decisions that affect their lives’ (Website 2010). They adopt an explicit 
rights-based approach and since 1998 with a strong emphasis on campaigning and lobby work 
at national and international levels. The justification of this shift was that ‘projects alone are not 
going to overcome long-term poverty, but that greater democracy, transparency, and the work of 
civil society to hold decision makers accountable, are more likely to achieve long-term sustainable 
changes for poor people’. Thus, ‘people-centred advocacy work’ was needed. Their advocacy work 
targets influential institutions to change their policies as it is assessed that rules create and reproduce 
unfair policies. Their legitimacy for advocacy is built on a human rights framework supported by 
research and policy analysis, spaces for local partners to make their concerns heard and solidarity of 
Northern citizens to press their own governments1. Source: www.actionaid.org
ALoP – Latin American Association of Development organisations - Asociación Latinoamericana 
de Organizaciones de Promoción al Desarrollo A.C. Established in 1979, is an association of 
development organisations based in 20 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.  Source: 
http://www.alop.org.mx
APRoDEv. APRODEV was founded in 1990 in order to strengthen the cooperation between the 
European development and humanitarian aid organisations which work closely together with the 
World Council of Churches. At present, 16 such organisations, with offices in 15 European countries, 
cooperate through APRODEV. Together, the members have an annual income of some € 720 million. 
Their partner organisations can be found in most parts of the world. APRODEV is fully financed 
by its members. The main objective of APRODEV is to influence decision-making processes in the 
European Union institutions as these affect developing countries, in order to promote justice and 
peace, and the eradication of poverty. In this, APRODEV pursues rights-based development from a 
faith-based perspective. Source: http://www.aprodev.eu 
1  Interview with activist June 2009.
OrganisatiOnal glOssary
221
CAD – Central America for Dialogue - Colectivo Centroamérica para el Diálogo. Established in 2003, 
it is a Central American network of organisations which functions as a space for coordination, critical 
analysis and social mobilisation, rather than as a registered single organisation. Organisations and 
social movements which take part in it are concerned with issues of sustainable development, 
regional integration and development cooperation. 
Source: http://www.ccer.org.ni/files/noticia/1218735875_Comunicado_CAD_ante_Cumbre_en_
Viena.pdf
Central American Trade Union Platform  - Plataforma Sindical Común Centroamericana (PSCC). It is 
a federation of trade unions which started with member organisations from Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua and Honduras. In 2003, trade unions from Costa Rica joined and finally, organisations 
from Panama in 2004. Source: http://www.pscc-ca.org
ChAAC (Coalición Hondureña de Acción Ciudadana). CHAAC was initiated in May 2004 to organise 
actions in view of the negotiations of a free trade agreement between Central American countries 
and the US. Advocacy was organised to stop the ratification of this treaty as members of the 
coalition (18) considered its impact would be negative. The coalition was conceived as a social 
space to promote citizen participation, research and the development of proposals of alternative 
development models (translated from Spanish and summarised by author)
Source: http://www.gloobal.net/iepala/gloobal/fichas/ficha.php?entidad=Agentes&id=14366&opc
ion=descripcion
CIDSE. It is an international alliance of 16 Catholic development agencies working together for 
global justice. Advocating and campaigning for the reform of current policymaking is one of CIDSE’s 
core priorities and strengths. This is where we promote and facilitate the social justice agenda of 
our members and partners. Through coordinated efforts, we target key events at European, North 
American and international level in order to influence policy making and therefore impact the lives 
of the world’s most vulnerable people. Source: www.cidse.org 
CIFCA (the Copenhagen Initiative for Central America and Mexico). Established in 1991, it is an 
association of 37 development and human rights NGOs in Europe. Its main objective is to promote 
the transformation of European policies related to Central America and Mexico so that they respect, 
protect, guarantee and promote human rights in the spheres of political dialogue, development 
cooperation, trade and investments. Source: www.cifca.org
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CLoC – Latin American Coordination of Peasant organisations - La Coordinadora Latinoamericana 
de Organizaciones del Campo. CLOC is the regional reference organisation of Via Campesina. CLOC 
is the coordinating instance among member organisations in Central American countries. Its aim 
is to influence decision-making in economic and agricultural policies that affect small and medium 
scale farming. Source: http://cloc-viacampesina.org/
Diakonia. It is a Swedish organisation for international development co-operation. It is a member of 
CIFCA and APRODEV. Source: www.diakonia.se 
ECDPM. It is an independent think-tank which aims to enhance the capacity of public and private 
actors in ACP countries and to improve cooperation among ‘development partners’ in Europe and 
ACP regions. Established in 1986, ECDPM is a foundation with the aim of improving relations and 
cooperation between the EU and ACP countries. It considers itself a think tank with mediating and 
facilitating role supported by research, information and providing services, rather than an advocacy 
organisation with its own position. Its main capacity building efforts are grouped in three areas: 
a) facilitation of key development processes through interventions to improve dialogue, advisory 
services and performance or contributions to evaluations; b) research, knowledge management and 
information services and; c) supporting and strengthening partnerships, alliances and networks. 
ECDPM runs four main programmes, on Governance, Development Policy and International 
Relations, Knowledge and Information and Economic and Trade Cooperation. The latter has as 
its primary aim: ‘to contribute to the development of a trade regime that promotes sustainable 
development and the integration of ACP countries into the world economy’. Source: www.ecdpm.
org
EnDA Tiers Monde. The Environment and Development Action in the Third World is an international 
non-profit organisation based in Dakar, Senegal. It was established in 1972 as a joint initiative of 
UNEP, the African Institute of Economic Development and Planning and the Swedish International 
Cooperation Agency.  Presently, its secretariat coordinates 21 decentralised operating units in Africa 
(14), South America (5) and Asia (2). The team that engaged in the EPAs negotiations was ENDA 
SYSPRO, which stands for ‘systems et prospectives’ and aims to strengthen capacities of African 
civil society to engage in policy processes, world social forums and lobby and advocacy on themes 
of international trade. ENDA SYSPRO exists since 1997 and their aim is to contribute to the debates 
on challenges arising from globalisation processes and alternatives to build a fairer world. Source: 
http://www.endatiersmonde.org/
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Eurostep. It is a network of European private aid agencies established in 1990 and based in Brussels. 
Presently, it has 18 member organisations active in 13 European Union member states and one 
organisation based in Switzerland. It ‘advocates changes in Europe’s policies and practice based on 
the perspectives drawn from direct experiences of an active involvement of its members and their 
partners in development in over 100 countries across the world’. Eurostep did not engage in the 
EPAs campaign as such, but monitored the development dimensions and policy coherence aspects 
of the Cotonou Agreement. Eurostep issues a weekly electronic bulletin in which they published 51 
articles in relation to EPAs and informed about actions of their members which were at among the 
most involved in actions such as 11.11.11 and Oxfam Novib. Source: www.eurostep.org 
ETUC. It is the European Trade Union Confederation. It was founded in 1973; it now represents 84 
trade union organisations in 36 European countries, plus 12 industry-based federations. It is part of 
the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) followed the implementation of the Cotonou 
Agreement since 2000. Their involvement and statements are worthwhile noting given their level 
of representativeness: ITUC is the main international trade union organisation, representing the 
interests of working people worldwide. It has 301 affiliated member organisations in 151 countries 
and territories, with a total membership of 176 million workers. Source: www.etuc.org
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). It is a private foundation founded in 1925 as a political legacy of 
Germany’s first democratically elected president, Friedrich Ebert, a social-democrat. He established 
the foundation with the aim to support political and social education in the spirit of democracy and 
pluralism and to contribute to international understanding and cooperation. Source: www.fes.de
Friends of the Earth (FoE). It is an international environmental network of local grassroots groups 
working in 77 countries worldwide. FOE became involved in the EPAs both through groups based in 
ACP and European countries as well as through its office in Brussels, Friends of the Earth-Europe. 
http://www.foeeurope.org/
Forum Syd. It is a Swedish organisation which promotes democracy and rights. ‘We challenge the 
abuse of power, oppression and discrimination as a means of reducing poverty in the world, and do 
so in association with our Swedish member organisations and thousands of volunteers the world 
over’. Forum Syd is a member of CIFCA. Source: https://www.forumsyd.org
FUnDE. Based in El Salvador, FUNDE (Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo, National Foundation for 
Development) defines itself as a research and advocacy organisation with the aims of formulating 
socio-economic policies and development promotion. Their vision is to be a leading think tank and 
influential organisation in the field of development (Funde, 2011). Source: http://www.funde.org/
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Ghana Trade and Livelihood Coalition. It is an association based in Accra which comprises of 
106 small-scale farmer and producer groups, community-based organisations, and development-
oriented NGOs with the aim of influencing policy in the areas of agriculture and trade and 
enhancing productivity and livelihoods of small-scale farmers and producers. Though they started 
campaigns in 2005, the coalition was only formalised in 2006. Source: http://gtlcghana.org/index.
php?language=english
Grupo Sur. It is a political alliance of 11 European development-oriented NGOs which works in the 
area of North-South cooperation from a human rights perspective and based on the principle of 
solidarity. Source: http://www.gruposur.eu.org/
GTUC. The Ghana Trade Unions Confederation exists since 1945 as a national centre of trade unions, 
with 17 affiliates with varying sizes, ranging from unions with less than a total membership of 1,000 
to those with membership of well over 40,000. In partnership with FES as it was stated above they 
were active in the West African Trade Union Working group on Trade and Development. They 
organised visits of trade union representatives to institutions such as ECOWAS, UNCTAD, WTO, the 
South Centre and Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation of EU members. 
hivos. The humanist Institute for Development Cooperation is a Dutch development organisation 
guided by humanist values. Hivos supports over 600 partners in 26 countries in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America. Hivos provides financial resources, knowledge and advice as well as political support 
to these local community-based organisations. In addition, Hivos itself is active in the area of policy 
advocacy, both on the international stage and in the Netherlands. Source: www.hivos.nl 
Iniciativa CID – Initiative Trade and Development - Iniciativa Comercio y Desarrollo. It is a Central 
American network of organisations whose aim is to facilitate coordination and policy influence 
efforts in the areas related to trade, regional integration, sustainable development and human 
rights. Its members are federations of NGOs, cooperatives, citizen fora and social movements 
committed to service to the most vulnerable groups and the promotion of citizenship.  Source: 
http://iniciativacid.com/
Manufacturers Association of nigeria (MAn). It is a national industrial association serving and 
representing nearly 2000 companies in private and public sectors in manufacturing, construction and 
service sectors. Established in 1971, it has its headquarters in Ikeja, Lagos, a liaison office in Abuja 
and 12 branches in different parts of the country. Their objectives are to support their members 
with advice and services, to represent the interests of the sector before the various institutional 
instances and to influence policies in regard to industrial, labour, technical, social, legal and training 
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matters. They are represented in various boards of government and committees, for example, in the 
Tariff Review Board, the Nigerian Export Promotion Council, and Presidential Advisory Committee 
on Economic Revitalization, the House of Representatives Committee on World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) Agreements, to name a few. MAN claims to be the ‘acknowledged representative of the 
manufacturing sector in Nigeria’. In their view, their main achievements have been in the area of 
policy advocacy as their association is recognised and respected by the government, whose opinions 
it seeks. Source: http://www.manufacturersnigeria.org/
national Association of nigerian Traders (nAnTS). It is the umbrella organisation of traders in raw 
materials, industrial and finished goods (shoes, garments, cosmetics, furniture). Established in 1997 
and legally registered in 2001, it is a membership-based organisation with headquarters in Abuja, 
and a commercial office in Lagos. They claim at present 152 market and producers associations 
as units under the umbrella consisting of over 14,000 individuals, of which 65% are women 
entrepreneurs. The aim of the association is to link traders to market opportunities and influence 
relevant policies so as to increase economic activities with the vision of ‘advancing trade beyond 
buying and selling to a vehicle for social justice, human rights, sustainable development and poverty 
reduction’. Source: www.nants.org 
national Confederation of Senegal workers - Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs du Sénégal 
(CnTS). It is the national federation of trade unions of Senegal. It was established in 1969 and has 
60.000 members. As a trade union they participate in regional and international structures (ITUC-
CSI)
nigerian Labour Confederation (nLC). It was formally constituted as the only national federation of 
trade unions in the country in 1978. Its membership is about 4 million, with 37 affiliate unions and 
37 state councils.  They participated in the Nigerian Trade Initiative and mobilised in numbers on 
special occasions such as 1 May in Abuja and major cities.
oxfam International. It is a confederation of 14 organisations working in 99 countries with partners 
and allies.  Though interconnected, their lines of work are presented as mainly three: direct work 
with communities in development projects, relief work in emergencies and advocacy work ‘to 
influence the powerful to ensure that poor people can improve their lives and livelihoods and have a 
say in decisions that affect them’ (Oxfam International Website, 2010). The rationale given for their 
work is their rights-based approach, that is, their belief that respect for human rights will help lift 
people out of poverty. Oxfam’s approach to activism combines the production of research, briefing 
papers, lobby and public mobilisation activities such as petitions, concerts and a strong presence 
in media. In their website they explain ‘lobbying for change: Oxfam produces high-quality research 
and advocates for responsible policies that will help poor people benefit from international trade’. 
Source: www.oxfam.org
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RoPPA – network of peasant and producer organisations of west Africa - Réseau des organisations 
paysannes et des producteurs de l’Afrique de l’Ouest.  ROPPA was set up in 2000 and presently has 
its headquarters in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso and members (national platforms of farmers) in 
10 countries in West Africa, most of them francophone countries with the exceptions of Gambia, 
Ghana and Sierra Leone. They state that the majority of their national membership is composed 
by women and young people who run and work in small units of land. Their main activities are 
capacity building seminars, research and involvement in policy processes at national, regional and 
international levels. Source: http://www.roppa.info/?lang=en
Seattle to Brussels network. The network is called ‘Seattle to Brussels Network - Taking Action 
Against Corporate Globalisation’. The S2B network is the European part of the global ‘Our World 
Is Not For Sale’ network (OWINFS).The S2B network includes development, environment, human 
rights, women and farmers organisations, trade unions, social movements as well as research 
institutes. Source: http://www.s2bnetwork.org/
Social hemispheric Alliance - Alianza Social Continental. It is a movement integrated by social 
organisations, thematic networks and sectoral organisations from the American continent. The 
idea of an Alliance was born at the Our Americas Forum in Belo Horizonte, Brazil in May of 1997. 
The Hemispheric Social Alliance is a forum where progressive organisations and movements from 
around the Americas can gather, strategize, share information and plan joint actions. As the base 
and strength of this movement grows, we will be in an even better position to fight for an alternative 
and democratic development model for our societies. Source: http://www.asc-hsa.org/
Swedish Cooperative Centre (SCC). It is a centre created by the Swedish Cooperative Movement in 
1958. Through long-term development work and ‘help to self-help’ they aim to equip poor people 
with the tools needed to fight poverty themselves. Through advocacy work they strive to convince 
more people to take stand for a world free from poverty and injustice. Their projects are partly 
financed by Sida, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. Source: http://www.
sccportal.org/
Transnational Institute (TnI). It was established in 1974 as an international network of 
activist researchers (‘scholar activists’) committed to critical analyses of the global problems. It 
aims to provide intellectual support to movements struggling for a more democratic, equitable and 
environmentally sustainable world. Source: http://www.tni.org
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Third world network (Twn). It is ‘an independent non-profit international network of organisations 
and individuals involved in issues relating to development, Third World and North-South affairs’ 
(TWN, 2010). It was established in 1984 in Penang, Malaysia to coordinate and consolidate 
cooperation among development groups in the South. Its main activities are to conduct research, to 
disseminate it through publications and to organise and participate in events to present Southern 
perspectives on economic, social and environmental issues. It is funded on programme and 
project-basis. It has a regional office in Accra, Ghana, whose team was most closely involved in 
the negotiations and coordinated the actions in relation to EPAs through the Africa Trade Network. 
Source: http://www.twnside.org.sg/
via Campesina. Born in 1993, la Via Campesina is the international movement which brings together 
millions of peasants, small and medium-size farmers, landless people, women farmers, indigenous 
people, migrants and agricultural workers from around the world. It defends small-scale sustainable 
agriculture and food sovereignty as a way to promote social justice and dignity. It strongly opposes 
corporate driven agriculture and transnational companies that are destroying people and nature. 
La Via Campesina comprises about 150 local and national organisations in 70 countries from 
Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas. Altogether, it represents about 200 million farmers. It is an 
autonomous, pluralist and multicultural movement, independent from any political, economic or 
other type of affiliation. Source: http://viacampesina.org/en/
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I realise how difficult it is to manage ideas, processes, groups of diverse people and time. In the 
cases I have examined, I have not been in the shoes of the activists nor had I to take decisions at a 
negotiation table. Thus, I could never feel comfortable telling or suggesting others different courses 
of actions. However, my observations and analysis are not neutral and do have implications for 
practice which deserve reflection. I share my ideas about these implications for policy and practice 
with the hope that these feed into the process of discussion and reflections within and among 
organisations. In my opinion, my findings could be related to two ongoing debates: the first is the 
debate about what constitutes ‘results’ of an advocacy intervention strategy as implemented by 
coalitions, often in which private aid agencies play an important role. Second, there is a debate 
about the idea that the involvement of civil society is inherently good and that it helps to address the 
legitimacy gaps of global governance. In the next paragraphs I offer some reflections on these two 
debates and a tool to guide evaluation of advocacy. 
Effectiveness and results-based evaluation for advocacy work
How to assess changes in policies and practices? How to prove attribution or contributions of 
advocacy to these changes? First, social change often takes time, thus, any evaluation should not 
only include baseline studies and monitoring instances, but a historical analysis of the structures, 
relations and perceptions prevailing in a society or an issue area. This makes it difficult for 
organisations who seek short-term results. Second, advocacy is predominantly done in coalitions, 
involving several simultaneous interventions in various locations and political arenas. It is difficult 
to isolate the effects or contributions of one organisation from the others. Some organisations in 
my research assumed that the complementarities of approaches (lobby, research and contestation) 
and a bigger coalition in terms of the number of organisations involved would lead to better 
results. I have shown that the sum of many small actions – often contradictory messages – led to 
changes in the negotiation atmosphere. However, the effects of joint but conflicting messages need 
to be explored in more detail. Converging on common messages or concerns increases the visibility 
of the concerns and the public pressure in policymakers’ eyes, but it does not necessarily lead to 
deeper dialogue on the underlying assumptions and causes of poverty, inequality and injustice. The 
assumption that the impact would be greater if more groups were to become involved needs to be 
examined in more detail. There is also a need to study the effects of watered-down and ambiguous 
messages. Third, a dominant ‘political correctness’ and ‘discourse of civil society’ hinders efforts to 
obtain honest opinions about the effects of campaigns. Though confidentiality is promised, policy 
makers do not want to hamper their image or relations with organisations. 
A practical tool: assessing nGo advocacy 
Defining advocacy
Advocacy is used here as a term encompassing a range of political activities by non-violent means 
towards social change. Originally, the term referred to the representation of an affected party (client) 
by a lawyer or advocate, derived from a technical term in Roman law, ‘to call’ or ‘to voice’. Presently, 
Reflections on implications foR pRactice
231
it is a broad term which includes lobby or direct contact with policy makers and campaigning such 
as public mobilisation activities. The roles between the client and the advocate are blurred and in 
many cases affected parties undertake advocacy activities on behalf of the groups they are part of. 
Theories of change and assumptions.
An advocacy strategy will depend on the implicit or explicit theories of change of the organisations 
involved. These contain assumptions on causal-effect processes that should be as much as possible 
spelled out. ‘Success’ depends on who defines it. 
Baselines
It is basic to determine a baseline, that is, the depth of the problem, how known and contentious the 
issue is among the affected and other groups in society and existing level of awareness, knowledge 
and organisation. It is important also to assess existing policies at the start of the intervention. 
Time
Each step may take more or less time depending on social, political and economic conditions 
and factors that in most cases are beyond the control of advocates. Usually, changes in attitudes, 
behaviour and structures can only be assessed in longer time frames. 
Political and legal context
It is crucial to assess the social, political and legal context. In some societies, where there are 
no civil and political rights guaranteed, it can be difficult and dangerous to start an advocacy 
activity. The political culture, quality of democracy, legal status of NGOs and the safety of activists 
should be considered. The international context should also be assessed as there are overlapping 
and developing regional/global governance arrangements and international Human Rights law 
instruments.
Suggested indicators and assessment tools
Though these indicators are presented in a linear manner, this does not imply that changes happen 
necessarily in this order.
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1.Quality of advocacy intervention
1.1. Encoding in terms of relevance of the issue for affected communities and for society, 
with emphasis on the most disadvantaged groups. This can mostly be assessed via 
qualitative methods. 
1.2. Confidence, skills and resources among affected communities to start and sustain 
political activity (implied: gender and cultural sensitivity, inclusion of all age groups, 
etc.)
1.3. Quality of relations between advocates and affected communities, or all involved in 
advocacy effort, local/international coalitions (shared identification of problem and 
possible solutions, trust, flow of communication, coordination). This can be assessed 
via social network analysis. 
1.4. Quality of relations and dialogue between advocates and targets, public authorities or 
company, opponents or/and indifferent groups. This can be assessed via social network 
analysis. 
1.5. Problem-solving orientations and (feasible) alternative proposals. This depends on the 
complexity of the issue. 
2. Visibility of the issue: the issue becomes an issue among targeted and relevant audiences
2.1. Priority in agenda setting, assessed via public documentation. 
2.2. Changed perceptions and ‘frames’ among policy makers, assessed through survey, 
interviews, observations using discourse analysis, ideally by independent institutions.
2.3. Presence in media and public opinion of the desired message, assessed through media 
monitoring, public opinion surveys.
2.4. Number of events organised, specific units/ departments created or adopting this issue 
as part of their work.
3. Increased and improved knowledge on the issue which takes into account the perspective 
of the advocates and affected communities
3.1. Increased production and circulation of knowledge among relevant stakeholders. This 
can be assessed through availability, accessibility (in local/relevant languages and 
format) and usability of knowledge. 
3.2. Quality of knowledge produced. 
4. Changes in attitudes and policies. Increased and improved abilities and capacities among 
targeted audiences to address/solve the issue
4.1. Official statements, new or changed legislation and public policy
4.2. Capacity of state/ community to independently identify, address and solve the issue. 
This can be assessed by looking at the technical expertise and attitudes among public 
officials to deal with issue, number of resolved demands, time taken to respond to 
demands and satisfaction by users/ beneficiaries. 
5. The issue is an established issue of work in society, largely solved
5.1. Changed perceptions become the norm and the issue is not contentious any more, or 
contentious but in different ways. The issue may become marginal, opening new areas 
of work and learning.
5.2. Existence and sustainability of prevention/ conflict transformation mechanisms (e.g. 
existence of monitoring mechanism to assess whether issue becomes a problem again).
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Civil society and democratisation
The second debate is about the idea that the involvement of civil society is inherently good and that 
it helps to address the legitimacy gaps of global governance. The agreements and frameworks guiding 
the negotiations examined in this thesis contained provisions for the participation of ‘civil society and 
the private sector’. Yet, this involvement has been problematic both in the eyes of policy makers and 
in the eyes of participants. What should then be the role of civil society? My take on this debate in a 
few propositions is as follows. 
First, the quality of deliberation in invited spaces could be improved. Both policy makers need 
to clarify what they could realistic expect from these spaces, be prepared to communicate better and 
create a conducive environment for dialogue. Commonly, consultation spaces are routine exercises 
without good facilitation or a conducive atmosphere for future-oriented and constructive joint 
problem-solving. Organisations also need to prepare better so as to be able to both encode their 
messages into the language that policy makers may be able to understand, and at the same time, 
being able to challenge that language and introduce new ways of thinking and approaching issues. 
Second, civil society dialogue is useful to improve governments – citizens’ communication about 
decisions that may have important implications for societies. Yet, these are not ways to address the 
democratic deficits and legitimacy gaps of regional and global governance. The roles of national and 
regional parliamentarians should be strengthened, for example, the capacities of parliamentarians to 
monitor negotiations and oil existing accountability mechanisms or create new ones.  
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Summary
Rationale
In the past decade, transnational activism has increased around the negotiations of international 
trade agreements. With multilateral trade negotiations being stalled, the number of bilateral trade 
agreement has increased. Given the multiple implications trade agreements have in the economic 
structures of countries and their relations with the rest of the world, activists have organised across 
borders to follow these negotiations. Activists collaborate transnationally to undertake political 
actions not only in their own national political arenas but also in regional and international ones.  
Despite the growth of this phenomenon, the roles and power of transnational activism in 
trade politics have not been sufficiently and adequately studied based on the conflicting conclusions 
of existing academic studies as it is explained below. Additionally, those involved in the policy-
making process, either as state representatives or advocacy organisations, struggle to understand 
the role of transnational activism. First, policy makers adopt different attitudes to the wide range 
of demands, from reluctance to listen and indifference to openness to dialogue and involvement of 
activists in consultations. With time, civil society has entered a general discourse of participation. 
Institutional spaces have been created by states to channel demands and inputs. However, these 
participation spaces have been questioned by activists in terms of their legitimacy, inclusiveness 
and real openness to dialogue. On another level, advocates and their supporters find difficulties to 
assess their own work in terms of results: they wish to understand better how and to what extent 
their efforts reach their desired goals. 
International Relations and Political Science literature indicates transnational activism has a 
role in shaping the normative contents of global politics. In other words, activism contributes to 
determine what norms and rules are perceived as correct and proper by the international community 
(Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999; Holzscheiter, 2005).  Yet, others indicate the 
capacity of citizens’ actions to shape normative contents in areas of economic policies – and more 
specifically in trade policy - is unclear and inconclusive (e.g. Nelson and Dorsey, 2007; Gold and 
Morin, 2010, Thomas, 2002). Non-state actors in trade politics have been mostly conceptualised 
as interest-groups. The influence of these groups is related to their material capabilities, how 
well defined and defended their interests are and the relative importance of the group in the 
reproduction of the economic system. Consequently, the influence of groups which seek general 
societal aims or defend diffuse interests is limited (e.g. Dür and De Bièvre, 2007). Others argue these 
groups with general societal concerns do play a role. These groups take part in debates in the public 
sphere and engage with the several contending discourses that shape global politics (Dryzek, 2006). 
The thesis examines and explains the power of transnational activism in which different 
types of activist groups work together to affect the process and outcomes of trade negotiations. 
These groups are different in terms of the type of interests they promote: defined or concentrated 
economic interests – e.g. farmers, bussiness associations – and diffuse interests or general goals for 
societal well-being – e.g. Northern Development non-governmental organisations or private aid 
agencies. To look into the roles of both material and ideational factors, I decided to look at trade 
negotiations which included political dialogue and development dimensions. These dimensions 
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made more explicit the normative aspects of trade, cooperation and development policies in the 
context of debates on policy coherence. It made conspicuous what was considered proper state 
conduct in its different roles or identities as trade player, donor, partner or aid recipient. Choosing 
agreements among unequal partners in terms of their economic development made the normative 
dimensions become more noticeable. 
Aims and research questions
This thesis examines and explains the ways transnational activism has contributed towards shaping 
trade and development politics in the context of negotiations of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) in 
conditions of economic and political asymmetry among the negotiating parties. It is guided by the 
following main research questions: 
• How has transnational activism contributed to change the process and outcomes in the 
selected cases of free trade negotiations?
• What strategies were used by transnational activists in their attempt to affect negotiations?
• What explains the contributions of transnational activism to the process and outcomes of 
the negotiations? 
A case-oriented and comparative case approach 
Two similar cases of transnational activism were studied, but with differences in terms of their 
effects on the negotiations: one was related to the negotiation of Economic Partnership Agreements 
between the European Union and West Africa (2002-2008) and the second was related to the 
negotiations between the European Union and Central America (2007-2010) reaching an Association 
Agreement, or ‘Acuerdo de Asociación’ (AA) in 2010. While in the first case, there is evidence that 
the campaign contributed to changes in the process and content of the negotiations, in the second, 
the process and content of the negotiation evolved largely as planned by state parties. Apart from 
similarities and differences of theoretical relevance, my choice of case studies was confirmed by the 
fact that key involved organisations were open to collaborate with the research and allowed access 
to their files and meetings. 
Theoretical and methodological approach 
Transnational activism as observed in these case studies was not a sum of engaged individuals and 
organisations that shared common values as often assumed in literature. Rather, organisations 
with similar concerns worked together in a conflictive symbiosis (Del Felice, 2012a). This meant 
working together in coalition and networks but at the same time, allowing room for differences of 
approach and separate actions. There were agreements on some common actions, for example, 
some statements or days of action, or only information sharing and some level of coordination. 
Transnational activists’ actions did not translate into one issue and tidy campaign with a single 
goal or message. This is why transnational activism was conceptualised as a set of related forces, a 
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functional network of organisations that coordinated actions across borders. This conceptualisation 
implies that there was not one strategy, but rather, several coexisting strategies with some degree 
of overlap.
To capture the various characteristics and strategies of activism, power was conceptualised as 
a multilayered concept, but mainly focusing on two dimensions: its material and discursive aspects. 
Interests and material resources do have a more direct and visible effect on decisions. At the same 
time, actors interests and decisions are continously re-defined and shaped in discursive legitimation 
processes or in Doty´s words, in the ‘play of practice’ (1993).   In brief, power was observed in the 
interplay between decisional and discursive power. Networks of transnational activists are formed 
by both groups with material capabilities and defined economic interests who do have more visible 
influence on state decisions, and groups of non-material capabilities who influence the normative 
contents of debates and identities and ultimately, the context in which decisions are made. 
This conceptualisation of power helps to observe effects in outcomes (decisions) and processes 
(discursive practices as forms of communicating and making policy). 
The concept of power was operationalised with the help of the concepf of discursive 
practices. Decisions, discourses and ways of communicating were observed in discursive practices. 
These are more or less stable social practices, that is, accepted forms of acting and speaking in 
a social situation, in which points of views are expressed through the use of different texts and 
oral formats, articulation of systems of ideas and styles. Important practices analysed were the 
‘civil society dialogues’ in which governmental representatives and activists interacted. It is in 
these stable interactions where the interplay between discursive and decisional aspects could 
be observed. In the discursive practices analysed both the material and non-material capabilities 
of activists could be traced: who was able to follow meetings and mobilise in time and scale and 
whose ideas were voiced and in which ways ideas were disseminated, encoded, accepted, rejected 
or perceived. Decisions were analysed in their discursive context. This meant understanding what 
were the boundaries and scope of options for decisions created by the discursive environment. 
Analysing key events, meetings and public hearings as discursive practices allowed to analyse key 
decisions in a medium-term and historical perspective. 
Strategies and efforts of transnational activism observed in discursive practices were assessed 
by examining its mobilisation capacity, its network and coalition building capacity and its discursive 
capacity. Mobilisation capacity refers basically to the capacity to assemble human, financial and 
other resources, implement planned actions and sustain the involvement in the negotiations 
process. Network and coalition building capacity refers to the capacity to build relations at different 
levels: at local, regional and international levels, to bring together or connect different types of 
organisations (knowledge-based, constituency-based, concentrated or defined economic interests’ 
organisations or diffuse or general interest organisations) and to build relations with the negotiating 
states. Finally, discursive capacity is succinctly the capacity to build a discursive bridge to shorten 
the distance between different ways of thinking. Discursive capacity refers to the capacity to make 
a certain discourse known, used and accepted. It was assessed through the capacity to use and mix 
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different types of communicative means or genres as appropriate vis-à-vis the intended audience 
and context, the capacity to make use and shape discursive spaces, both invited/run by states or 
created new ones (Gaventa, 2006), and the capacity of persuasion.  
Data was gathered through interviews with key stakeholders, observation of activities such 
as public and internal meetings, events, and collection of materials produced by the involved states 
and organisations.
Strategies of transnational activism: composite activism
Given the fact that several strategies coexisted, the overall emerging strategy of transnational 
activism could be summarised as ‘composite transnational activism’. The term composite means 
mixed or composed of sub-parts. Activism was composite in several ways. Activists aimed to 
maximise the chance of achieving their goals pulling together resources and forging collaborations 
at various levels. First, groups acted in the North and in the South and coordinated actions across 
national borders and regions. Activists were aware of the fact that being bi-regional negotiations, if 
one country or region changed its positions the whole process would be altered. They deliberately 
took advantage of this fact. Secondly, groups adopted different advocacy approaches in terms of ways 
of acting and ways of representing economic reality. They made use of invited spaces and created new 
spaces, with more or less contentious modes. They used ties and t-shirts. Dialogue and contentious 
activism are not two mutually excluding choices; rather, they are used in combination depending on 
the moment, place and interlocutor. And thirdly, open networks and coalitions included groups of both 
concentrated and diffuse interests. The fact that these two types of groups coordinated their actions 
defied theoretical frameworks which either explained power through the weight of concentrated 
interests or explained power through the capacity to forge new normative contents through appealing 
to moral principles. 
Transnational activism contributions to changes in the negotiations
I argue that transnational activism contributed to affect negotiations by affecting the debates in the 
public sphere. These debates had weight because of the variety of groups involved, both of material 
and non-material capabilities. Debates in the public sphere – of which activism is an important 
part – and within which negotiations take place mattered for their outcomes. More specifically, 
transnational activism contributed to shape discursive practices and through them, helped to set 
the boundaries of what was considered possible and desirable in terms of decisions. The main 
example analysed was that though an ambitious agenda was proposed by the European Union, 
negotiations concentrated only in trade of goods; negotiations on services and other ‘behind the 
border issues’ remained quite contentious. 
Transnational activism contributed to continuity and changes in discursive practices in a 
number of ways. Most characteristics continued to be reproduced and maintained, notably in terms 
of ideas, the underlying assumptions about trade liberalisation was not destabilised, though some 
groups aimed at this. At the same time, the presence and actions organised by activists contributed 
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to a general diversification in genres both by states and organisations. There were deliberate efforts 
by all actors to reach out more and better to different audiences, for example, by producing more 
and different kinds of publications and media actions such as newsletters, briefing papers, flyers 
and presentations.  The issues of debate were also varied, such as the meanings of development 
and ‘development-friendly’ given that it was a South-North negotiation. Activists appealed to the 
identity of the European Union as a responsible donor and fair competitor, through engaging in 
the debate over what pro-development free trade agreements would entail. Immersed in a more 
politicised issue than expected, negotiating parties attempted to reconcile regional/ national 
economic interests and compliance to policy coherence between trade and development. It was 
in the ‘play of practice’ that activism opened spaces for change as observed in the discussion on 
Economic Partnership Agreements and World Trade Organisation compatibility. They did so helped 
by and in relation to debates on what ‘proper conduct‘ means in trade and development policies. 
Negotiating parties were encouraged to search for alternatives and it was non-state actors who led 
important search exercises of WTO-compatible alternatives. In both cases, the role of civil society 
was further institutionalised and, in the case of the Association Agreement, a bi-regional periodic 
civil society forum became part of the text of the agreement as a consultative space. 
Explaining the power of transnational activism 
Some of the most important factors mentioned by interviewees to explain power in negotiations 
coincide with those given by some scholars: it is national states’ interests, the pressure of domestic 
interest-groups and the relevance of unquestioned policy paradigms which matter. In this light, 
transnational activism may appear as irrelevant. However, these factors were not enough to explain 
the observed difference in outcomes between the two negotiations. In the two cases these factors 
were relatively similar, yet the outcomes and negotiations processes were quite different. 
I argue that transnational activism played a role in making some issues contentious and 
reinforcing the position of some critical states in both cases. In the case of EPAs, the distance 
between ECOWAS positions and West African civil society was shorter than the distance between 
state positions and activists in the case of the Association Agreement. But even if there would be 
a total coincidence of positions or no coincidence, I argue it would have been less likely that some 
states would have maintained their strong original positions without the politicisation created 
around the negotiations and the additional studies and materials provided to their negotiating 
teams. 
It is then a combination of causes which explains the contributions of transnational activism to 
the process: bi-regional functional networks were organised in time and scale and had the discursive 
capacity to encode demands so that they would resound as feasible and proper conduct for some of 
the negotiating states. Messages were centered on the suitability of trade liberalisation to promote 
sustainable development, thus, safeguarding the national interests of developing countries to 
integrate into the world economy. Involving relevant economic domestic groups in the campaigns 
helped to increase the legitimacy of the demands before policy makers. This was especially the 
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case of West Africa where small-scale famers had a key role. They were heard and taken seriously 
as millions of livelihoods depend on their economic activities. The proposals were framed within 
an overall pro-development policy paradigm, supported by commitments of policy coherence and 
protection of human rights. The terms of the debate were shaped and the boundaries of what 
could be negotiated were expanded through appealing to already existing principles of flexibility 
within the multilateral trade system. At the same time, the general discourse of civil society as 
an important actor created opportunities for access to information and consultation spaces that 
facilitated communication.  
In brief, the role transnational activism played can be explained through the ways that networks 
profit from opportunities in the context of negotiations. Using opportunities means aggregating 
interests and mobilising groups by shortening distances among different ideas and arguments for or 
against proposed decisions. In this way, transnational activism contributes to shape the boundaries 
of what is possible and perceived as proper conduct in terms of decisions. 
Conclusions 
The implications of these findings are manifold. For International Relations and Political Science 
theory the main implication is that the effects of this type of transnational activism can be best 
seen through an analytical framework which captures both changes in decisions and in the small 
– and often less visible – changes in the discursive context making some decisions possible, and 
others not. The power of transnational activism in trade politics is thus only observable in the 
interplay between changes in discourses and changes in behaviour. Discursive practices shape what 
is possible in terms of decisions. Both interests and norms matter and are inextricably linked. My 
analysis reinforces the complementarities of liberal/pluralist and social constructivist approaches. 
The main implication for the democratising efforts in trade politics is that transnational activism 
contributes by creating spaces and tools for reflexivity and politicisation. If all political parties and 
groups think alike or have no qualitatively different proposals, representative democratic channels 
and elections become less relevant. The improvement in the quality of debate and the search of 
robust future-oriented alternative proposals are as important as improving citizen participation 
spaces and access to information.
Finally, this thesis aimed to contribute to a better understanding of the role and power of 
transnational activism. It is hoped that these reflections are useful for both policy makers and those 
involved as activists or supporting them. It is ultimately up to them and their constituencies to 
define what success means in their efforts to promote social justice, development and fairer trade 
relations. 
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samenvatting
Grondgedachte
In de afgelopen tien jaar is transnationaal activisme rond de onderhandelingen van vrijhandelsover-
eenkomsten toegenomen. Op het moment dat multilaterale handelsonderhandelingen in het slop 
zijn geraakt, is het aantal bilaterale handelsovereenkomsten toegenomen. Gezien de meervoudige 
implicaties die handelsovereenkomsten hebben op de economische structuren van landen en hun 
relaties met de rest van de wereld, hebben activisten zich over de landsgrenzen heen georganiseerd 
om deze onderhandelingen te kunnen volgen. Activisten werken transnationaal samen om politieke 
acties te ondernemen, niet alleen in hun eigen nationale politieke arena’s, maar ook in regionale 
en internationale. 
Ondanks de groei van dit fenomeen zijn de rollen en de macht van transnationaal activisme 
in handelspolitiek niet voldoende en adequaat onderzocht, op basis ook de van conflicterende 
conclusies van bestaand wetenschappelijk onderzoek, zoals in hieronder zal worden uitgelegd. 
Ook hebben diegenen die betrokken zijn bij het beleidsproces, zoals de vertegenwoordigers van 
de staat of ‘advocacy’ organisaties, moeite om de rol van transnationaal activisme te begrijpen. 
Ten eerste nemen beleidsmakers verschillende houdingen aan ten opzichte van de uitgebreide 
optelsom aan eisen, van tegenzin om te luisteren en onverschilligheid wat tot aan openheid om 
de dialoog aan te gaan en om activisten te betrekken bij de besprekingen. In de loop van de tijd 
heeft het maatschappelijk middenveld een algemeen discours van participatie aangenomen. 
Institutionele ruimte is gecreëerd door staten om eisen en input te kanaliseren. Deze ruimtes voor 
participatie zijn echter ter discussie gesteld door activisten wat betreft hun legitimiteit, inclusiviteit 
en daadwerkelijke openheid voor dialoog. Activisten en hun supporters daarentegen komen 
moeilijkheden tegen in het beoordelen van hun eigen werk op resultaten: zij willen beter begrijpen 
hoe en tot welke hoogte hun inspanningen de gewenste doelen bereiken.
Literatuur op het gebied van Internationale Betrekkingen en Politieke Wetenschappen geeft 
aan dat transnationaal activisme een rol speelt bij het vormgeven van de normatieve inhoud van 
wereldpolitiek. Met andere woorden, activisme draagt bij aan het vaststellen welke normen en 
regels als correct en passend worden beschouwd door de internationale gemeenschap (Keck en 
Sikkink, 1998, Risse, Ropp en Sikkink, 1999; Holzscheiter, 2005). Toch geven ook anderen aan dat 
de capaciteit van burgers om de normatieve inhoud vorm te geven op het gebied van economisch 
beleid – en meer specifiek handelsbeleid – onduidelijk en niet overtuigend is (bijvoorbeeld Nelson 
en Dorsey, 2007; Gold en Morin, 2010, Thomas, 2002). Niet-statelijke actoren in de handelspolitiek 
worden doorgaans gedefinieerd als belangengroeperingen. De invloed van deze groeperingen is 
gerelateerd aan hun materiële mogelijkheden, hoe goed hun belangen zijn gedefinieerd en worden 
verdedigd, en het relatieve belang van de groepering voor de reproductie van het economisch 
systeem. Als gevolg daarvan is de invloed van groeperingen die algemene maatschappelijke doelen 
vertegenwoordigen of diffuse belangen verdedigen beperkt (bijvoorbeeld Dür en De Bièvre, 2007). 
Andere auteurs beargumenteren dat deze groeperingen met hun algemene maatschappelijke 
belangen wel degelijk een rol spelen. Deze groeperingen nemen deel aan debatten in de publieke 
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sfeer en engageren zich bezig via verscheidene tegenstrijdige discoursen die de wereldpolitiek 
vormgeven (Dryzek, 2006).
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt en verklaart de macht van transnationaal activisme, waarin 
verschillende soorten activistische groeperingen samenwerken om het proces en de resultaten 
van handelsonderhandelingen te beïnvloeden. Deze groeperingen verschillen wat betreft het soort 
belangen dat zij verdedigen: vastgestelde of geconcentreerde economische belangen – bijvoorbeeld 
boeren of zakelijke verenigingen – en diffuse belangen of algemene doelen voor maatschappelijk 
welzijn – bijvoorbeeld Noordelijke niet-gouvernementele ontwikkelingsorganisaties of particuliere 
hulporganisaties. Om de rollen van zowel materiële als ideële factoren te bestuderen, heb ik besloten 
om te kijken naar handelsonderhandelingen die politieke dialoog en ontwikkelingsdimensies 
bevatten. Deze dimensies maken de meer normatieve aspecten van handels-, samenwerkings- en 
ontwikkelingsbeleid expliciet, in de context ook van de debatten over coherentie van beleid. Deze 
debatten hebben een ander licht geworpen op wat passend staatsgedrag is bij de verschillende 
rollen of identiteiten als handelsspeler, donor, partner of hulpontvanger die staten hebben. Het 
kiezen van overeenkomsten tussen partners die ongelijk zijn in economische ontwikkeling, heeft de 
normatieve dimensies meer zichtbaar gemaakt. 
Doel en onderzoeksvragen
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt en verklaart de manieren waarop transnationaal activisme heeft 
bijgedragen aan het vormgeven van handels- en ontwikkelingspolitiek in de context van 
onderhandelingen over Vrijhandelsovereenkomsten (FTAs) in situaties van economische en politieke 
asymmetrie tussen de onderhandelende partijen. Het onderzoek werd geleid door de volgende 
hoofdvragen:
• Hoe heeft transnationaal activisme bijgedragen aan het veranderen van het proces en de 
resultaten in de geselecteerde casussen van vrijhandelsonderhandelingen?
• Welke strategieën werden gebruikt door transnationale activisten in hun poging om 
onderhandelingen te beïnvloeden?
• Wat verklaart de bijdragen van transnationaal activisme aan het proces en de resultaten 
van de onderhandelingen?
Een casus-georiënteerde en vergelijkende casusbenadering
Twee vergelijkbare casussen van transnationaal activisme zijn onderzocht, maar met verschillen wat 
betreft hun invloed op de onderhandelingen: de één was gerelateerd aan de onderhandeling over 
de Economische Partnerschapsovereenkomsten (EPAs) tussen de Europese Unie en West-Afrika 
(2002-2008) en de tweede was gerelateerd aan de onderhandelingen tussen de Europese Unie en 
Midden-Amerika (2007-2010) die een Associatie Overeenkomst, of ‘Acuerdo de Asociación’ (AA) 
bereikten in 2010. Terwijl er in de eerste casus een bewijs is dat de campagne heeft bijgedragen aan 
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veranderingen in het proces en de inhoud van de onderhandelingen, ontwikkelden het proces en de 
inhoud van de onderhandeling in de tweede casus zich grotendeels zoals gepland door de statelijke 
deelnemers. Afgezien van overeenkomsten en verschillen in theoretisch relevantie, werd mijn keuze 
van case studies bevestigd door het feit dat de belangrijkste betrokken organisaties openstonden 
voor medewerking met het onderzoek en mij toegang gaven tot hun documenten en vergaderingen. 
Theoretische en Methodologische Benadering
Transnationaal activisme, zoals dit geobserveerd is in deze case studies, was geen optelsom van 
betrokken individuen en organisaties die gemeenschappelijke waarden deelden, zoals vaak 
aangenomen wordt in literatuur. Organisaties met soortgelijke belangen werkten meer samen 
in een botsende symbiose (Del Felice, 2012a). Dit betekende samenwerken in een coalitie en 
netwerken, maar tegelijkertijd ruimte toestaan voor verschillen in benadering en afzonderlijke 
acties. Er waren overeenkomsten over sommige gemeenschappelijke handelingen, bijvoorbeeld 
sommige verklaringen of actiedagen, of alleen het delen van informatie en een bepaald niveau van 
coördinatie. De acties van transnationale activisten vertaalden zich niet in een one issue campagne 
of een nette campagne met één enkel doel of één enkele boodschap. Daarom is transnationaal 
activisme hier geconceptualiseerd als een samenstel van aan elkaar gerelateerde krachten, een 
functioneel netwerk van organisaties dat acties over landsgrenzen heen coördineerde. Deze 
conceptualisatie impliceert dat er niet één strategie was, maar juist verscheidene, naast elkaar 
bestaande strategieën met een zekere mate van overlap. 
Om de verschillende kenmerken en strategieën van activisme te omvatten, werd macht 
gedefinieerd als een concept met meerdere lagen, maar hoofdzakelijk gericht op twee dimensies: 
zijn materiële en discursieve aspecten. Belangen en materiële hulpbronnen hebben wel een meer 
direct en zichtbaar effect op beslissingen. Tegelijkertijd worden de belangen en beslissingen van 
actoren doorlopend opnieuw gedefinieerd en gevormd in discursieve rechtvaardigingsprocessen, 
of in Doty’s woorden, in het “praktijkspel” (1993). Kortom, macht werd geobserveerd in de 
wisselwerking tussen besluitende en discursieve macht. Netwerken van transnationale activisten 
worden gevormd door zowel groepen met materiële mogelijkheden en vastgestelde economische 
belangen die een meer zichtbare invloed hebben op besluiten van staten, als door groepen met 
niet-materiële middelen die de normatieve inhoud van debatten en identiteiten beïnvloeden en 
uiteindelijk de context waarbinnen beslissingen worden genomen. Deze definiëring van macht helpt 
om de effecten in resultaten (beslissingen) en processen (discursieve praktijken als vormen van 
communicatie en beleidsvorming) te observeren. 
Het concept macht werd gedefinieerd aan de hand van het concept discursieve praktijken. 
Beslissingen, discoursen en communicatiewijzen werden geobserveerd in discursieve praktijken. Dit 
zijn min of meer stabiele sociale praktijken, oftewel geaccepteerde vormen van handelen en spreken 
in een sociale situatie, waarbinnen perspectieven worden uitgedrukt door middel van het gebruik 
van verschillende teksten en mondelinge uitingen, de articulatie van systemen van ideeën en stijlen. 
Belangrijke praktijken die geanalyseerd zijn, waren de “maatschappelijk middenvelddialogen” [Civil 
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Society Dialogues] waar overheidsvertegenwoordigers en activisten elkaar troffen. Het is binnen 
deze stabiele interacties waar de wisselwerking tussen discursieve en besluitmatige aspecten van 
macht geobserveerd kon worden. Binnen de geanalyseerde discursieve praktijken konden zowel 
de materiële als de non-materiële middelen van activisten getraceerd worden: wie was in staat 
om vergaderingen te volgen en qua tijd en schaal zaken te mobiliseren, en waarvan ideeën werden 
verwoord en op welke manieren werden ideeën verspreid, gecodeerd, geaccepteerd, verworpen of 
begrepen. Beslissingen werden geanalyseerd in hun discursieve context. Dit betekende het begrijpen 
van de grenzen en het bereik van beschikbare opties voor beslissingen die gecreëerd waren door 
de discursieve omgeving. Het analyseren van de belangrijkste gebeurtenissen, vergaderingen en 
publieke hoorzittingen als discursieve praktijken gaf de mogelijkheid om de belangrijkste beslissingen 
te analyseren vanuit een middellange termijn en historisch perspectief.
Strategieën en pogingen van transnationaal activisme die geobserveerd waren in discursieve 
praktijken, werden beoordeeld door het bestuderen van de capaciteit om te mobiliseren, de 
capaciteit om te netwerken en coalities te vormen en de discursieve capaciteit. Capaciteit om te 
mobiliseren verwijst in feite naar de capaciteit om menselijke, financiële en andere hulpbronnen 
bij elkaar te brengen, om geplande acties te implementeren en om de betrokkenheid bij het 
onderhandelingsproces vol te houden. De capaciteit om te netwerken en coalities te vormen 
verwijst naar de capaciteit om relaties te vormen op verschillende niveaus: op lokale, regionale en 
internationale niveaus, om verschillende soorten organisaties samen te brengen of te verbinden 
(op kennis gebaseerde, op kiezers gebaseerde, geconcentreerde of gedefinieerde economische 
belangenorganisaties of diffuse of algemene belangenorganisaties) en om relaties te vormen met 
de onderhandelende staten. Ten slotte is discursieve capaciteit kort gezegd de capaciteit om een 
discursieve brug te bouwen om de afstand tussen verschillende denkwijzen te verkleinen. Discursieve 
capaciteit verwijst naar de capaciteit om een specifiek discours bekend, gebruikt en geaccepteerd te 
maken. Het werd beoordeeld op de capaciteit om verschillende soorten communicatiemiddelen of 
–genres te gebruiken en mengen, aangepast aan het beoogde publiek en aan de context; tevens op 
de capaciteit om gebruik te maken van en vorm te geven aan discursieve ruimtes, zowel die waartoe 
staten uitnodigen of die zij beheren als nieuw gecreëerde ruimtes (Gaventa, 2006); en tenslotte op 
de capaciteit om te overtuigen. 
Data werden verzameld door interviews met de voornaamste stakeholders, door observatie 
van activiteiten zoals openbare en interne vergaderingen, bijeenkomsten, en de verzameling van 
documentatie die geproduceerd werd door de betrokken staten en organisaties.
Strategieën in transnationaal activisme: samengesteld activisme
Gezien het feit dat verschillende strategieën naast elkaar bestonden, zou de algehele, zo 
verschijnende strategie van transnationaal activisme kunnen worden samengevat als “samengesteld 
transnationaal activisme”. De term samengesteld betekent gemengd of samengesteld uit sub-
onderdelen. Activisme werd op verschillende manieren samengesteld. Activisten probeerden 
de kans om hun doelen te bereiken te maximaliseren door hulpbronnen te verzamelen en 
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samenwerking te smeden op verschillende niveaus. Ten eerste handelden groepen in het Noorden 
en Zuiden en coördineerden ze acties die nationale grenzen en regio’s overstegen. Activisten waren 
zich bewust van het feit dat het hele proces veranderd zou worden als één land of regio zijn of haar 
positie zou veranderen, aangezien het bi-regionale onderhandelingen waren. Zij maakten hier met 
opzet gebruik van. 
Ten tweede gebruikten groeperingen verschillende manieren van advocacy bij hun handelen 
en bij manieren om de economische realiteit te verbeelden. Ze maakten gebruik van ruimtes war 
ze uitgenodigd waren, maar ze ook creëerden nieuwe ruimtes, op min of meer controversiële 
manier. Ze gebruikten stropdassen en T-shirts. Dialoog en confronterend activisme zijn niet twee 
onverenigbare keuzes; ze worden eerder gecombineerd gebruikt, afhankelijk van het moment, de 
plaats en de gesprekspartner. En ten derde omvatten open netwerken en coalities groeperingen met 
zowel geconcentreerde als diffuse belangen. Het feit dat deze twee soorten groeperingen hun acties 
coördineerden, plaatst vraagtekens bij die theoretische ideeën die macht en invloed of verklaren 
vanuit het gewicht van geconcentreerde belangen of vanuit de capaciteit om nieuwe normatieve 
inhouden te smeden door een beroep te doen op morele principes. 
De bijdragen van transnationaal activisme aan veranderingen in de onderhandelingen
Ik beargumenteer dat transnationaal activisme heeft bijgedragen aan het beïnvloeden van 
onderhandelingen door debatten in de publieke sfeer te beïnvloeden. Deze debatten waren van 
invloed vanwege de variëteit van betrokken groepen, zowel die met materiële als non-materiële 
belangen. Debatten in de publieke sfeer – waarvan activisme een belangrijk onderdeel is – en 
waarbinnen onderhandelingen plaatsvinden, waren van betekenis voor de uiteindelijke resultaten. 
Het transnationaal activisme heeft in het bijzonder bijgedragen aan het vormen van discursieve 
praktijken en dit heeft weer geholpen om de grenzen te stellen en bij te stellen aan wat als 
mogelijk en wenselijk werd beschouwd bij uiteindelijke beslissingen. Het belangrijkste voorbeeld 
dat we geanalyseerd hebben, was dat, hoewel er een ambitieuze agenda was voorgesteld door 
de Europese Unie, de onderhandelingen zich alleen concentreerden op de handel van goederen; 
onderhandelingen over dienstensector en andere “achter de grens zaken” [behind the border 
issues] bleven zeer controversieel.  
Transnationaal activisme heeft bijgedragen aan continuïteit en veranderingen in discursieve 
praktijken op een aantal manieren. De meeste karakteristieken van het handelsdebat bleven 
onveranderd en gehandhaafd, vooral de onderliggende aannames over handelsliberalisme werden 
niet gedestabiliseerd, hoewel sommige groeperingen dat wel als doel hadden. Tegelijkertijd hebben 
de aanwezigheid van activisten en door hen georganiseerde acties bijgedragen aan een algemene 
diversificatie van de genres waarin gecommuniceerd werd, zowel van de zijde van staten als van 
organisaties. Er waren bewuste pogingen door alle actoren om verschillende soorten van publiek 
meer en beter te bereiken, bijvoorbeeld door meer en verschillende soorten publicaties te produceren 
en media-activiteiten te ondernemen, zoals nieuwsbrieven, briefing papers en presentaties. 
De debatonderwerpen waren ook gevarieerd, zoals wat de betekenis is van “ontwikkeling” en 
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“ontwikkelingsvriendelijk” omdat het om een Noord-Zuid onderhandeling ging. Activisten deden een 
beroep op de identiteit van de Europese Unie als een verantwoordelijke donor en eerlijke deelnemer, 
door zich te mengen in het debat over wat pro-ontwikkeling vrijhandelsovereenkomsten zouden 
kunnen inhouden. Terecht gekomen in een meer gepolitiseerde onderhandeling dan verwacht, 
probeerden onderhandelende partijen regionale/nationale economische belangen te verzoenen en 
trouw te zijn aan het principe van coherentie van beleid op het vlak handel en ontwikkeling. Het 
was in het “praktijkspel” dat activisme ruimtes opende voor verandering, zoals geobserveerd kan 
worden in de discussie over de Economische Partnerschapsovereenkomsten en hun compatibiliteit 
met de regels van de Wereld Handelsorganisatie (WTO). Activisten werden daarbij geholpen door de 
debatten over wat “gepast gedrag” betekent in handels- en ontwikkelingsbeleid. Onderhandelende 
partijen werden aangemoedigd om naar alternatieven te zoeken en het waren niet-statelijke 
actoren die zoekexercities leidden naar alternatieven die compatibel zijn met de WTO regels. In 
beide gevallen werd de rol van het maatschappelijk middenveld verder geïnstitutionaliseerd en 
in het geval van de Associatie Overeenkomsten werd een bi-regionaal periodiek maatschappelijk 
middenveld forum onderdeel van de tekst van de overeenkomst als een consultatieve ruimte. 
het verklaren van de macht van transnationaal activisme
Een aantal van de meest belangrijke factoren om macht in onderhandelingen te verklaren die 
door geïnterviewden genoemd zijn, vallen samen met factoren die worden beschreven door 
sommige wetenschappers: het zijn de belangen van nationale staten, de druk van binnenlandse 
belangengroeperingen en de relevantie van niet ter discussie gestelde beleidsparadigma’s die van 
belang zijn. In dit licht zou transnationaal activisme irrelevant kunnen lijken. Deze factoren waren 
echter niet genoeg om het geobserveerde verschil in uitkomsten tussen de twee onderhandelingen 
te verklaren. In de twee bestudeerde gevallen waren deze factoren min of meer gelijk, maar de 
uitkomsten en onderhandelingsprocessen waren zeer verschillend. 
Ik stel dat transnationaal activisme een rol heeft gespeeld bij het controversieel maken van 
sommige kwesties en het versterken van de positie van sommige kritische staten in beide gevallen. 
In het geval van Economische Partnerschapsovereenkomsten was de afstand tussen posities van 
ECOWAS en het West-Afrikaanse maatschappelijke middenveld kleiner dan de afstand tussen posities 
van de regeringen en activisten in het geval van de Associatie Overeenkomst. Maar ik durf te stellen 
dat - zelfs als de posities volledig zouden zijn samen gevallen of juist helemaal niet overeenkwamen 
- het minder waarschijnlijk is dat sommige staten hun sterke oorspronkelijke posities zouden 
hebben gehandhaafd, als er niet de politisering gecreëerd was rondom de onderhandelingen en 
hun onderhandelende teams niet zodoende extra onderzoeken en documentatie hadden gekregen. 
Het is een combinatie van oorzaken die de bijdragen van transnationaal activisme aan het 
proces verklaart: bi-regionale functionele netwerken werden op tijd georganiseerd en zij hadden 
de discursieve capaciteit om eisen te coderen, die zowel haalbaar klonken en stuurden op “gepast 
gedrag” [Proper Conduct] voor sommige van de onderhandelende staten. Uitgaande berichten 
concentreerden zich op de geschiktheid van handelsliberalisatie om duurzame ontwikkeling 
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te bevorderen, en zodoende nationale belangen van ontwikkelingslanden te beschermen bij 
hun integratie in de wereldeconomie. Het betrekken van relevante economische binnenlandse 
groeperingen bij de campagnes hielp om de legitimiteit van de eisen voor beleidsmakers te doen 
toenemen. Dit was in het bijzonder het geval in West-Afrika waar kleinschalige boeren een sleutelrol 
hadden. Zij werden gehoord en serieus genomen aangezien miljoenen voor hun levensonderhoud 
afhankelijk zijn van hun economische activiteiten. De voorstellen werden vormgegeven binnen een 
algemeen pro-ontwikkeling beleidsparadigma, gesteund door de beloftes betreffende coherentie van 
beleid en bescherming van mensenrechten. De termen van het debat werden vorm gegeven en de 
grenzen van waar over onderhandeld kon worden werden uitgebreid door een beroep te doen op al 
bestaande principes van flexibiliteit binnen het multilaterale handelssysteem. Tegelijkertijd creëerde 
het algemene discours van het maatschappelijk middenveld, als een belangrijke actor, kansen voor 
toegang tot informatie en ruimtes voor besprekingen die communicatie vergemakkelijkte. 
Kortom, de rol die transnationaal activisme speelde kan verklaard worden door de manieren 
waarop netwerken profiteren van kansen in de context van onderhandelingen. Kansen gebruiken 
betekent belangen verzamelen en groepen mobiliseren door afstanden tussen verschillende 
ideeën en argumenten voor of tegen voorgestelde besluiten te verkleinen. Op deze manier draagt 
transnationaal activisme bij aan het vormen van de grenzen van wat mogelijk is en beschouwd 
wordt als “gepast gedrag” in termen van beslissingen. 
Conclusies
De implicaties van deze bevindingen zijn meervoudig. De belangrijkste implicatie voor theorie 
van Internationale Betrekkingen en Politieke Wetenschappen is dat de effecten van dit type 
transnationaal activisme het beste gezien kan worden door een analytisch raamwerk dat zowel 
veranderingen omvat in besluiten als in de kleine – en vaak minder zichtbare – veranderingen in 
de discursieve context die sommige beslissingen mogelijk maken, en andere niet. De macht van 
transnationaal activisme in handelspolitiek is dus alleen te observeren in de wisselwerking tussen 
veranderingen in discoursen en veranderingen in gedrag. Discursieve praktijken geven vorm aan 
wat mogelijk is in termen van beslissingen. Zowel belangen als normen zijn van betekenis en zijn 
onlosmakelijk met elkaar verbonden. Mijn analyse versterkt de complementariteit van liberaal/
pluralistische en sociaal constructivistische benaderingen.
De belangrijkste implicatie voor de pogingen om de internationale handelspolitiek te 
democratiseren is dat transnationaal activisme daaraan bijdraagt door het creëren van ruimtes 
en gereedschappen voor reflexiviteit en politisering. Als alle politiek partijen en groeperingen 
hetzelfde denken of geen kwalitatief verschillende voorstellen hebben, worden representatieve 
democratische kanalen en verkiezingen minder relevant. Even belangrijk als het verbeteren van 
ruimtes voor burgerparticipatie of toegang tot informatie is ook de verbetering van de kwaliteit van 
debat en het zoeken naar robuuste, toekomstgeoriënteerde alternatieve voorstellen. 
Ten slotte heeft dit proefschrift tot doel gehad om bij te dragen aan een beter begrip van de 
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rol en macht van transnationaal activisme. Het is te hopen dat deze reflecties nuttig zijn voor zowel 
beleidsmakers als zij die betrokken zijn als activisten of hen steunen. Het is uiteindelijk aan hen en 
hun achterban om te definiëren wat succes betekent in hun pogingen om sociale rechtvaardigheid, 
ontwikkeling en eerlijkere handelsrelaties te stimuleren. 
[Vertaling: Annemaaike Kruisselbrink en Paul Hoebink]
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Activists challenging free trade agreements are often portrayed as T-shirt 
wearing, banner-toting demonstrators at high level negotiation events. Is this 
picture accurate? Do negotiators listen? And if they do, how do they react? 
This study illustrates how activists can exercise power when trade negotiations 
involve bi-regional North-South politics. It explains the contributions of 
transnational activism to the process and outcomes of negotiations and 
how activism impacts the definition of the options open to the negotiators.  
Two sets of negotiations were examined, those between the European Union 
and countries of West Africa and Central America in the periods of 2003-2009 
and 2007-2010.
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